Middleton v. Vasquez
| Decision Date | 01 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 19-1182 GBW/GJF |
| Parties | KENNETH SHEA MIDDLETON, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL VASQUEZ, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Complaint and for Qualified Immunity. Doc. 4. Having reviewed the Motion and the attendant briefing (docs. 4, 13, 14), and being otherwise fully advised regarding relevant case law, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant City of Carlsbad d/b/a Carlsbad Police Department, DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Defendants Daniel Vasquez and Israel Rodriguez, and DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
This case arises from Plaintiff's arrest on May 25, 2018, for allegedly obstructive conduct during a traffic stop in which Plaintiff was a passenger. On December 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violation of his constitutional rights by all Defendants. Doc. 1. In Count 1, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Vasquez searched, arrested, and maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶¶ 30-38. In Count 2, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rodriguez violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by failing to intervene to prevent Defendant Vasquez's violation. Id. at ¶¶ 39-44. In Count 3, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of Carlsbad violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by failing to adequately supervise and train its officers, including Defendants Vasquez and Rodriguez, regarding citizens' constitutional rights and New Mexico's criminal statutes. Id. at ¶¶ 45-50.
On February 6, 2020, in lieu of an answer, Defendants filed the present motion, seeking dismissal of all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the alternative, Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims based on qualified immunity. On February 12, 2020, Defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay the proceedings, including discovery. Doc. 6. Consequently, all discovery and proceedings have been stayed pending the outcome of the present motion. Doc. 10.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Leverington v. City of Colorado Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). This standarddoes not require "detailed factual allegations," but it does require more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must "assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Leverington, 643 F.3d at 723 (quoting Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009)). However, the court need not accept the truth of any legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Rather, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). The complaint must only be "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555. However, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In other words, the well-pleaded facts must "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct"; otherwise, the plaintiff has not shown entitlement to relief. Id. at 679.
On a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, courts must consider both (1) whether the facts alleged "make out a violation of a constitutional right," and (2) whether "the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." Leverington, 643 F.3d at 732 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). The plaintiff carries the "heavy two-part burden." Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). The Court need not answer these questions sequentially but may use its "sound discretion" in determining which prong to address first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (2009).
Although the Twombly standard may sometimes have "greater bite" in the qualified immunity context, the complaint need not include "all the factual allegations necessary to sustain a conclusion that defendant violated clearly established law." Robbins v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Instead, the operative question is whether the plaintiff has "plead factual matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that [defendants] deprived him of his clearly established constitutional rights." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), this Court must "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of showing "that there is an absence of evidence tosupport the nonmoving party's case." Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). Once the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party is required to designate specific facts showing that "there are . . . genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Notably, however, summary judgment motions based upon the defense of qualified immunity are reviewed differently from other summary judgment motions. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009). "When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established." Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009)). This is a "strict two-part test" that must be met before the defendant asserting qualified immunity again "bear[s] the traditional burden of the movant for summary judgment—showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nelson v. McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). The Court may address the two prongs of the test in any order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
"Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). While it is not necessary to identify a case with identical facts, "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts "not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality." City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)). General principles "do not by themselves create clearly established law outside 'an obvious case.'" White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2018) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)). The test is whether the "right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it." Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1153 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014)).
In determining whether the plaintiff has met his or her burden to overcome a qualified immunity defense, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007). In so doing, the Court must keep in mind three principles. First, the Court's role is not to weigh the evidence, but to assess the threshold issue of whether a genuine issue existsas to material facts requiring a trial. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Second, the Court must resolve all reasonable inferences and doubts and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 550-54 (1999). Third, the court cannot decide any issues of credibility. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. "[T]o survive the . . . motion, [the nonmovant] need only present evidence from which a jury might...
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