Midland Funding LLC v. Sotolongo

• Decision Date: 24 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 20120381–CA.,20120381–CA.
• Citation: 759 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,325 P.3d 871
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals
• Parties: MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Daniel SOTOLONGO, Defendant, Third-party Plaintiff, and Appellant, v. Johnson Mark, LLC; Brad J. Clark; Jacob H.B. Franklin; and William A. Mark, Third-party Defendants and Appellees.

325 P.3d 871

759 Utah Adv. Rep. 16

MIDLAND FUNDING LLC, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Daniel SOTOLONGO, Defendant, Third-party Plaintiff, and Appellant,

v.Johnson Mark, LLC; Brad J. Clark; Jacob H.B. Franklin; and William A. Mark, Third-party Defendants and Appellees.

No. 20120381–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

April 24, 2014.

Brian W. Steffensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

S. Grace Acosta and Jonathan H. Rupp, Salt Lake City, for Appellees. Johnson Mark, LLC, Draper; Brad J. Clark; Jacob H.B. Franklin, Draper; and William A. Mark, Salt Lake City, Christopher J. Rogers, Draper, for Appellee Midland Funding LLC.

Judge MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in which Judges J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶ 1 Daniel Sotolongo appeals from the district court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Midland Funding LLC (Midland) and its attorneys on a breach of contract claim brought by Midland and multiple consumer-law claims brought by Sotolongo. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the district court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This case arises from Midland's attempts to collect a credit card debt. On September 22, 2010, Midland filed a debt-collection complaint against Sotolongo alleging breach of a credit contract and seeking the amount owed on the credit account plus interest and attorney fees as provided for in the contract. By way of response, on October 14, Sotolongo filed a letter pro se with the district court. In that letter, Sotolongo denied that he owed the debt and made various demands on Midland for information relating to the credit account.¹ On October 20, Midland filed a default certificate with the district court because Sotolongo's time to file an answer had expired. The district court denied Midland's request for a default, treating Sotolongo's letter as an answer to Midland's complaint. On that date, Midland also filed a certificate of service for a set of discovery requests it had mailed to Sotolongo on October 19.

¶ 3 Sotolongo failed to timely respond to Midland's discovery requests and did not request a protective order from the district court prior to the expiration of his time to respond to the requests. On December 1, 2010, Sotolongo filed a letter asking the district court to order that he not be required to respond to discovery until Midland responded to the demands in his October 14 letter. Sotolongo did not submit that request for decision, and the district court did not issue an order excusing Sotolongo from responding to Midland's discovery requests. On December 23, 2010, Midland moved for summary judgment on the basis of Sotolongo's failure to deny Midland's requests for admission that, if deemed admitted, established the essential elements of Midland's breach of contract claim.

¶ 4 On February 14, 2011, counsel for Sotolongo entered an appearance with the district court and requested leave to amend Sotolongo's pro se answer. On March 28, in light of Sotolongo's prior lack of representation, the district court denied Midland's motion for summary judgment and allowed Sotolongo ten days to amend his answer, respond to Midland's discovery requests, and prepare discovery requests of his own. Sotolongo's amended answer added Midland's counsel—Johnson Mark, LLC and attorneys Brad J. Clark, Jacob H.B. Franklin, and William A. Mark (collectively, Johnson Mark)—as third-party defendants, alleging various violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA) against Johnson Mark (the Consumer Claims).

¶ 5 On July 13, 2011, Midland filed a second motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim. Sotolongo filed three motions for an enlargement of time to respond, the latest of which provided for a due date of September 2, 2011. Sotolongo did not file a timely opposition to Midland's motion. On August 29, he filed his own motion for summary judgment on the Consumer Claims. That motion was accompanied by a “sworn verification” by Sotolongo of the factual assertions made in the supporting memorandum. Johnson Mark filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the Consumer Claims, and Sotolongo filed an opposition and reply memorandum in support of his own motion on those claims. On October 16, Sotolongo filed a “supplemental memorandum” in opposition to Midland's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim. Midland filed an objection and motion to strike the memorandum as untimely and filed without leave of court.

¶ 6 A hearing on all pending motions was held on February 16, 2012. After the hearing, Sotolongo filed a “post hearing memorandum and motion to amend to conform to the evidence.” Johnson Mark moved to strike the memorandum as filed without leave of court. In its March 19 Ruling and Order on the parties' outstanding motions, the district court granted Midland's motions to strike Sotolongo's supplemental memorandum and posthearing memorandum, concluding that Sotolongo's memoranda were filed without leave of the court and could not be considered in deciding the remaining issues. The district court granted Midland's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, explaining that Sotolongo's motion for summary judgment on the Consumer Claims did not address the factual assertions and issues raised by Midland's motion and therefore had not adequately opposed it. The court also granted Johnson Mark's motion for summary judgment on the Consumer Claims on the merits and denied Sotolongo's motion for summary judgment on those claims.

¶ 7 The district court then directed Midland to prepare an affidavit of attorney fees, which Midland submitted on April 9, 2012. The district court entered judgment awarding Midland attorney fees on April 11. Thereafter, Sotolongo filed a rule 60(b) motion asking the district court to set aside the judgment, arguing both that attorney fees were not authorized and that the district court's ruling was premature because Sotolongo was entitled to five days to respond to Midland's affidavit of attorney fees. Sotolongo also argued that the district court had erred in granting summary judgment and requested that the district court set aside its summary judgment ruling. The district court denied Sotolongo's motion. Sotolongo then timely appealed from the district court's April 11 judgment.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Sotolongo first challenges the district court's grant of Midland's motion to strike his supplemental memorandum. “Motions to strike pleadings or parts thereof are addressed to the judgment and discretion of the trial court.” Francis v. State, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 19, 321 P.3d 1089 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We review a district court's ruling on a motion to strike a pleading for an abuse of that discretion. Id.

¶ 9 Sotolongo next argues that the district court erred in granting Midland's and Johnson Mark's motions for summary judgment and denying his own motion for summary judgment. “[W]e review a district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, considering only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 10 Last, Sotolongo argues that the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to Midland prior to the expiration of his time to object to the order awarding those fees. Where proceedings are governed by an established rule of procedure, we review the district court's interpretation and application of the rule for correctness. Edwards v. Powder Mountain Water & Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, ¶ 14, 214 P.3d 120. However, where no rule of procedure limits the district court's authority, we must determine whether the district court's actions fall within its “broad discretion in managing the cases assigned” to it. See Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ¶ 23, 222 P.3d 775 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Striking Sotolongo's Memorandum.

¶ 11 Sotolongo argues that the district court abused its discretion in striking his supplemental memorandum because the district court did not also strike a memorandum that Sotolongo maintains Midland filed late. When reviewing a district court's exercise of its discretion, we will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the district court's decision. Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998).

¶ 12 Midland filed its motion for summary judgment on July 13, 2011. Any response to Midland's motion was due no later than September 2, based on Sotolongo's requests for an enlargement of time to respond. Sotolongo did not file his supplemental memorandum in opposition to Midland's motion until October 16. Sotolongo did not request leave of the district court to file a late memorandum in opposition to Midland's motion for summary judgment. SeeUtah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) (providing that a memorandum in opposition shall be filed within ten days after service of a motion). Neither did he request leave to file a supplemental pleading relating to the parties' motions, and such a supplemental pleading was not otherwise authorized by the district court or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. (providing that no memoranda will be considered without leave of court except those enumerated in this rule). Thus, whether the supplemental memorandum is viewed as an untimely opposition or a supplemental pleading otherwise disallowed by the rules of civil procedure, Sotolongo was required to receive leave from the district court to file it. Because he did not do so, the district court had a reasonable basis on which to grant Midland's motion to strike, and the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in striking Sotolongo's supplemental memorandum. See Langeland, 952 P.2d at 1061;...