R.O. v. M.M. (In re Adoption A.M.O.)

• Decision Date: 25 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 20120762–CA.,20120762–CA.
• Citation: 332 P.3d 372,765 Utah Adv. Rep. 24
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals
• Parties: In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF A.M.O., A Minor. R.O., Petitioner and Appellant, v. M.M., Respondent and Appellee.

332 P.3d 372

765 Utah Adv. Rep. 24

In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF A.M.O., A Minor.R.O., Petitioner and Appellant,

v.M.M., Respondent and Appellee.

No. 20120762–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

July 25, 2014.

Jack M. McIntyre and Lori J. Cave, for Appellant.

Senior Judge RUSSELL W. BENCH authored this Opinion, in which Judge GREGORY K. ORME and Senior Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD concurred.¹

Opinion

BENCH, Senior Judge:

¶ 1 R.O. (Stepmother) appeals the district court's order denying her petition to terminate the parental rights of M.M. (Mother) and dismissing Stepmother's petition for the adoption of A.M.O. (Child). Stepmother argues that the district court's findings of fact are insufficiently detailed. We agree and reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Stepmother is married to Child's biological father (Father). Since 2008, Mother, who is Child's biological mother, and Father have shared legal custody of Child, but Father has retained physical custody of Child. Mother has a history of substance abuse, and in November 2010, she was arrested and incarcerated for drug-related offenses.

¶ 3 In May 2011, Stepmother filed a petition for adoption, in which she sought to terminate Mother's parental rights and to become Child's adoptive parent. On May 18, 2011, Mother was served with notice of the adoption proceeding. The notice informed Mother that she had thirty days to file a response if she intended to intervene in or contest the adoption. Mother's pro se Motion to Extend Time for Answer was filed in district court on June 20, 2011.² Shortly thereafter, Stepmother moved to strike Mother's motion to extend for noncompliance with section 78B–6–110 of the Utah Adoption Act. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78B–6–110(6) (LexisNexis Supp.2013).³ The district court denied Stepmother's motion to strike and informed Mother that she had ten days to file an answer. Mother filed a motion to intervene within those ten days and then filed an answer the following week.

¶ 4 The district court held evidentiary hearings in 2012 and announced its findings of fact and rulings from the bench. In evaluating a petition to terminate parental rights, the court engages in a two-step analysis. The first step requires the court to determine whether the petitioner demonstrated grounds to terminate parental rights. In re Adoption of T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d 480 (“First, the court must find that a specific ground for termination exists, finding the parent unfit or incompetent based on a ground enumerated in [section 78A–6–507] of the Utah Code.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). As to this first step, the district court in this case found that Child lived with both families at one point or another from 2001 to 2008. The district court found that for the period from January 2009 to July 2010, it was undisputed that Father and Stepmother had primary custody of Child and that Mother did not pay child support during that time period. The district court then noted that the amount of contact between Mother and Child during this period was the subject of some dispute. However, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that from July 2010 until Mother's arrest in November 2010, Mother struggled with drug addiction and had no meaningful contact with Child. Likewise, the district court indicated that no evidence showed Mother had any meaningful contact with Child from the time Mother was jailed until the date the petition was filed.⁴ Based on these findings, the district court further found that Mother had failed to communicate with Child for a period of more than six months, failed to show the normal interest of a parent without just cause, and abandoned Child. See generallyUtah Code Ann. § 78A–6–508(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (“[I]t is prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent ... ha[s] failed to communicate with the child by mail, telephone, or otherwise for six months; [or has] failed to have shown the normal interest of a natural parent, without just cause....”).

¶ 5 At this point, the district court explained that the burden shifted to Mother to demonstrate that during that period of time there were not grounds for terminating her parental rights. See In re K.J., 2013 UT App 237, ¶ 26, 327 P.3d 1203 (“While the petitioner bears the ultimate burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, once evidence is presented that would justify termination, the burden shifts to the parent to persuade the court that the [petitioner] had not established [the ground for termination] by clear and convincing evidence.” (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court found that Mother had not met that burden with respect to the period of November 2010 to May 2011.

¶ 6 The district court then turned to evaluating the second step involved in a petition to terminate parental rights: whether it would be in Child's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights. See In re Adoption of T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d 480 (“Second, after finding one of the enumerated grounds, the court must find that termination of parental rights serves the best interests of the child.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court found that Child “has a caring, loving family with whom he's permanently residing” and that Stepmother “has treated [Child] in every respect as her own child.” The district court then explained it would not decide whether Stepmother or Mother was a better parent, but rather would decide whether it was in Child's best interest that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The district court stated that it had heard “very little evidence” on the issue of best interest and had not heard testimony from any therapist indicating how Child understood his relationship with Mother. In addition, the district court viewed the evidence that Stepmother presented on the issue as “understandably self interested.” As a result, the district court declared that it “ha[d] not heard evidence that would convince [the court] that it would be in [Child's] best interest to terminate [Mother's] parental rights, at least so long as she remains fit.” The district court further explained that there was “no question” that Mother was not fit to be a parent “as long as she was using ... drugs and as long as she was incarcerated.” However, the district court stated that it believed that Mother can be a fit parent “[i]f she can maintain sobriety” and that Mother could possibly have a relationship with Child in the future. After conducting this analysis, the district court denied Stepmother's petition.

¶ 7 Thereafter, the district court entered a short written order denying Stepmother's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, dismissing Stepmother's petition to adopt, and noting that it had made its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. Stepmother subsequently filed a motion to amend and for a new trial, arguing that the district court did not make adequate findings regarding Child's best interest and that the court did not state the standard it was using for evaluating best interest. Mother did not file a memorandum in opposition. Nevertheless, the district court denied Stepmother's motion to amend and “[stood] by the findings and conclusions previously made, based on the evidence presented in the hearings.” Stepmother now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 8 On appeal, Stepmother contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to strike Mother's pleadings.⁵ “ ‘Motions to strike pleadings or parts thereof are addressed to the judgment and discretion of the trial court.’ ” Midland Funding LLC v. Sotolongo, 2014 UT App 95, ¶ 8, 325 P.3d 871 (quoting Francis v. State, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 19, 321 P.3d 1089). Generally, “[w]e review a district court's ruling on a motion to strike a pleading for an abuse of that discretion.” Id. However, Stepmother's argument focuses on the proper construction of the statutory provisions governing notice of adoption proceedings. “[M]atters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness....” In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 980 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (reviewing for correctnessthe denial of a motion to strike another party's motion to dismiss where the timeliness of the motion to dismiss depended upon proper construction of the court rule or statute under which the motion to dismiss was brought).

¶ 9 Stepmother also argues that the district court did not enter findings sufficient to support its conclusion that it was not in Child's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights. “We review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a question of law.” Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 15, 257 P.3d 478 (citation and internal quotation marks omittted). “Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly support[s] the trial court's decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial court.” Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Strike

¶ 10 Stepmother argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to strike Mother's pleadings. According to Stepmother, Mother was required by statute to file a motion to intervene within thirty days after receiving notice of the adoption proceeding. Stepmother further contends that by failing to file a motion to intervene within that time frame, Mother forfeited her parental rights to Child.

¶ 11 In support of her argument that Mother forfeited her parental rights, Stepmother relies on section 78B–6–110 of the Utah Adoption Act. Subsection (6)(a) of this...