Mid–south Retina v. Conner

• Decision Date: 10 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2010–IA–00190–SCT.,2010–IA–00190–SCT.
• Parties: MID–SOUTH RETINA, LLCv.Bernice CONNER.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

72 So.3d 1048

MID–SOUTH RETINA, LLC

v.Bernice CONNER.

No. 2010–IA–00190–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 8, 2011.Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 2011.

Shelby Kirk Milam, Josiah Dennis Coleman, Oxford, attorneys for appellant.Daniel M. Czamanske, Jr., Joseph Harland Webster, attorneys for appellee.EN BANC.CARLSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Bernice Conner filed a medical-negligence suit against Mid–South Retina, LLC. The County Court of Coahoma County originally granted summary judgment in favor of Mid–South, finding that Conner had failed to establish the necessary element of causation. The trial court then reversed its judgment upon reconsideration and denied Mid–South's motion for summary judgment. Aggrieved, Mid–South filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, and we granted the petition. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the trial court's judgment denying Mid–South's motion for summary judgment and render judgment here in favor of Mid–South.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 2. In 2003, Mid–South Retina, LLC, and Dr. Brad Priester treated Bernice Conner for age-related macular degeneration. As part of Conner's treatment, she intravenously received Visudyne, a drug that aids in cold-laser therapy for macular degeneration. During Conner's second visit to Mid–South, Visudyne infiltrated the soft tissue around the injection site in the bend of Conner's elbow. Dr. Priester determined that enough Visudyne had entered Conner's bloodstream and proceeded with the cold-laser therapy. The therapy session continued without incident.

¶ 3. Visudyne is a photodynamic drug, and tissue containing the drug can easily burn if exposed to sunlight. Dr. Priester testified that, because of this side effect, he ensured that Conner's elbow was sufficiently bandaged and covered prior to her leaving Mid–South. Shortly after leaving, Conner called Mid–South complaining that her arm was hurting. She was instructed to return to Mid–South. Upon her return, Dr. Priester sent Conner to a dermatologist. The dermatologist instructed Conner to go immediately to an emergency room. Conner did not go to the emergency room, but instead returned to her home.

¶ 4. The next day, Dr. Priester contacted Conner, and she informed him that she was still in pain. Dr. Priester instructed her to go to an emergency room. Conner went to an emergency room and was referred to a general surgeon, who prescribed pain medication and antibiotics. Conner saw the surgeon two more times in 2003, and the surgeon noted that the injury on Conner's elbow measured less than one centimeter in size.

¶ 5. Conner filed suit against Mid–South and Dr. Priester in 2004, alleging medical negligence in the administration of Visudyne. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Conner had failed to designate an expert witness. Conner then designated LaDonna Northington, a registered nurse, as her only expert witness. Northington stated in her affidavit that the Mid–South nurses were negligent in failing to document fully Conner's treatment and the Visudyne infiltration. The defendants filed a rebuttal to Conner's designation, claiming that Conner had not established the necessary element of causation. At the summary judgment hearing, Conner conceded that summary judgment was appropriate as to Dr. Priester. On August 10, 2009, the trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of Dr. Priester and Mid–South, finding that Conner had not sufficiently established all the elements of her medical-negligence claim.

¶ 6. On August 20, 2009, Conner filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching a supplemental affidavit from Northington. Mid–South moved to strike the affidavit, arguing that Conner should not be able to correct the deficiencies in her previous affidavit through a post-judgment motion for reconsideration. The trial court found that Conner had, at that time, established all the necessary elements of her medical-negligence claim. Thus, the trial court denied Mid–South's motion to strike the supplemental affidavit submitted by Northington, reversed its previous grant of summary judgment in favor of Mid–South, and denied Mid–South's motion for summary judgment. Mid–South then petitioned this Court for an interlocutory appeal, and we granted Mid–South's petition.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7. Mid–South raises three issues on interlocutory appeal: (1) whether Northington is qualified to render an expert opinion on medical causation; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Mid–South's motion for summary judgment; and (3) whether the trial court erred in considering Northington's supplemental affidavit. Because the first two issues are dispositive, we decline to address the final issue on appeal. See Berry v. Patten, 51 So.3d 934, 937 (Miss.2010). We combine our discussion of the first two issues for the purposes of today's appeal.

WHETHER MID–SOUTH IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE CONNER HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ALL OF THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF HER MEDICAL–NEGLIGENCE CLAIM.

¶ 8. In order to establish a prima facie case of medical negligence, the plaintiff must prove the following elements:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of injury; (2) the defendant failed to conform to that required standard; (3) the defendant's breach of duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and; (4) the plaintiff was injured as a result.

McDonald v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport, 8 So.3d 175, 180 (Miss.2009) (quoting Delta Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Venton, 964 So.2d 500, 504 (Miss.2007)) (other citations omitted). In medical-negligence cases, expert testimony is generally required to survive summary judgment. McDonald, 8 So.3d at 180. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has failed sufficiently to establish an essential element of that party's claim. Buckel v. Chaney, 47 So.3d 148, 153 (Miss.2010) (citations omitted).

¶ 9. Citing our recent opinion in Vaughn v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center, 20 So.3d 645 (Miss.2009), Mid–South contends that Northington cannot offer an opinion on medical causation, and thus, Conner has failed to establish the necessary element of causation. In Vaughn, we “explicitly [held] that nurses cannot testify as to medical causation.” Id. at 652.

¶ 10. In Vaughn, the plaintiff's only expert-causation witness was a registered nurse. Id. at 651. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that Vaughn had failed to show how her injury was the proximate result of the defendant's acts or omissions. Id. at 650. The trial court also struck Vaughn's expert designation of a registered nurse, “finding that nurses could not properly offer expert testimony as to medical causation.” Id. Although we found that the trial court erred in striking all of the nurse's testimony, we ultimately found that summary judgment was proper.¹ Id. at 655. Citing Richardson v. Methodist Hospital of Hattiesburg, Inc., 807 So.2d 1244, 1247–48 (Miss.2002), and numerous holdings from other jurisdictions, we held that “nurses cannot testify as to medical causation.” Vaughn, 20 So.3d at 652. Accordingly, we held that the trial court in Vaughn did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff had failed to establish the necessary element of causation. Id. at 653.

¶ 11. In today's case, Conner argues that the issue of whether Northington may render an expert opinion on causation was not before the trial court and therefore is not properly before this Court on interlocutory appeal. Mid–South moved for summary judgment on October 22, 2008, arguing that it was entitled to summary judgment because Conner had failed to designate an expert witness. In response to Mid–South's motion, Conner designated Northington, a registered nurse, as her expert witness. In November 2008, Conner submitted Northington's affidavit and filed a response to Mid–South's motion for summary judgment, stating that she had now designated an expert witness and that Northington was “competent and qualified” to offer testimony. Mid–South filed a rebuttal memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in December 2008. The trial court granted Mid–South's motion for summary judgment, finding that Northington was not familiar with Visudyne administration and that Conner had not established the necessary element of causation. The trial court entered its original order, granting Mid–South's motion for summary judgment, in August 2009. Conner filed her motion for reconsideration, and Mid–South responded in August 2009 as well. The trial judge entered his order denying Mid–South's motion for summary judgment upon reconsideration in January 2010. We handed down our opinion in Vaughn in October 2009—two months after the parties had filed their last pretrial motions and responses, but three months before the trial court had ruled on the motions. Vaughn, 20 So.3d at 645.

¶ 12. The parties in today's case were without the benefit of Vaughn during the pretrial phase mentioned above, and we recognize that our holding in Vaughn was not brought before the learned trial judge as part of the parties' pretrial arguments. The rule in Vaughn is clear: Nurses cannot render expert opinions on medical causation. Id. at 652. Thus the relevant inquiry before us is whether this explicit rule applies to today's appeal.

¶ 13. Generally, “all judicial decisions apply retroactively unless the Court has specifically stated the ruling is prospective.” Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So.2d 108, 113 (Miss.2006) (citing Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 753 So.2d 1077, 1093 (Miss.2000); Morgan v. State, 703 So.2d 832, 839 (Miss.1997)). Further, “newly enunciated rules of law are applied retroactively to cases that are pending trial or that are on appeal, and not final at the time of the enunciation.” Thompson...