Miedzinski v. Landman, 129

• Decision Date: 15 October 1958
• Docket Number: No. 129,129
• Citation: 145 A.2d 220,218 Md. 3
• Parties: Robert MIEDZINSKI, Sheriff of St. Mary's County, et al. v. Loren L. LANDMAN et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 3

218 Md. 3

145 A.2d 220

Robert MIEDZINSKI, Sheriff of St. Mary's County, et al. v. Loren L. LANDMAN et al.

No. 129.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Oct. 15, 1958.

James H. Norris, Jr., Special Asst. Atty. Gen., and Stedman Prescott, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellants.

William O. E. Sterling and Paul J. Bailey, Leonardtown (George Mason, Jr., Colonial Beach, Va., of Westmoreland County, Va., on the brief), for appellees.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.

HENDERSON, Judge.

This appeal is from a decree of the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County filed July 21, 1958, declaring Chapter 18 of the Acts of 1958 to be unconstitutional and enjoining the appellants from enforcing the law. The bill was filed on May 21, 1958, before the Act took effect according to its terms on June 1, 1958. An answer was filed on May 28 and the case set for hearing upon bill, answer, exhibits and stipulation, on June 13, 1958. By agreement of counsel on May 29, 1958, a restraining order was signed until the case should be finally determined by the court below. We advanced the case for argument at the beginning of the new term. Neither in the lower court nor in this Court was any question raised as to the standing of the appellees to raise the questions presented by a bill in equity for a declaratory decree, and we shall assume for present purposes that they had such standing.

The principal question presented, and the question that was thought to be determinative by the court below, is whether the Act was passed in violation of the Maryland Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 15. That section, ratified November 2, 1948, provides, in part, that in the 'thirty-day sessions in even years, the General Assembly shall consider no bills other than (1) Bills having to do with budgetary, revenue and financial matters of the State Government, (2) legislation dealing with an acture emergency, and (3) legislation in the general public welfare.' Chapter 18 undertook to add a new section to Art. 27 of the Code, reading as follows:

'246A. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corporation to bet, wage or gamble at or to keep, conduct, maintain or operate any game of chance, gaming table or coin operated gambling machine or device upon any vessel upon any of the waters within the State of Maryland, or upon any pier, wharf, building or other structure of any kind whatsoever which is built upon or over any of the waters of this State and which pier, wharf, building or other structure cannot be entered from the shore of the State of Maryland by a person on foot, and it shall further be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corporation to establish, keep, rent, use or occupy, or knowingly suffer to be established, kept, rented, used or occupied, any vessel upon any of the waters of the State of Maryland, or any pier, wharf, building or other structure of any kind whatsoever which is built upon or over any of the waters of this State and which cannot be entered from the shore of the State of Maryland by a person on foot, for the purpose of conducting, maintaining or operating any game of chance, gaming table or coin operated gambling machine or device. This Section shall prevail despite the issue of any form of license or permit granted through or by any county, municipal corporation or other political subdivision of this State. Any person, firm, association or corporation violating the provisions of this Section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to a fine of not less than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.), or more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.), or imprisonment not to exceed one year for each such violation or may be both fined and imprisoned in the discretion of the court.

'(b) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to authorize the doing of any act which is otherwise prohibited by law.' Section 2 of the Act repealed inconsistent laws.

The complainants, appellees, are the owners and operators of taverns and restaurants located on piers or wharves extending from the Virginia shore out into the Potomac River, except that one of the complainants owns and operates a similar establishment on a vessel moored in the Potomac near the Virginia shore. The respondents are the Sheriffs of St. Mary's and Charles Counties. Each of the complainants holds a license permitting the operation of gaming devices, commonly known as slot machines, in their respective establishments, pursuant to local laws of St. Mary's and Charles Counties, respectively. These licenses purported to be valid for one year from May 1, 1958, but at the time they were obtained Chapter 18 had been passed and approved by the Governor on March 6, 1958. It is conceded that these places of business are located in the State of Maryland and in St. Mary's and Charles Counties, respectively, although access is gained by piers extending from the Commonwealth of Virginia across the State line, which was long since established at the low water mark of the river on the Virginia side. Virginia law does not permit the operation of the gaming devices which are lawful when properly licensed in St. Mary's and Charles Counties. As pointed out by the court below, the complainants' establishments are extensively patronized by Virginia residents and others who resort thereto from the Commonwealth, but there is substantial sentiment in Virginia opposing the conduct of places of business adjacent to the Virginia line which permit gaming devices not lawful in that State. The lower court also noted that the Governor of Maryland recommended to the General Assembly the passage of the legislation in question, upon the formal request of the Governor of Virginia.

The appellees contend that although the Act in question is in the form of a public general law applicable to the entire State, its impact is wholly local, and hence, it cannot be deemed to be in the 'general public welfare'. They strongly rely upon the case of Funk v. Mullan Contracting Co., 197 Md. 192, 78 A.2d 632, 634, 79 A.2d 152, where this Court invalidated Chapter 30 of the Acts of 1950 setting up a commission to fix the generally prevailing wages which were required to be paid by contractors for the construction of buildings, roads or bridges for the State. However, the Act did not repeal, but left in effect, a previous Act applicable in three counties only, where the prevailing wages in road contracts were to be those predetermined by the United States Department of Labor. The Court pointed out that Chapter 30 was therefore applicable to Baltimore City and twenty of the twenty-three counties, but in the other three, the Commission created by that Act had no authority over wages to be paid for State road work.

The Court referred to the fact that the plethora of local measures considered by the Legislature had in the past impeded the proper consideration of State-wide measures, and found that the Legislature, in using the word 'general' in the new amendment, meant to restrict itself in the even-year sessions 'to matters generally affecting the State, rather than affecting parts thereof.' But it was also said (197 Md. at page 199, 78 A.2d at page 636): 'We are not required on this record to determine whether acts covering subjects of interest and importance to the entire State, and by their terms applicable thereto, might not be legislation in the general public welfare, even though their actual geographical impact is upon parts of the State only. We have here no such situation.' In the light of this qualification, we think the holding was that generality was destroyed by the fact that Chapter 30, in effect, exempted three counties from its operation, not merely by the fact that it had a limited geographical impact. This conclusion is somewhat...