Miezgiel v. Holder
| Decision Date | 17 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–CV–2129 DLICLP.,11–CV–2129 DLICLP. |
| Citation | 33 F.Supp.3d 184 |
| Parties | Wladyslaw MIEZGIEL, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General and Janet Napolitano, Department of Homeland Security, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Jerzy Sokol, Jerzy Sokol, Brooklyn, NY, for Petitioner.
Carmel Aileen Morgan, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Elliot M. Schachner, United States Attorneys Office, Brooklyn, NY, for Respondents.
Petitioner Wladyslaw Miezgiel (“Petitioner”) filed an I–130 Petition for Alien Relative (the “I–130 Petition”) with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), seeking recognition of his marriage to Grazyna Miezgiel (“Grazyna”). USCIS denied the I–130 Petition, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. Petitioner commenced this action seeking judicial review of the BIA decision. The government moves for summary judgment. Petitioner opposes. (Pet.'s Mem., Docket Entry No. 18.) For the reasons set forth below, the government's motion for summary judgment is granted.
On January 26, 2006, Petitioner, then a lawful permanent resident of the United States, filed an I–130 Petition with USCIS seeking recognition of his marriage to Grazyna. (R.1 at 176.) As evidence of the marriage, Petitioner submitted a “Complete Transcript of a Marriage Certificate” (“Certificate”), issued by the Office of Vital Records in Warsaw, Poland. (Id. at 179–82.) The Certificate stated that Petitioner and Grazyna were married at the Polish Consulate in New York on March 8, 2002. (Id. at 180.) On June 18, 2009, USCIS notified Petitioner that the Certificate was “not considered valid for immigration purposes,” because it was from the Polish Consulate rather than from “the appropriate civil authority in the state where the marriage ceremony was performed.” (Id. at 199–200.) In response, Petitioner submitted an essentially identical document entitled “Abridged Transcript of a Marriage Certificate” (“Abridged Certificate”), which stated that Petitioner and Grazyna were married in New York but made no mention of the Polish Consulate. (Id. at 202.)
On August 27, 2009, the District Director of USCIS's Vermont Service Center denied the I–130 Petition, holding that Petitioner had failed to comply with USCIS's prior notice to provide a marriage certificate issued by a civil authority in New York, the state where Petitioner and Grazyna allegedly were married. (Id. 140–41.) On September 28, 2009, Petitioner appealed the District Director's decision to the BIA. (Id. 139–71.) On September 7, 2010, the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal without prejudice to file another application that included evidence of a marriage performed in compliance with New York law. (Id. 131–32.)
On May 2, 2011, Petitioner appealed the decision of the BIA to this Court. By notice of motion dated September 28, 2011, the government moves for summary judgment. Petitioner opposes, contending that his marriage to Grazyna is valid.
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and determine whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, raising an issue for trial.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotations omitted). A fact is “material” within the meaning of Rule 56 when its resolution “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. To determine whether an issue is genuine, “[t]he inferences to be drawn from the underlying affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995) (). “[T]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).
The moving party bears the burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). Once the moving party has met its burden, “the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis omitted). The nonmoving party must offer “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in [its] favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party may not “rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible, or upon the mere allegations or denials of the nonmoving party's pleading.” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532–33 (2d Cir.1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.’ ” Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ).
When reviewing agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Court “begin[s] by reviewing the agency's construction of the statute at issue ... by applying the familiar two-step process of statutory interpretation' established by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).” Barahona v. Napolitano, 2011 WL 4840716, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2011). Under Chevron, the Court first inquires “ ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue’; if so, our inquiry is at an end.” Bellevue Hosp. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 443 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 842–43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ). However, “[i]f there is silence or ambiguity in the statute ... then the agency has discretion in its implementation, and we ask only if the construction it has given the statute is reasonable.” Id.
Assuming the agency's action was authorized by statute, the Court then must consider whether the action at issue was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). An agency decision may be overturned as arbitrary and capricious only “ ‘if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.’ ” Berrios v. Holder, 502 Fed.Appx. 100, 101 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) ).
Whether an agency action is arbitrary and capricious is a legal question to be resolved on the basis of agency records in existence at the time of the action, and the Court will not engage in an evidentiary hearing or a de novo review. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985) ; Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394–95 (2d Cir.2005) ; J. Andrew Lange, Inc. v. FAA, 208 F.3d 389, 391 (2d Cir.2000). Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing, by citation to evidence in the administrative record, that an agency's actions are arbitrary and capricious. See Boatmen v. Gutierrez, 429 F.Supp.2d 543, 548 (E.D.N.Y.2006) ; Glara Fashion, Inc. v. Holder, 2012 WL 352309, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2012). When undertaking APA review, a court properly may grant summary judgment based upon a finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute with regard to the administrative record. See Soler v. G & U, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y.1985) ; Just Bagels Mfg., Inc. v. Mayorkas, 900 F.Supp.2d 363, 371–73 (S.D.N.Y.2012).
There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. The parties disagree only as to whether USCIS's decision that Petitioner's marriage to Grazyna was invalid for immigration purposes was arbitrary and capricious. The government argues that it was reasonable to require Petitioner to submit documentation of a marriage in compliance with New York State law. (Respt.'s Mem. at 6.) Petitioner argues that it was arbitrary and capricious for USCIS to deny his I–130 Petition, because a marriage ceremony conducted by a foreign...
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