Mihok v. Medtronic, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:14–cv–1169 (VLB).
• Citation: 119 F.Supp.3d 22
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Linda MIHOK, Plaintiff, v. MEDTRONIC, INC., Medtronic Puerto Rico Operations Co., Medtronic Neuromodulation, and Greenwich Hospital, Defendants.

119 F.Supp.3d 22

Linda MIHOK, Plaintiff,

v.MEDTRONIC, INC., Medtronic Puerto Rico Operations Co., Medtronic Neuromodulation, and Greenwich Hospital, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:14–cv–1169 (VLB).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed Aug. 10, 2015.

Jacqueline E. Fusco, Brenden P. Leydon, Jacqueline E. Fusco, Tooher & Wocl & Leydon LLC, Stamford, CT, for Plaintiff.

James H. Rotondo, Kaitlin A. Canty, Day Pitney LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [DKT. # 23]

VANESSA L. BRYANT, District Judge.

Plaintiff Linda Mihok, a citizen of Connecticut, brings claims in both her individual capacity and as Executrix of the Estate of Michael Mihok, against Defendants Medtronic Inc., Medtronic Puerto Rico Operations Co., Medtronic Neuromodulation (collectively the "Medtronic Defendants"), and Greenwich Hospital ("Greenwich"), for violations of the Connecticut Products Liability Act ("CPLA"), Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 52–572m –q, Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"), Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 42–110a, and loss of consortium. Mihok's claims concern injuries suffered by her spouse, Michael Mihok, when a surgically-inserted catheter fractured, depriving him of necessary medication.¹

The Complaint was originally filed in the Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk, at Stamford, on July 7, 2014, docket number FST–CV14–6023001–S. On August 13, 2014, the Medtronic Defendants filed a Notice of Removal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1331, and 1332, in which they asserted (i) that the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to establish "arising under" jurisdiction and (ii) that Defendant Greenwich, the only non-diverse defendant, was fraudulently joined. [Dkt. # 1]. Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand this action back to the Connecticut Superior Court. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and REMANDS this matter back to the Connecticut Superior Court.

I. Background

Michael Mihok, decedent, was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis (MS) in the year 2000. [Dkt. # 1–1, Compl. at ¶ 56]. While Mihok lost all function in his legs and some function in his arms and hands, Mihok retained sufficient use of his right arm and hand to successfully operate his motorized wheelchair and maintain his employment. [Id. ].

On December 11, 2006, in an effort to manage his symptoms, Mihok underwent a procedure at Greenwich Hospital to implant the Medtronic's SynchroMed® II Implantable Infusion System (the "System"), which administered medication to control muscle spasticity. [Id. at ¶ 57]. The System consisted of a Medtronic pump and a catheter. [Id. ]. In addition to implanting the System, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Greenwich sold various medical products to patients, "including the ... System at issue in this claim." [Id. at ¶ 11; see also id. at ¶ 14 (stating that Defendant Greenwich "sells the [System], which is a programmable infusion system implanted in the body for drug delivery") ]. Following this procedure, and for several years thereafter, the medication delivered by the System effectively managed Mihok's symptoms. [Id. at ¶ 58].

On July 5, 2011, Defendant Medtronic Neuromedical issued a notification warning users of the System that, as a result of a malfunctioning battery, the pump component might require replacement sooner than had originally been anticipated. [Id. at ¶ 59]. As a result, on July 6, 2012, Mihok underwent a pump replacement procedure at Greenwich. [Id. at ¶ 60]. The pump was replaced with no surgical complications, but the doctor did not remove the original catheter. [Id. ].

Two weeks after the procedure, Mihok began to show signs of withdrawal, and his spasticity returned, resulting in the loss of function in his hands and arms, along with painful and debilitating spasms. [Id. at ¶ 62]. Mihok visited several different doctors following the onset of these symptoms. On September 7, 2012, after evaluating Mihok's symptoms and the pump, Dr. Kenneth Vives, a surgeon at Yale Neurosurgery, determined that the catheter had fractured. [Id. at ¶ 63]. Thereafter, another doctor, Dr. Kenneth Vines, of the Associated Neurologists of Southern Connecticut, replaced the catheter, and Mihok's symptoms subsided. [Id. at ¶ 65].

The System is a Class III medical device, approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") through the pre-market approval ("PMA") process. [Id. at ¶ 15]. At times before and after the System was implanted in Michael Mihok (December 11, 2006), the FDA issued Warning Letters to Medtronic stating that Medtronic violated various provisions of the Current Good Manufacturing Practice ("CGMP") regulations promulgated under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). See [id. at ¶¶ 33–55, 66].² Accordingly, the Complaint asserts that the Defendants manufactured, warranted, prescribed, and sold to Michael Mihok a defective pump system, in violation of the CPLA and CUTPA, which caused injuries to both Michael and Linda Mihok, in the form of loss of consortium. In essence, the Complaint alleges that the Defendant's violated the Connecticut Products Liability Act by (or as evidenced by) manufacturing, marketing, selling or implanting a device placed into the stream of commerce without complying with the applicable FDA regulations.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Remand

"It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack the power to disregard such limits as have been imposed by the Constitution or Congress." Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson, & Cortese–Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir.2009) (citation and quotations omitted). The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving that the case is properly before the federal court. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). Where federal jurisdiction is asserted by a defendant pursuant to the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, "the defendant has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. CenterMark Properties, 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted). "In light of the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, as well as the importance of preserving the independence of state governments, federal courts construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability." Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir.2013) (citation and quotations omitted). A party may remove "[a]ny civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Section 1331, the federal-question statute, provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1332, the diversity statute, states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 ... and is between ... citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Defendants assert that this Court has jurisdiction on both federal-question and diversity grounds. Accordingly, the Court takes up each of these arguments.

B. The Court Lacks Federal–Question Jurisdiction Under Gunn–Grable

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In the "vast bulk" of cases, a suit arises under federal law where the complaint pleads a federal cause of action.

Gunn v. Minton, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013). In addition,

[t]hree situations exist in which a complaint that does not allege a federal cause of action may nonetheless ‘arise under’ federal law for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction: first, if Congress expressly provides, by statute, for removal of state law claims ... second, if the state law claims are completely preempted by federal law ... and third, in certain cases if the vindication of a state law right necessarily turns on a question of federal law

Fracasse v. People's United Bank, 747 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir.2014) (citations and quotations omitted).

Here, the parties appear to acknowledge that only the third situation is potentially applicable, and the Court agrees. The Supreme Court recently opined on this third situation and found that only a "special and small" number of cases fall within it. Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1064. To aid courts in identifying the "extremely rare exceptions" comprising this group, id., the Supreme Court has fastened a four-part test:

[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.

Id. at 1065 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005) ).

Federal-question jurisdiction lies only "[w]here all four of these requirements are met." Id. Applying the four-part Gunn–Grable test, the Court concludes that the third prong, substantiality of the federal issue, is lacking, and thus finds that federal-question jurisdiction is absent.

1. The Complaint Necessarily Raises a Disputed Issue of Federal Law

As for the first two elements of Gunn–Grable, the Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint necessarily raises a federal issue which the parties actually dispute. The allegations in the Complaint are plainly grounded in Defendants' alleged violations of the federal CGMP requirements.See [Dkt. # 1–1 Compl. at ¶¶ 23–55, 81–87, 91–97, 102, 104, 110]. As Defendants point out, if Plaintiff's state law claims "challenging the safety of an FDA-approved medical device"...