Mikesell v. Mikesell

• Decision Date: 14 July 1909
• Docket Number: 178-1909
• Citation: 40 Pa.Super. 392
• Parties: Mikesell, Appellant, v. Mikesell
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

40 Pa.Super. 392

Mikesell, Appellant, v. Mikesell

No. 178-1909

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 14, 1909

Argued April 28, 1909

Appeal by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. No. 4, Allegheny Co Third Term, 1907, No. 554, for defendant on case tried by the court without a jury in suit of Ada B. Mikesell v. George A Mikesell.

Feigned issue and interpleader to determine right to death benefits.

The case was tried by Cohen, J., under the Act of April 22, 1874 P. L. 108.

The court entered judgment for defendant on feigned issue.

Error assigned was in entering judgment for defendant on the feigned issue.

Horace J. Miller, for appellant. -- Only the beneficiary designated in the policy has standing to claim death benefits; if the designated beneficiary cannot take, the benefit lapses: Solis v. Blank, 199 Pa. 600; Hamill v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 152 Pa. 537; Beers v. Robinson, 9 Pa. 229; Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watts, 104; Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Pa. 235; Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76; Delp v. Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42.

The association having paid the fund in controversy into court, in the common domicile of the claimants for adjudication, the question depends not upon whether the lex fori or the lex loci should prevail, upon the construction of the policy itself under which the parties claim: Brown's App., 125 Pa. 303; Com. v. National Mut. Aid Assn., 94 Pa. 481; Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 5 Pa. 339; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226 (11 S.Ct. 882); National Mut. Aid Society v. Lupold, 101 Pa. 111.

Although the beneficiary designated in the policy is the only person who can claim death benefits, yet in this case, as between the designated beneficiary and the association, the right is defeasible: Smith v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 81 Md. 412. (32 A. 181).

The right to defeat the claim of Ada B. Mikesell belongs only to the association, and it can waive its right. Payment of the money into court constitutes a complete waiver of the fraud and of the noncompliance with the regulations: Brown's App., 125 Pa. 303; Johnson v. Knights of Honor, 53 Ark. 255 (13 S.W. 794); Maguire v. Supreme Council, 59 A.D. 143; Markey v. Supreme Council, 74 N.Y.S. 1069; Bacon v. Charlton, 61 Mass. 581; Dyer v. Ashton, 1 B. & C. 4; Huntington v. American Bank, 23 Mass. 340; White v. Turner, 217 Pa. 25; Taylor v. Hair, 112 F. 913.

Ernest C. Irwin, with him Watson & Freeman, for appellee. -- The law of the state where a beneficial organization is incorporated must be read in connection with and as a part of the contract; and in deciding who is a proper beneficiary, we must look to the constitution and by-laws of the association and interpret them by the statutes under which the association had its origin: Harton's Est., 213 Pa. 499; Masonic Aid Assn. v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99; Parke v. Welch, 33 Ill.App. 188; American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580; Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Nairn, 60 Mich. 44 (26 N.W. 826); Rose v. Wilkins, 78 Miss. 401 (29 So. 397); Masonic Benevolent Assn. v. Bunch, 109 Mo. 560 (19 S.W. 25).

The decision of the Ohio courts puts the question out of doubt that one who sustains no relation to a deceased member other than that of mistress has no right to the fund which the insurance company admits to be due: State v. Relief Assn., 29 Ohio, 399; State v. Standard Life Assn., 38 Ohio, 281; State v. People's Mut. Benefit Assn., 42 Ohio, 579.

Where the beneficiaries are limited to a certain class and a member goes outside of the designated class and names someone not entitled to take, the benefits will be paid to the persons within the prescribed class and not to the person improperly named as beneficiary: Fodell v. Miller, 193 Pa. 570; Harton's Est., 213 Pa. 499; Burst v. Weisenborn, 1 Pa.Super. 276.

The payment of the money into court on an interpleader by the beneficial association was not an acknowledgment of the right of the plaintiff to recover: B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Veltri, 37 Pa.Super. 399; Keener v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., 38 Mo.App. 543.

The certificate is not made payable to plaintiff only, but to her or the lawful heirs of the deceased. Since she is not competent to take, the alternative provision operates, and the lawful heir of the deceased, that is, the defendant, is entitled.

Before Rice, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head and Beaver, JJ.

OPINION

ORLADY, J.

John B. Mikesell was, at the time of his death, a member in good standing of the Locomotive Engineers Mutual Life and Accident Insurance Company, a corporation regularly incorporated under the provisions of secs. 3631-16 of the annotated statutes of Ohio. Its declared object being " to transact a business of life and accident insurance on the assessment plan, for the purpose of mutual protection and relief of its members; and for the payment to the family, heirs, relatives by blood, marriage or lawful adoption, affianced wife, or to person or persons dependent upon the member of said association."

At the time of the death of John B. Mikesell, which occurred March 13, 1907, the policy in suit, which was in the sum of $ 1,500, became due and payable by its very terms. Ada B. Mikesell was named as beneficiary, and is therein designated, as the wife of John B. Mikesell. On July 3, 1907, she brought an action of assumpsit against the association based upon this insurance policy, and on August 2, 1907, a petition was presented on behalf of the association, and a rule was granted on the plaintiff to show cause why she and George A. Mikesell should not interplead, as to the subject-matter of the action, and why the insurance company, defendant, should not have leave to pay the money or fund into court. This rule was finally made absolute, and by direction of the court, Ada B. Mikesell and George A. Mikesell having appeared in answer to the rule, and the court having fully considered the case, it was ordered that Ada B. Mikesell and George A. Mikesell interplead and that the insurance association have leave to pay the money into court, and further it was ordered that a feigned issue be awarded, in which Ada B. Mikesell should be plaintiff, and George A. Mikesell the defendant to determine the right of property in said fund.

When the case was called for trial, the parties agreed in writing to waive a trial by jury, and to have it heard by the judge of the court, under the act of assembly in such case made and provided. Certain facts were submitted as being agreed to and no oral testimony was offered. Among the important ones were the following, in addition to those above stated; 5. That the said John B. Mikesell was never married; that his mother is dead; that George A. Mikesell is the father of said John B. Mikesell. 6. That Ada B. Mikesell never was the wife of John B. Mikesell, either by marriage performed or by common law marriage, and that she was at the time of the death of John B. Mikesell, and at all times while living with him, the lawful, undivorced wife of another man then living. 7. It is further agreed, that the insurance company did not know at the time the policy was issued that Ada B. Mikesell was not the wife of John B. Mikesell, but became cognizant of the fact for the first time, when the interpleader was asked for and the money paid into court.

After hearing, the court below ordered and directed that the fund in court, less the legal costs of the prothonotary, be paid to the defendant in the case, George A. Mikesell, and entered a judgment in his favor therefor.

The designation of Ada B. Mikesell as wife, was a violation of the fundamental laws and rules of the insurance company, and could only have resulted through a fraud perpetrated on it. While the association is not a party to this issue, it having paid into court the amount admitted to be due on the certificate of membership, for the use of such party as the law shall declare to be entitled to it, it is an essential rule to look to the law of the state where the beneficial society was created and to read it into the contract, in determining the validity of the designation in the beneficial certificate. This rule has been followed in Parke v. Welch, 33 Ill.App. 188; American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580, 5 N.E. 634; Supreme Lodge v. Nairn, 60 Mich. 44; Rose v. Wilkins, 78 Miss. 401, 29 So. 397; Masonic Benevolent Assn. v. Bunch, 109 Mo. 560, 19 S.W. 25; and in our own state, in Masonic Aid Assn. v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99, 26 A. 253; Fodell v. Miller, 193 Pa. 570, 44 A. 919; Harton's Est., 213 Pa. 499, 62 A. 1058. In this last case the court states that it is clear the object of the assured was to conceal the real nature of the transaction, in the belief that a full disclosure of it would result in a refusal of the company to sanction it. The relation between Harton and the association was contractual, and the contract is to be interpreted in the light of conditions existing when it was entered into. The association was a beneficial society organized under the laws of the state of Ohio. The act authorizing associations of this character expressly indicated the purposes and objects of the same, and to this extent places a limitation upon their powers and privileges. The purpose and objects as expressed by the act are for the mutual protection and relief of the members, and for the payment (as in this case) to the family, heirs, relatives by blood, marriage or legal adoption, affianced wife or to a person or persons dependent upon the member of said association, stipulated amounts, etc.

The Ohio statute in regard to beneficiaries entitled to take reads as follows: " Beneficiaries who take death benefits shall be confined to the family, heirs, relatives by blood, marriage...