Milas v. Labor Ass'n of Wisconsin, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-1197,96-1197 |
| Citation | 571 N.W.2d 656,214 Wis.2d 1 |
| Parties | , 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3179 Michael D. MILAS, Ozaukee County Sheriff, Ozaukee County and Ozaukee County Law Enforcement Committee, Petitioners-Respondents, v. The LABOR ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN, INC., Respondent, Michael J. Ciszewski, Respondent-Appellant. The LABOR ASSOCIATION OF WISCONSIN, INC., for and on behalf of the Ozaukee County Law Enforcement Employees, Petitioners, Michael Ciszewski, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael D. MILAS, Ozaukee County Sheriff, Ozaukee County and Ozaukee County Law Enforcement Committee, Respondents-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Scott L. Schroeder and Murphy, Murphy & Schroeder, S.C., Racine and Gordon E. McQuillen and Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach, Madison and oral argument by Gordon E. McQuillen and Scott L. Schroeder.
For the petitioners respondent there was a brief by Roger E. Walsh, William Sosnay and Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by William Sosnay.
Amicus curiae was filed (in the Court of Appeals) by Richard Thal, Gordon E. McQuillen and Cullen, Weston, Pines & Bach, Madison, for the Wisconsin Professional Police Association.
¶1
This is an appeal by the Labor Association of Wisconsin, Inc., and Michael J. Ciszewski from an order of the circuit court for Ozaukee County, Lawrence F. Waddick, Judge, granting summary judgment to Ozaukee County Sheriff Michael D. Milas, Ozaukee County, and the Ozaukee County Law Enforcement Committee (collectively referred to as the County). The circuit court's order vacated the decision of an arbitrator relating to a disciplinary dispute involving Michael J. Ciszewski, a deputy sheriff of Ozaukee County. 1 The circuit court concluded that arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement subsequent to a disciplinary decision of the Ozaukee County Law Enforcement Committee was void because the deputy sheriff's sole and exclusive remedy following an adverse decision of the Law Enforcement Committee was review by the circuit court pursuant to the statutory appeal process set forth in Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92). 2 The circuit court also concluded that the County had not "waive[d] the statutory process so as to be estopped by their actions." The deputy sheriff appealed to the court of appeals, which certified the appeal to this court. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96).
¶2 The court of appeals certified two issues. The first issue relates to the validity of the collective bargaining agreement allowing arbitration of a disciplinary matter involving a deputy sheriff. The question is whether the deputy sheriff's sole and exclusive remedy following an adverse decision of the Law Enforcement Committee is review by the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92). Wisconsin Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 provides in pertinent part: "The accused may appeal from the order [of the grievance committee] to the circuit court...." 3 The second issue relates to whether the County was estopped in this case from challenging the validity of the arbitration award as contravening Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92). 4 We hold that the County is estopped in this case from challenging the validity of the arbitration award as contravening Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92). Because we decide this case on estoppel grounds, we need not, and do not, reach the first question posed by the court of appeals. Furthermore, the arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement at issue in the present case no longer appears in the current collective bargaining agreement. For the reasons set forth, we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the arbitration award. 5
¶3 The facts are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. In January 1993 Ozaukee County Sheriff Michael D. Milas filed disciplinary charges against deputy sheriff Michael J. Ciszewski, alleging that between the summer of 1991 and fall of 1992, the deputy sheriff had committed five acts of misconduct. The Sheriff suspended the deputy sheriff without pay and recommended to the Law Enforcement Committee that the deputy sheriff be dismissed. 6
¶4 In February 1993 the Law Enforcement Committee reviewed the charges and determined that dismissal of the deputy sheriff was warranted. The deputy sheriff objected to the Law Enforcement Committee's decision and requested arbitration. Although the collective bargaining agreement under which the deputy sheriff sought arbitration had expired on December 31, 1992, Ozaukee County and the deputy sheriff proceeded with arbitration in adherence to the collective bargaining agreement.
¶5 In June 1993 Ozaukee County and the deputy sheriff appeared before the arbitrator for hearings on the disciplinary matter. In March 1994 the arbitrator concluded that Ozaukee County failed to prove three of the five charges against the deputy sheriff. Although the arbitrator concluded that the two proven charges were "extremely serious," he found that the charges did not warrant dismissal of the deputy sheriff due to the deputy sheriff's "extremely difficult" personal problems. The arbitrator modified the Law Enforcement Committee's decision, treating the time following the deputy sheriff's dismissal as unpaid suspension and ordering the deputy sheriff to be returned to work after passing medical and psychological examinations to determine his fitness for duty.
¶6 As required by the arbitration award, the deputy sheriff submitted proof of fitness for duty. The Sheriff, however, refused to return the deputy sheriff to work.
¶7 In June 1994 the County moved to vacate the arbitration award on summary judgment, claiming that under Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 (1991-92) judicial review by the circuit court was the sole and exclusive means to challenge the Law Enforcement Committee's decision. The deputy sheriff moved to confirm the arbitration award.
¶8 In January 1996 the circuit court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and vacated the arbitration award. 7 The deputy sheriff appealed the circuit court's order to the court of appeals, which certified the case to this court.
¶9 On appeal from a circuit court order granting summary judgment, this court applies the same methodology used by the circuit court, which is set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (1995-96). See Jeske v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 183 Wis.2d 667, 672, 515 N.W.2d 705 (1994). Whether summary judgment should be granted is a question of law.
¶10 When the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom are not disputed, it is a question of law whether equitable estoppel has been established. This court determines questions of law independent of the circuit court, benefiting from its analysis. See Harms v. Harms, 174 Wis.2d 780, 784, 498 N.W.2d 229 (1993).
¶11 The circuit court concluded that the County had not "waive[d] the statutory appeal process so as to be estopped by their actions." In stating its holding the circuit court used both the words "waiver" and "estoppel." 8 The parties in this case seem to argue both waiver and estoppel but concentrate their legal analyses on waiver.
¶12 While the words "waiver" and "estoppel" are often used interchangeably, they represent distinct but related doctrines. See Von Uhl v. Trempealeau County Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis.2d 32, 37, 146 N.W.2d 516 (1966); Saverslak v. Davis-Cleaver Produce Co., 606 F.2d 208, 213 (7th Cir.1979). 9
¶13 This court has defined waiver as the "voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right" and has stated that "intent to relinquish [the right] is an essential element of waiver." Von Uhl, 33 Wis.2d at [214 Wis.2d 10] 37, 146 N.W.2d 516. 10 The waiver doctrine focuses on the intent of the party against whom waiver is asserted. It is not necessary, however, to prove that the party had an actual intent to waive. See Attoe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 Wis.2d 539, 545, 153 N.W.2d 575 (1967). "[T]he intent to waive may be inferred as a matter of law from the conduct of the parties." Nelson v. Caddo-Texas Oil Lands Co., 176 Wis. 327, 329, 186 N.W. 155 (1922).
¶14 The parties in this case dispute whether the County made a voluntary and intentional waiver of a known right. The County asserts that it never made a voluntary and intentional waiver of its right to object to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. 11 The County claims it did not know until three days after the arbitration award was announced that it could object to the arbitrator's jurisdiction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6. 12
¶15 We need not decide whether the County voluntarily and intentionally waived its objection to a known right. For purposes of evaluating the County's argument we accept the County's position that it did not know it might object to arbitration on the basis of Wis. Stat. § 59.21(8)(b)6 when it proceeded with arbitration. The County's knowledge of the right it asserts here to object to the arbitrator's jurisdiction is not, however, determinative of the rights of the parties. As a matter of law, the facts of the case establish equitable estoppel.
¶16 The estoppel doctrine, also called equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, focuses on the conduct of the parties. 13 The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) action or non-action, (2) on the part of one against whom estoppel is asserted, (3) which induces reasonable reliance thereon by the other, either in action or non-action, and (4) which is to his or her detriment. See Department of Revenue v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis.2d 610, 634, 279 N.W.2d 213 (1979). 14
¶17 All the elements of equitable estoppel are present in this case. The County's actions that form the basis of estoppel occurred both before and after the County's dispute with the deputy sheriff. Prior to the deputy...
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