Miles v. Bowen, Civ. A. No. 82-429-N.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-429-N.
• Citation: 632 F. Supp. 282
• Parties: Armada MILES, Plaintiff, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

632 F. Supp. 282

Armada MILES, Plaintiff, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 82-429-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

March 14, 1986.

Legal Services Corp., of Alabama, Lawrence F. Gardella, Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff.

John C. Bell, U.S. Atty., Calvin C. Pryor, Asst. U.S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HOBBS, Chief Judge.

This cause is now before the Court on defendant's motion, filed January 30, 1986, to affirm the Secretary's decision and on plaintiff's renewed application for attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), filed February 4, 1986. On January 20, 1983, this Court remanded this cause to the Secretary for a determination of whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) applied the proper legal standard in giving "no significant weight" to plaintiff's complaints of pain. On May 17, 1984, the ALJ decided on remand that plaintiff's entitlement to disability ended on June 30, 1981. The ALJ's decision was appealed to the Appeals Council, who refused to accept the ALJ's decision and instead concluded that although plaintiff was not disabled because of pain, she was disabled and continued to be disabled as a result of severe muscle weakness and fatigue. Accordingly, the Appeals Council authorized the continuance of plaintiff's disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits.

The Secretary now has complied with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Taylor v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 674 (11th Cir.1985) by filing with the Court a copy of the Appeals Council's final decision to continue plaintiff's benefits. Upon consideration of the Appeals Council's decision, filed January 30, 1986, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that said decision is due to be and is hereby affirmed.

Because plaintiff's application for attorney fees has now been filed within thirty days of this final judgment, said application is timely even though the Appeals Council made its final decision on September 24, 1984. See Taylor v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 674. Accordingly, the Court now will address plaintiff's application for attorney fees.

FACTS

The facts are set forth in this Court's Memorandum Opinion of January 20, 1983.

DISCUSSION

The primary purpose of the EAJA is "to ensure that private parties will not be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unjustified governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights." H.R.Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 132, 132-33. Congress also desired to discourage federal agencies from taking frivolous positions. Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F.Supp. 348, 352 n. 7 (D.D.C. 1982). To achieve these goals, the EAJA allows an award of attorney's fees to a party who prevails in a civil action against a federal agency "unless the Court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

Clearly, plaintiff is a prevailing party within the meaning of the EAJA, but the EAJA does not reveal what proof is necessary for the Secretary to meet his burden of showing a substantial justification for his position. When the EAJA was originally passed, Congress made it clear that the "test of whether or not a government action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. Where the government can show that its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made." H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4953, 4989. Furthermore, the legislative history of the original EAJA indicates that Congress did not intend to raise a presumption that the government's position was not substantially justified merely because the government lost its case. See H.R.Rep. No. 1418 at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 4953, 4990; S.Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7. Congress also did not intend to require the government to prove that its decision to litigate was based on a substantial probability of prevailing, id., and the cases have consistently followed these congressional directives. See, e.g., Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843, 850 (11th Cir.1984); Matthews v. United States, 713 F.2d 677, 683 (11th Cir.1983); Albrecht v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1985); Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 108 (4th Cir.1983); Couch v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 749 F.2d 359, 360 (6th Cir.1984) (per curiam).

But the House Judiciary Committee Report describing the 1985 amendments to the EAJA seems to reject this case law and Congress' previous intent. The report states:

Several courts have held correctly that "substantial justification" means more than merely reasonable. Because in 1980 Congress rejected a standard of "reasonably justified" in favor of "substantially justified," the test must be more than mere reasonableness.

Especially puzzling, however, have been statements by some courts that an administrative decision may be substantially justified under the Act even if it must be reversed because it was arbitrary and capricious or was not supported by substantial evidence. Agency action found to be arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence is virtually certain not to have been substantially justified under the Act. Only the most extraordinary special circumstances could permit such an action to be found to be substantially justified under the Act.

H.R.Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 132, 138 (footnotes omitted).

If this committee report accurately reflects Congressional intent, the government now must demonstrate more than mere reasonableness to satisfy the "substantially justified" standard and will be required to pay the attorney fees of its opponent every time the government loses, no matter how close the issues were.

However, this Court does not believe the language in the House Judiciary Committee Report adequately represents the Congressional intent behind the EAJA. In a statement to Congress a month after the committee report was published, Representative Kindness of the House Judiciary Committee stated:

The committee's report ... would tend to mislead those uninitiated in the lore of the substantial evidence rule ... Substantial justification is a different and lesser standard than the substantial evidence standard applied in a review of administrative proceedings. The government may still prove that its position was substantially justified even if the court does not believe that the case on the merits was supported by "substantial evidence on the record as a whole."

131 Cong.Rec. 4763 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) ...