Miles v. Caldwell

• Decision Date: 01 December 1864
• Citation: 17 L.Ed. 755,69 U.S. 35,2 Wall. 35
• Parties: MILES v. CALDWELL
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

69 U.S. 35

17 L.Ed. 755

2 Wall. 35

MILES v. CALDWELL.

December Term, 1864

MILES brought ejectment against Caldwell, in the Circuit Court of Missouri; the action being brought, not in the fictitious form, still sometimes used in the United States, but in the form now more frequent with us, in which the parties actually suing appear in their proper names, as Thomas Miles against William Caldwell, and where the land claimed is described as by metes or bounds, or by both; the action being entitled, in Missouri, 'trespass in ejectment.' Both parties in the present suit claimed under one Ely, who, in 1837, and prior to that time, was owner of the land; Caldwell claiming under a mortgage made by Ely to Gallagher in that year; and a subsequent release by Ely;¹ Miles, under a mortgage of 1838, by Ely to Carswell and McClellan, and a foreclosure and sale founded on it. The defendant, Caldwell, in that ejectment, contended that his own title, under the mortgage to Gallagher, was good; and that the title of Miles, under the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan, was bad, as having been made in fraud of creditors. Miles, the plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the mortgage to Gallagher had been satisfied; and that his own mortgage was not fraudulent, but given for a valid debt. Both these points—that is to say, the point whether Gallagher's mortgage had or had not been paid, and whether that of Carswell and McClellan was fraudulent or was good—were submitted to the jury, who, on instructions from the court, passed upon them, finding a verdict for the plaintiff, Miles. Indeed, as to the question of fraud, there was an express agreement, now before this court, that the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan was, in the action of ejectment, impeached for fraud; and the record of that suit also established the fact that the question, whether the mortgage to Gallagher had been paid off in full, was submitted to them. But neither of these points were points put in issue by the pleadings themselves; nor, indeed, was it practicable so to put them in issue in the action,—that of ejectment.

In this state of the facts, Caldwell, wishing, as he represented, to have his title 'quieted,' filed his bill on the equity side of the court, where the judgment at law had been obtained, to enjoin execution on the judgment, and to prevent Miles's taking possession of the land.

The grounds of the complainant's application were these:

1. That his title was good and valid, founded on the senior mortgage; and, being the true legal title, should prevail.

2. That the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan was fraudulent, because made for the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors; and that a court of equity should decree it to be void, and prevent its being used to the injury of complainant.

3. That he had made valuable improvements, in good faith, on the land, supposing it to be his own, for which he was entitled to compensation before it was taken from him.

It is necessary here to say, that in Missouri one of the Revised Statutes enacts, that in ejectment, as in other actions authorized by it, a judgment, except one of nonsuit, 'shall be a bar to any other action between the same parties, or those claiming under them, as to the same subject-matter.'- The court below granted the injunction, and an appeal came here.

Mr. Green, in support of the decree: Caldwell, being in possession, under a senior mortgage, had a right to stay. Even if the judgment on the note did not foreclose the mortgage, he had a release from Ely which gave him the equity of redemption. Admitting that the question of the payment of Gallagher's mortgage, and the good faith of that of Carswell and McClellan were in issue on the trial at law, what is there to prevent their being passed on here? The action was ejectment; a proceeding in which it is matter of common knowledge that one judgment never binds. Moreover, it is a rule that nothing will be held as concluded by the verdict which is not put in issue by the pleadings. Outram v. Morewood,² confines the conclusiveness to questions expressly so put.

[On the third ground assigned for relief—valuable improvements put on the land—Mr. Green made no remarks.]

Mr. Gantt, contra.

Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

1. The complainant's first proposition—that his title is good, founded on the prior mortgage, and, being the true legal title, should prevail—contains no element as it is stated, or in the facts which go to make up his title, that calls into action the powers of a court of chancery. If under the proceedings which took place in regard to the mortgage of Gallagher,³ the complainant acquired the legal title to the real estate in question, a court of law would notice that title, and is as much bound to respect it as a court of equity. If he did not really obtain the legal title, but having the possession, was entitled to be treated as a mortgagee in possession, a court of law is bound to protect him in that possession against any title, not paramount to the mortgage under which he held.

We cannot perceive that there is any circumstance connected with the title of complainant, which brings his case within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. Although it is true that in the practice of the English courts, and in those States of the Union where the fictitious action of ejectment is still in use, chancery will interfere where there have been repeated verdicts in favor of the same title to prevent further litigation, it is not true that chancery will interpose in favor of the unsuccessful party in the first trial, upon the sole ground that he has the legal title, and, therefore, ought to have succeeded in the action at law. It would be a novelty that a court of chancery, which in proper cases quiets a title which has been established by several verdicts and judgments at law, should reverse its course of action to quiet a title strictly legal, with no impediment to its assertion in a court of law, where it had been defeated in the only action in which it had been thus set up.

2. The second proposition, in respect of which complainant asks relief,—that the mortgage to Carswell and McClellan is fraudulent, made to hinder creditors, &c.,—is one of the common grounds of equity jurisdiction. To relieve against fraud, and to set aside and cancel fraudulent conveyances, are among the ordinary duties of courts of chancery. Courts of law, however, have concurrent jurisdiction of questions of fraud, when properly raised; and, although they cannot cancel or set aside fraudulent instruments of writing, yet when they are produced in evidence by a party claiming any right under them, their fraudulent character may, under proper circumstances, be shown, and their validity in the particular case contested.

It is a general rule, growing out of the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of law and chancery over this subject, as well as a variety of others, founded also upon the principle that it is the interest of the public, that there should be some end to litigation, that when a matter has once been heard and determined in one court, it shall not be subject to re-examination in another court between the same parties. The defendant in this suit invokes the benefit of this rule as regards the question of fraud in the mortgage from Ely to Carswell and McClellan, and also as to the fact charged by him that the Gallagher mortgage had been fully satisfied, and was no longer of any force; alleging that both questions were submitted to the jury and decided against complainant in the action of ejectment, the judgment in which is now sought to be enjoined. Of the fact of such submission and finding there can, in this case, be no doubt. Under the instructions of the court, which are in proof in this record, if the jury found either of these issues in favor of Caldwell, the plaintiff was not entitled to a verdict. The plaintiff, however, did get a verdict. It thus appears conclusively that the jury found that there was no fraud in the second mortgage, and that the first had been satisfied.

The complainant, however, seeks to evade the force of the general principle on the ground that the verdict and judgment in actions of ejectment have not that conclusive effect between the parties which they have in other actions, either in courts of law or equity. It must be conceded that such is the general doctrine on the subject, as...