Miles v. Foley
Decision Date | 31 August 1999 |
Docket Number | (AC 17418) |
Citation | 736 A.2d 180,54 Conn. App. 645 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | JESSE MILES, TRUSTEE v. DANIEL A. FOLEY ET AL. |
Robert A. Fuller, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael J. Cacace, with whom were Ronald E. Kowalski II and Aamina Ahmad, for the appellees (intervening defendants).
This appeal arises out of a decision by the defendant planning and zoning commission of the town of New Canaan (commission)1 to reject a subdivision application submitted by the plaintiff, Jesse Miles, trustee. The plaintiff brought a mandamus action seeking a trial court order directing the commission to approve the subdivision map or, if the trial court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to such relief, an order directing the commission to process the application. The plaintiff and the defendants moved for summary judgment.2 The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order denying the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
The plaintiff claims that the trial court's order denying his motion for summary judgment3 and granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment was improper because the trial court improperly concluded that (1) the commission's vote to reject the plaintiffs application without processing it was a valid action under General Statutes § 8-26 and (2) an administrative appeal from the commission's refusal to process the application was an adequate remedy at law, thereby precluding an action of mandamus. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On May 20, 1996, the plaintiffs agent delivered a subdivision application to the commission in accordance with § 8-26. The following day, at the regular commission meeting, the commission discussed the plaintiffs proposed subdivision application and unanimously voted to reject the application because it was premature.4 On August 8, 1996, the plaintiffs attorney sent a letter to the commission demanding that it issue a certificate of approval pursuant to § 8-26 because more than sixty-five days passed. When the commission refused this demand, the plaintiff brought a mandamus action.
Subsequently, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, claiming that "there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of mandamus as a matter of law." The defendants also moved for summary judgments, claiming that a writ of mandamus cannot be granted where the party does not have a clear right to have the duty performed.
On July 7, 1997, the trial court issued an order denying the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The reason that the trial court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was that it found that the vote of the commission rejecting the plaintiffs subdivision application was action within the meaning of § 8-26, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 311-12, 592 A.2d 953 (1991). Therefore, the trial court reasoned that the rejection precluded the automatic approval of the subdivision application. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the commission did not act within sixty-five days, as required for automatic approval pursuant to § 8-26 and, therefore, the trial court reasoned that the mandamus action did not lie.
When issues in an appeal concern questions of law, this court reviews those claims de novo. See Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Bulaong, 218 Conn. 51, 58, 588 A.2d 138 (1991); Norse Systems, Inc. v. Tingley Systems, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 582, 592, 715 A.2d 807 (1998); Schratwieser v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 44 Conn. App. 754, 757, 692 A.2d 1283, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 915, 696 A.2d 340 (1997). Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, 204 Conn. 399, 402, 528 A.2d 805 (1987). (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Avon Meadow Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Bank of Boston Connecticut, 50 Conn. App. 688, 692-93, 719 A.2d 66, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 946, 723 A.2d 320 (1998).
The plaintiff first claims that the vote by the commission to reject the plaintiffs subdivision application without processing it was not a valid action under the provisions of § 8-265 and, because the commission did not act within sixty-five days after the receipt of the application, as required by General Statutes § 8-26d (b),6 the plaintiff was entitled to a certificate of approval. Specifically, the plaintiff, citing Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 592, 409 A.2d 1029 (1979), argues that the commission's vote to reject the plaintiffs subdivision application without processing it is not a valid action because action under § 8-26 is limited to either the approval, modification and approval, or disapproval of an application, and does not include rejection of an application.
In response, the defendants claim that the commission acted on the subdivision application, as required by § 8-26, when the commission discussed the application at a regular meeting and voted to reject the application. The question, therefore, is whether the action taken by the commission was the action required by § 8-26 so as to prevent the automatic approval of the subdivision application filed by the plaintiff.
The automatic approval provision of § 8-26 provides that "[t]he failure of the commission to act [upon a subdivision application] shall be considered as an approval...." Our Supreme Court has construed this provision to require a planning commission to "approve, modify and approve, or disapprove" such an application within the time allowed in order to avoid the sanction of automatic approval. Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 176 Conn. 593. Carpenter, however, is not dispositive of the issue in this case. In Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 597, our Supreme Court held "that an `approval' subject to a condition, the fulfillment of which is not within the control of the applicant, or in which an approval by a coordinate agency is not shown to be a reasonable probability, is not an `approval' within § 8-26 ... and such an approval is thus a `failure to act'...."
In this case, however, we are not faced with determining whether a conditional approval is an "approval" under § 8-26; we are faced with determining whether a rejection of the application is a "disapproval" under § 8-26. The minutes of the May 21, 1996 commission meeting state that the application was unanimously rejected since it was premature and the town planner was instructed to return the file to the applicant. It is clear, as the trial court found and the record shows, that the commission voted to deny the application. We conclude that the commission's rejection here is equivalent to a "disapproval" of the application and is the action that avoids the automatic approval provision of § 8-26. See Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 219 Conn. 313-14 ( ).
The plaintiff further argues that the commission's reasons for the rejection of the subdivision application "were not valid or justified by any statute, and violated the express provisions and legislative intent of § 8-26." We fail to see how this would result in the automatic approval of the subdivision application.
The commission's rejection of the subdivision application was based on the determination by the commission that the subdivision application was premature because the approval of the application by the environmental commission was the subject of a pending appeal. Additionally, the commission determined that the subdivision application, as presented, violated provisions of the town zoning regulations.
Any challenge to the merits of or the reasons underlying the commission's denial is the subject of an administrative appeal. The plaintiff, however, did not take an administrative appeal. Instead, the plaintiff brought a mandamus action seeking a trial court order directing the commission to approve the subdivision map because the plaintiff incorrectly believed that the commission's rejection of the subdivision application triggered the automatic approval provision of § 8-26. On appeal, therefore, we are limited to the determination of whether the plaintiff was entitled to the automatic approval of the subdivision application and, thereafter, the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Because we concluded that the commission's rejection of the subdivision application is action under § 8-26, the plaintiff is not automatically entitled to a certificate of approval. We do not find that an improper decision by the commission would result in a finding of inaction that would trigger the automatic approval of the subdivision application under § 8-26.
The plaintiff further claims that the failure of the...
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1999 Connecticut Appellate Review
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