Miles v. Johnson-Piper, Case No. 19-cv-1078 (WMW/KMM)
| Decision Date | 23 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-1078 (WMW/KMM) |
| Parties | Gordon Miles, Plaintiff, v. Emily Johnson-Piper et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
This matter is before the Court on the January 23, 2020 Report and Recommendation (R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Katherine M. Menendez. (Dkt. 44.) The R&R recommends granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff Gordon Miles's complaint and denying Miles's motions for preliminary injunction and consolidation. Defendants and Miles filed timely objections to the R&R. For the reasons addressed below, the Court adopts the R&R as modified, grants Defendants' motion to dismiss, denies Miles's motions for preliminary injunction and consolidation, and dismisses this case.
As the R&R provides a detailed factual and procedural history, the Court briefly summarizes the background of this litigation. Miles is committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexual psychopathic personality and a sexually dangerous person. On April 19, 2019, Miles commenced this civil rights action against 34 MSOP employees in their individual and official capacities. In his amended complaint, Miles alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, failed to protect him by insisting that he room with another MSOP client, retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights, denied him meaningful access to the courts, and deprived him of property and imposed restrictive living arrangements in violation of his rights to procedural and substantive due process.1
Miles also filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion for consolidation. Defendants responded to Miles's motion for preliminary injunction and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Magistrate Judge Menendez issued an R&R on January 23, 2020. Miles and Defendants filed timely objections to the R&R. Defendants filed a timely reply to Miles's objections.
Both Miles and Defendants object to aspects of the R&R. The Court reviews de novo each portion of the R&R to which an objection is made. 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); LR 72(b)(3); United States v. Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 2003). The Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
Defendants' objections to the R&R are twofold. First, Defendants object to the R&R's conclusion that Defendant Kent Johansen, an MSOP employee, is not entitled toqualified immunity. Second, Defendants object to the R&R's recommendation to deny Defendants' motion to dismiss Miles's First Amendment retaliation claim for failure to state a claim.
A. Qualified Immunity of Kent Johansen
The R&R concludes that determining whether Johansen is entitled to qualified immunity would be premature on the present record. Defendants object to this conclusion, arguing that Johansen is entitled to qualified immunity because the Court has failed to identify a case in which an officer acting under similar circumstances was found to have violated the United States Constitution.
Qualified immunity "protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). On a motion to dismiss, qualified immunity is upheld "only when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint." Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts consider two factors to determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity: "(1) whether the facts alleged or shown, construed most favorably to the plaintiff[], establish a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, such that a reasonable official would have known that the acts were unlawful." Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2013). A constitutional right is clearly established only if the unlawfulness of theofficial's action is apparent in light of pre-existing law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). The pre-existing law must be "particularized to the facts of the case." White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the pre-existing law must be particularized, identification of a case directly on point is not required; instead, the standard requires "existing precedent [to] have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate." Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). On a motion to dismiss, "if it is clear from the [compliant] that the [plaintiff's] allegations do not amount to constitutional violations, or even if they do, the rights at issue were not clearly established, the Court must grant the motion[ ] to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds." Schatz Family v. Gierer, 399 F.Supp. 2d 973, 987 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
The Court's research has identified two cases with facts similar to the present matter. In Koster v. Jelinek, the district court considered whether the rules of a treatment and detention center for sexually violent individuals that restricted a detainee's right to take notes and discuss grievances and lawsuits during group therapy violated the detainee's First Amendment right of free speech. No. 10-3003, 2011 WL 3349831, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2011). The court concluded that the center "did not violate the [detainee's] First Amendment rights by prohibiting note-taking during the group therapy, restricting the topics of discussion during group therapy sessions, or prohibiting the [detainee] from threatening the defendants with lawsuits and grievances as a condition of continued group therapy." Id. at *3. The court reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment does not demand thata [detention center] resident be allowed to manipulate and disrupt group therapy" and that a detention center's group therapy rules "fall comfortably within [the center's] professional discretion." Id. Applying Koster's reasoning, Miles did not have a clearly established constitutional right to discuss his grievances regarding the double-bunking policy during group therapy at MSOP.
Similarly, in Wicklund v. Idaho Department of Corrections, the district court considered whether a sex offender treatment program's limitation on disruptions occurring during therapy violated a detainee's First Amendment rights. No. 1:09-CV-00674-EJL-CWD, 2012 WL 913761, at *8 (D. Idaho Mar. 16, 2012). Although the court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that the detainee's "speech during the therapy sessions is not protected speech under the First Amendment." Id. The court reasoned that "the probation officers' order during the meeting or at any other time prohibiting [the detainee] from complaining about the polygrapher, prosecutor or prosecuting attorney's office during court ordered therapy session[s] was not a violation of [the detainee's] First Amend rights" because defendants "had a legitimate correctional goal in preventing [the detainee] from disrupting the therapy sessions." Id. Applying Wicklund's reasoning, Miles did not have a clearly established constitutional right to discuss his grievances regarding the double-bunking policy during group therapy at MSOP.
At issue here is whether Miles's dismissal from group therapy, which resulted from his disruptive contributions regarding his discontent with the double-bunking policy duringgroup therapy sessions, violated his First Amendment rights. Even assuming Miles is able to establish a violation of a constitutional right, the Court's research does not reflect that a reasonable official in Johansen's position would have known that the act of dismissing Miles from group therapy in response to his disruptive contributions was unlawful. The Court's research did not locate any pre-existing law that suggests a pre-established right to deviate from topics deemed acceptable by MSOP, nor has Miles cited any. In fact, the Court's research suggests the opposite. As the court in Koster explained, a center may restrict therapy discussion topics and a detainee has no First Amendment right to disrupt group therapy. 2011 WL 3349831, at *3; see also Wicklund, 2012 WL 913761, at *8. Furthermore, MSOP may use its discretion to set guidelines addressing conduct and expectations during group therapy, especially when the guidelines support a legitimate correctional goal such as compliance with court-ordered participation in therapy sessions. Koster, 2011 WL 3349831, at *3; see also Wicklund, 2012 WL 913761, at *8. Because Johansen, at the time of the alleged conduct, had no reason to believe that his actions violated clearly established constitutional rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity. In light of Johansen's qualified immunity, Defendants' objections to that aspect of the R&R are sustained.2
Miles advances five objections to the R&R. First, Miles objects to the R&R's conclusion that the amended complaint fails to state a failure-to-protect or deliberate-indifference claim. Second, Miles objects to the R&R's conclusion that the amended complaint fails to state a procedural-due-process claim. Third, Miles objects to the R&R's conclusion as to the substantive-due-process claim. Fourth, Miles objects to the R&R's recommendation to deny his motion for preliminary injunction. And fifth, Miles objects to the R&R's conclusion regarding his motion for...
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