Miles v. State
Decision Date | 07 October 1954 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 682 |
Citation | 261 Ala. 670,75 So.2d 479 |
Parties | Willie MILES v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
B. E. Jones and Robert H. Jones, Evergreen, for appellant.
Si Garrett, Atty. Gen., and Paul T. Gish, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
This case is before us by virtue of the Automatic Appeal Statute, §§ 382(1) to 382(13), Tit. 15, Code of Alabama, 1940, Cum.Pocket Part.
Appellant's counsel have furnished us with an excellent brief which discusses every point worthy of consideration. Under our view of the case, however, only one of these need be treated in this opinion, the others relating to matters either within the discretion of the trial court, or which are unlikely to arise on another trial.
Upon being called on the morning after the alleged offense, the sheriff and his brother, the chief deputy, began an investigation. Soon they were joined in the investigation by Sergeant Melton and another member of the Highway Patrol. As a result of their investigation, the defendant was arrested and committed to jail. As a further result of their activity, an alleged confession was obtained from the defendant at his home where he was arrested. It is undisputed that they caused the defendant to remove all his clothing. The defendant's testimony was that he was beaten and otherwise mistreated, by two of the officers in order to coerce this confession. The sheriff and Sergeant Melton testified that no coercion, violence, force or mistreatment of any kind was imposed upon the accused. The sheriff made the entire investigation of the case, was the chief actor in discovering and bringing into court the evidence upon which the accused was indicted and convicted, and in addition was the principal witness against the accused other than the victim of the alleged offense. The highway patrolman was also a witness.
Defendant's motion for a mistrial before the case was submitted to the jury, and defendant's motion for new trial after conviction and sentence, in addition to other grounds, assigned the following state of facts, as set out in motion for new trial:
Our leading case of Oliver v. State, 232 Ala. 5, 166 So. 615, 617, concurred in by all the Justices, quotes from the case of Owens v. State of Florida, 68 Fla. 154, 159-160, 67 So. 39, 40, Ann.Cas.1917B, 252, and cases from other jurisdictions and contains so much of our law on this subject that the opinion in that case, so far as here applicable is quoted:
'It is established that in their deliberation the jury should be separated from and uninfluenced by the outside world. Any misconduct that might influence the jury, affect the verdict rendered or the punishment fixed, is a cause for a new trial. The test of vitiating influence upon a jury authorizing a new trial is not whether it did influence the jury to act without the evidence, but whether it might have unlawfully influenced the jury in the verdict returned, as to its nature, character, or degree, or the amount and extent of the punishment fixed by the jury within the statute. The authorities on this subject are collected in Roan v. State, 225 Ala. 428, 435, 143 So. 454; Leith v. State, 206 Ala. 439, 443, 444, 90 So. 687; Lakey v. State, 206 Ala. 180, 182, 89 So. 605.
'The Coroner Enslen, who has been active in investigating the case, procuring witnesses, causing the defendant's arrest, testified as to material facts and should not have been permitted by the sheriff to have charge of the jury and to remain with them during much of their deliberation. As to this conduct, the state did not overcome the presumption of injury that entered into the verdict rendered by reason of the presence of such witness. Roan v. State, supra; Aylward v. State, 216 Ala. 218 113 So. 22; Satterfield v. State, 212 Ala. 349, 102 So. 691; Lowery v. State, 23 Ala.App. 191, 122 So. 603; Taylor v. State, 18 Ala.App. 466, 93 So. 78.
'Each case is to be judged by its particular facts. Bell v. State, 227 Ala. 254, 149 So. 687. The association of this witness (Enslen) as special bailiff in control of the jury during the trial and its deliberations, furnished opportunity for ingratiating himself in the minds of the individual jurors, and for unduly emphasizing his testimony given in that case, causing it to affect and enter into the verdict rendered. His constant presence with the jury no doubt had bearing upon the case, though he and the jurors testified that he had not spoken to any individual juror about the evidence in the case or about the defendant. The injury which resulted was no doubt unconsciously brought about, but was none the less real or effective.
'In a case very much like this case, Owens v. State of Florida, 68 Fla. 154, 159-160, 67 So. 39, 40, Ann.Cas.1917B, 252, the Chief Justice observed: 'It is sufficient to say that while it is not affirmatively made to appear that either Beach or Cellon did actually attempt to influence the jury in any way, and, as a matter of fact each one positively denies having done so, yet it plainly appears that each one had the opportunity of so doing. It was manifestly improper for Beach, who was a material witness for the prosecution, to have charge of or to be with the jury. See People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.W. 927, 36 Am.Rep. 438, and appended note. We would also refer to Madden v. State, 1 Kan. 340; State v. Snyder, 20 Kan. 306; Gainey v. People, 97 Ill. 270, 37 Am.Rep. 109; Rickard v. State, 74 Ind. 275. We shall not undertake to express any opinion concerning the evidence. Suffice it to say that there is a conflict therein upon material points. This being true, and it plainly appearing that some of the deputies of the sheriff had acted in an irregular and improper manner while in charge of the jury and it would seem, were over zealous for the prosecution, we think that the ends of justice would be best subserved by another trial. As was said in Buxton v. State, 89 Tenn. 216, text 217, 14 S.W. 480: 'An impartial jury, selected and kept free from all outside or improper influences, has always been regarded by our courts as necessary to a fair and impartial trial.''
The foregoing decision is quoted in part in footnote 2, 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1352, p. 1013.
In the case of Aylward v. State, 216 Ala. 218, 221, 113 So. 22, 24, the sheriff had a private conversation with one of the jurors. Although the sheriff testified that the conversation was innocuous, the case was reversed. The opinion of this court, by Sayre, J., concluded with the following:
Our Court of Appeals in reversing Taylor v. State, 18 Ala.App. 466, 93 So. 78, 79, on account of action of...
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