Miles v. State
| Decision Date | 23 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 79554,79554 |
| Citation | 500 P.3d 1263 |
| Parties | Christian Stephon MILES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Mario D. Valencia, Henderson, for Appellant.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and John Niman, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.
This case concerns the warnings a trial court must give to a criminal defendant who has expressed a desire to exercise his right, under Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), to waive the right to counsel and represent oneself. In this opinion, we emphasize that a Faretta canvass must ensure that a defendant decides whether to waive counsel with eyes open. The canvass must safeguard against the unacceptable danger that defendants would choose to represent themselves with an incomplete understanding of the risks they face. Inadequate warnings harm not only the defendant, but also the credibility of our justice system.
We hold today that a trial court should not ignore a defendant's lack of understanding about the charges and potential sentences that becomes evident during the canvass. While no specific questions are required, the trial court should not disregard a defendant's evident lack of understanding. Here, because the trial court's canvass did not ensure that the defendant understood the aggregate mandatory minimum sentence he potentially faced or the risks and disadvantages of waiving the right to counsel, we reverse and remand. We further observe that the trial court inappropriately disparaged the defendant's choice to waive counsel during the canvass. While it is important that the trial court ensure that a defendant understands the risks of deciding to waive counsel, the court must conduct its canvass in a courteous manner, consistent with the respect due to the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right and the decorum and impartiality demanded by the judicial process.
Appellant Christian Stephon Miles was charged with sex trafficking of a child under 18 years of age, first-degree kidnapping, living from the earnings of a prostitute, and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. The victim, who was 16 years old at the time of the crimes, testified that Miles contacted her to entice her to engage in prostitution, helped her to run away from home and to remove an ankle bracelet she was required to wear in connection with a previous prostitution arrest, and advertised her sexual services on Craigslist.
Well before trial, Miles became dissatisfied with the attorney assigned to him, and he moved for permission to represent himself. The trial court immediately began to discourage Miles from doing so, calling self-representation "the stupidest thing in the world," "a bonehead move," and "a nail in your coffin." But Miles was insistent, and the court engaged in a Faretta canvass, stating that "I'll try and make it quick."1
The court explained to Miles that an attorney trains in the law and has the skills and experience to properly defend a case; Miles acknowledged that his legal training was limited to reading litigation manuals "and trial books." The court probed Miles’ understanding of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify and the consequences of waiving that right. The court explained in particular that the State might be able to introduce Miles’ prior conviction for pandering to impeach him as a witness, and Miles said he understood. The court also asked Miles to explain the difference between peremptory and for-cause challenges to jurors. Miles’ responses to these questions indicated a generally accurate, if rough, understanding of trial procedure.
The court also asked Miles to state the elements of sex trafficking. Miles answered: The court did not inquire further as to Miles’ understanding of the substantive law underlying sex trafficking and did not ask Miles whether he understood the elements of the other charges.
The court also asked Miles to state the range of punishment for the crimes he was charged with. Miles replied:
No other discussion of the potential sentence occurred during the Faretta canvass. At the conclusion of the canvass, the court observed, The court reluctantly granted Miles’ motion.
Miles represented himself at trial. A jury found him guilty of all charges. The court sentenced him to 5 years to life on the sex trafficking charge, 5 years to life on the kidnapping charge, 19 to 48 months on the living-off-the-earnings charge, and 24 to 72 months on the child abuse charge. The court ordered the minimum sentences for each charge to run consecutively, for a total of 163 months to life. Miles appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Miles v. State, No. 79554-COA, 2021 WL 398992 (Nev. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2021) (Amended Order of Affirmance and Order Denying Rehearing). We granted Miles’ subsequent petition for review under NRAP 40B.
Background of the Faretta right
A criminal defendant may waive one's right to counsel and represent oneself. See generally Faretta v . California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The right to represent oneself, and to refuse appointed counsel of the State's choosing, stems from "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ––––, ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1507, 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) ().
422 U.S. at 852, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Justice Blackmun was surely correct that a criminal defendant can rarely, if ever, represent oneself as effectively as a trained attorney. Yet the right to represent oneself is firmly embedded in our law as a fundamental aspect of the right to control one's own defense. Accordingly, courts and legislatures have developed various safeguards to ensure that defendants who choose to exercise that right are well-informed enough not to make fools of themselves—even if their choice is, in an objective sense, likely unwise.
The need for at least some safeguards has been recognized from the beginning, when the Supreme Court of the United States wrote that a defendant who chooses to waive counsel "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." ’ Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) ). Thus, "an accused who chooses self-representation must satisfy the court that his waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary." Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 337-38, 22 P.3d 1164, 1170 (2001). A court does not show respect for individual dignity and autonomy by allowing an individual who has not knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel—or, to put it another way, who has waived counsel with eyes closed—to represent oneself. A conviction obtained after an invalid waiver of the right to counsel—that is, one that fails to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right—is per se invalid and is not subject to harmless-error analysis. Hooks v. State , 124 Nev. 48, 57-58 & n.23, 176 P.3d 1081, 1086-87 & n.23 (2008).
Determining whether a waiver is valid is not a mechanical task. The Supreme Court of the United States has not "prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel." Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004). Likewise, "this court has ‘rejected the necessity of a mechanical performance of a Faretta canvass.’ " Hooks, 124 Nev. at 55, 176 P.3d at 1085 (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 125, 912 P.2d 234, 238 (1996) ). Despite not requiring any "mechanical performance" of a script, we have nevertheless repeatedly "urge[d] the district courts to conduct a thorough inquiry of a defendant who wishes to represent himself and to make findings as to whether the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Id. at 55-56, 176 P.3d at 1085 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Wayne v. State, 100 Nev. 582, 585, 691 P.2d 414, 416 (1984). Certain "areas of suggested inquiry are set forth in SCR 253(3), including the defendant's understanding of the charges and the possible penalties." Hooks , 124 Nev. at 54, 176 P.3d at 1085 ; see SCR 253(3)(g) (...
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