Miles v. Strong

• Citation: 25 A. 459,62 Conn. 95
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 30 June 1892
• Parties: MILES et al. v. STRONG et al.

25 A. 459

62 Conn. 95

MILES et al.

v. STRONG et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 30, 1892.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Thayer, Judge.

Suit by Samuel A. Miles and Ernest Strong Miles against Charles K. Strong and others. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

G. P. Carroll, for appellants.

W. B. Stoddard and S. C. Loomis, for appellees.

TORRANCE, J. This is a complaint brought to remove a cloud upon the title to certain land in the town of Milford, and for discovery and other relief. The defendants demurred to the complaint, chiefly on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not show the existence of any cloud upon the plaintiffs' title, or entitle them to the relief sought. The demurrer was overruled, the case was heard upon its merits, and upon the facts found on the record judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs. No discovery was in fact sought for or obtained. The record shows substantially the following facts: The real estate in question was devised to Ernest Strong Miles, one of the plaintiffs, under the will of Selah Strong, which contains the folio wing clause: "The foregoing devises to the said Ernest Strong Miles are subject to the charges aforesaid, to him and his heirs forever: provided, however, that if he, the said Ernest Strong Miles, shall die before he attains his majority, or without leaving lawful issue surviving him, and without having disposed of all the lands by this will devised to him, either by deed or by will, then, and in either of these events, it is my will that all said lands herein devised to the said Ernest Strong Miles, and not by him disposed of, shall descend to and be distributed among my heirs at law, and those who legally represent them."

All the real estate so devised to Ernest was subsequently set out and distributed to him in 1882, and the estate of Selah Strong was then fully and completely settled in the probate court. The distributors set out said lands to Ernest, subject to the provisions of the above clause of the will, and their return showing that fact is recorded at length in the Milford land records. In 1890, after Ernest became 21 years old, and after the charges in the eighth clause of the will mentioned had ceased to exist, he conveyed by deed to his father, the other plaintiff, in trust for himself, and for other purposes set forth in the deed, most of the real estate so devised and set out to him. Subsequently it became necessary, in order that the plaintiffs might obtain any benefit or profit from the land, to sell that portion of it which is described in the complaint. The plaintiffs, who have been in the full and exclusive possession of all the land devised to "Ernest since 1879, claiming an absolute estate in fee therein, contracted to sell the portion of it described in the complaint to Mrs. E. P. Smith. In consequence of certain claims of interest in or title to the land made by the defendants, who were the heirs at law of Selah Strong, the testator, Mrs. Smith refused to purchase or pay for the land. These are the principal facts stated in the complaint and found by the court.

The precise claims which the defendants made and continue to make, and which are said to constitute a cloud upon the plaintiffs' title, and the consequences flowing there from, are stated in the finding as follows: "After this bargain [to soil the land to Mrs. Smith] was made, the defendants claimed, and since have claimed, that the will and distribution give them some interest in the land, and that any deed of the same from the plaintiffs, or either of them, would only convey the same subject to such interest of the defendants. This claim of the defendants came to the knowledge of Mrs. Smith and the plaintiffs, but the exact claim or nature of the interest or title of the defendants, as claimed by them, was not made known to the plaintiffs or Mrs. Smith. In consequence of this claim of the defendants, Mrs. Smith refused to complete the purchase and accept a deed of the premises, and the plaintiffs lost the sale thereof."

The principal question made upon the present appeal, and the only one which it will be necessary to consider here, is whether, upon the facts stated, the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment. The record clearly shows that the claim made by the defendants is in fact based upon the will. As stated in the plaintiffs' brief, it is that, unless Ernest died leaving issue, the land devised to him would go to the defendants as heirs at law of the testator. In other words, the defendants asserted orally that they had, under the eighth clause of the will, a contingent interest in the lands. The plaintiffs do not claim that the mere, bare, naked, oral assertion of some right, title, or interest in land, without more, would constitute a cloud upon title which a court of equity could be called upon to remove. Such a claim would be untenable. Welles v. Rhodes, 59 Conn. 493, 22 Atl. Rep. 286. But they do claim that such oral assertions, taken in connection with the will and the distribution as spread upon the public records, constitute such a cloud. We think the plaintiffs are mistaken in this claim. It will be observed that all the parties claim under the same will and under the same provisions of that will. They all assert the genuineness and validity of the will and of those provisions. It also appears that, in terms at least, the heirs at law of the testator have or may have under the will some sort of contingent interest in the lands devised to Ernest. Whether the plaintiffs have the absolute title which they claim, or whether the defendants have the contingent interest which they assert, depends upon the construction of the will. If any cloud whatever exists upon the plaintiffs' title, it exists solely because of the will, and not because of the record of the distribution, or of the oral claims and assertions made by the defendants. These are based upon, and derive all their force and effect from, the will, and without that they would clearly constitute no cloud upon the plaintiffs' title which a court of equity would ordinarily remove. It is the will, then, and the will alone, that casts a cloud upon the plaintiffs' title, if such a cloud exists; and whether or not any such cloud exists depends solely upon the construction of the will.

Furthermore, the construction of the part of the will now in question manifestly depends upon the language of the will itself, without the aid of extrinsic evidence. The plaintiffs' claim to the contrary is not well founded. Whether, in case Ernest dies without leaving lawful...