Milford Water Co. v. Town of Hopkinton

• Decision Date: 05 July 1906
• Citation: 78 N.E. 451,192 Mass. 491
• Parties: MILFORD WATER CO. v. TOWN OF HOPKINTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

192 Mass. 491

78 N.E. 451

MILFORD WATER CO. v. TOWN OF HOPKINTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

July 5, 1906

COUNSEL

John R. Thayer, Arthur P. Rugg, Henry H. Thayer, and Wendell Williams, for petitioner.

Chas F. Choate, Jr., and Francis C. Pillior, for respondent.

OPINION

HAMMOND J.

The principal question is whether the real estate is exempt from taxation. The petitioner does not base the claim of exemption upon any express provision of statute, nor does it deny the power of the Legislature to tax the property. But it contends that the general provisions of our statutes for the taxation of real estate are not applicable where the estate is taken by right of eminent domain (or, being subject to be so taken, has been purchased) for a public purpose and is being used for that purpose.

The leading case upon this subject in our reports is Worcester v. Western R. R. Corp. 4 Metc. 564. The railroad company had been authorized to take a strip of land five rods wide (and, in certain cases not here material, to a greater width), and to purchase such land outside of said strip as might be proper and necessary in carrying on the business for which it was incorporated. It was said by this court that it was manifest upon an inspection of the charter that 'the establishment of that great thoroughfare is regarded as a public work established by public authority, intended for the public use and benefit,' and it was held that to the extent of the land which the corporation could take by right of eminent domain the real estate of the corporation was exempt from taxation so long as used for the public purpose. It was further held that this was the limit of exemption. The rule thus laid down was approved in Boston & Main R. R. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush. 237. In Wayland v. County Com'rs, 4 Gray, 500, the same principle was applied where land situated in the town of Wayland had been taken by the city of Boston under St. 1846, p. 113, c. 167, for supplying the city with pure water. Thomas, J., in giving the opinion of the court says: 'We think the question substantially settled by the decision of this court in the case of Worcester v Western Railroad.'

The principle seems to be that where land is taken (or purchased when it could have been taken) and held for a public purpose, it shall be exempt from taxation in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary. It has been applied to a gravel pit owned by one city within the limits of another, and to land taken for highways. Somerville v. Waltham, 170 Mass. 160, 48 N.E. 1092; Lancy v. Boston, 186 Mass. 128, 71 N.E. 302, and cases cited; Boston v. B. & A. R. R., 170 Mass. 95, 49 N.E. 95, and cases cited. In the case last cited, Knowlton, J., said: 'This exemption is not founded upon any express provision of any statute, but rests upon general principles of propriety, justice and expediency which are applicable alike to every kind of taxation.'

The petitioner, the Milford Water Company, was incorporated 'for the purpose of furnishing the inhabitants of Milford with pure water for the extinguishment of fires, and for domestic and other purposes'; and to that end was authorized to take, hold and convey the water of any spring or stream in Milford, and to take and hold by purchase or otherwise any land in the town of Milford or in the town of Hopkinton south of Granite street which might be proper and necessary. There was a provision in the act of incorporation providing that the town of Milford should have the right to purchase the corporate property, the price to be agreed upon by the parties or, failing an agreement, by three commissioners. St. 1881, p. 399, c. 77; St. 1882, p. 141, c. 188.

The use is public. As said by Thomas, J., in Wayland v. County Com'rs, ubi supra, 'It would be difficult * * * to find any class of cases in which the right of eminent domain is more justly or wisely exercised than in provisions to supply our crowded towns and cities with pure water, provisions equally necessary to the health and the safety of the people.' The petitioner was engaged in ministering to this use, and for this purpose it was empowered to take land by right of eminent domain. It could take land for no other purpose. We do not understand the respondent town to deny that the real estate in question was held and used by the petitioners under its act of incorporation. If the estate had been held by the town of Milford, then the case would have been completely covered by the last case above cited.

It is true that by St. 1893, p. 987, c. 352 (now Rev. Laws, c. 12, § 10), it was provided in substance that although property held by a city or town in another city or town for the purpose of a water supply, if yielding no rent, should be exempt from taxation yet that the city or town so holding should pay to the city or town in which the land was situated a certain sum dependent upon the value of the land exclusive of buildings or other structures; yet it is manifest that this sum is not technically a tax, but simply a substitute for a tax. The principle of the decision in Wayland v. County Com'rs, ubi supra, is still the law of the commonwealth so far as respects the question of taxation.

It can make no difference that the party which is empowered to exercise the right of eminent domain and to perform this public trust is a corporation other than municipal. The true test is whether it is engaged in the administration of a public trust with power to take land for that purpose. It is the character of the use to which the property is put, and not of the party who uses it, that settles the question of exemption from taxation. Worcester v. Western R. R., ubi supra; Wayland v. Count Com'rs, supra; Boston v. B. & A. R. R., 170 Mass. 95, 49 N.E. 95; Essex v Salem, 153 Mass. 141, 26 N.E. 431. The case is clearly...