Mill Valley Refuse Co. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 July 1980
• Citation: 166 Cal.Rptr. 687,108 Cal.App.3d 707
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: MILL VALLEY REFUSE COMPANY et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF MARIN, Respondent, Julia DIAS, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 49054.

Page 687

166 Cal.Rptr. 687

108 Cal.App.3d 707

MILL VALLEY REFUSE COMPANY et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF MARIN, Respondent, Julia DIAS, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 49054.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

July 29, 1980.

James D. Biernat, Law Offices of Richard B. Barrett, Burlingame, for petitioners.

L. Lawrence Bernheim, Spridgen, Barrett, Achor, Luckhardt, Anderson & James, Santa Rosa, for real party in interest.

CALDECOTT, Presiding Justice.

We are concerned on this petition with two joint tortfeasors each of whom settled in good faith with the plaintiff in the underlying action before verdict or judgment. The question presented is whether Code of Civil Procedure section 877, subdivision (b) protects each tortfeasor from contribution or comparative indemnity from the other tortfeasor. We hold that each tortfeasor is protected.

The accident which gave rise to the subject action occurred on December 2, 1977. Catherine Chasse, the plaintiff, was a passenger in an automobile driven by cross-complainant Julia Dias, which collided with a Mill Valley Refuse Company truck driven by Benjamin Guice. Catherine Chasse filed her complaint on July 21, 1978. The complaint named as defendants Mill Valley Refuse Company, Benjamin Guice and Julia Dias. Julia Dias filed a cross-complaint against Mill Valley and Benjamin Guice on August 23, 1978, for equitable comparative indemnity.

On or about August 14, 1979, Julia Dias settled the claim of the plaintiff against her for $13,000. On September 27, 1979, apparently the day set for trial, the refuse company and Benjamin Guice settled with plaintiff for $5,000.

On January 18, 1980, petitioners Mill Valley Refuse Company and Benjamin Guice filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the cross-complaint of Julia Dias, was barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 877, subdivision (b).

The motion for summary judgment was denied by the trial court on or about February 11, 1980, in an order citing Weiss v. Field (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 487, 161 Cal.Rptr. 74.

Mill Valley Refuse Company and Benjamin Guice ¹ filed this petition for a writ of mandate, naming Dias as real party in interest and asking that this court direct respondent superior court to dismiss a cross-complaint for indemnity against them on the ground that under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 877, subdivision (b), their settlement with the plaintiff discharges them from any contribution to any other tortfeasor.

Code of Civil Procedure section 877, subdivision (b) provides: "Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort . . . (P) (b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasors."

Stambaugh v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 132 Cal.Rptr. 843, held that the principles of comparative negligence enunciated in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 did not modify the rule of subdivision (b) of section 877. Accordingly, the court granted a writ of mandate, where the trial court had denied a motion for summary judgment on a cross- complaint made by a tortfeasor who had settled with the plaintiff.

The court in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 cited Stambaugh with approval in reasoning that section 877 did not preclude the adoption of comparative partial indemnity. There the court stated at page 604, 146 Cal.Rptr. at page 198, 578 P.2d at page 915: "Thus, while we recognize that section 877, by its terms, releases a settling tortfeasor only from liability for contribution and not partial indemnity, we conclude that from a realistic perspective the legislative policy underlying the provision dictates that a tortfeasor who has entered into a 'good faith' settlement (see River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d 986 (103 Cal.Rptr. 498)) with the plaintiff must also be discharged from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor. As the Court of Appeal noted recently in Stambaugh v. Superior Court . . . (supra ) 62 Cal.App.3d 231, 236 (132 Cal.Rptr. 843) . . . : 'Few things would be better calculated to frustrate (section 877's) policy, and to discourage settlement of disputed tort claims, than knowledge that such a settlement lacked finality and would lead to further litigation with one's joint tortfeasors, and perhaps further liability.' This observation is as applicable in a partial indemnity framework as in the contribution context. Moreover, to preserve the incentive to settle which section 877 provides to injured plaintiffs, we conclude that a plaintiff's recovery from nonsettling tortfeasors should be diminished only by the amount that the plaintiff has actually recovered in a good faith settlement, rather than by an amount measured by the settling tortfeasor's proportionate responsibility for the injury. (See Fleming, Forward: Comparative Negligence At Last By Judicial Choice (1976) 64 Cal.L.Rev. 239, 258-259.)"

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