Millard v. Curtis
Decision Date | 12 February 1929 |
Docket Number | 39198 |
Citation | 223 N.W. 489,208 Iowa 682 |
Parties | E. J. MILLARD et al., Appellees, v. GERTRUDE M. CURTIS, Appellant |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED JUNE 24, 1929.
Appeal from Harrison District Court.--H. J. MANTZ, Judge.
Action at law by the trustees of a bank which had been in the hands of a receiver, to recover on defendant's promissory note to the bank. Jury waived. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Robertson & Wolfe, for appellant.
Bolter & Murray, for appellees.
OPINION
The note sued on is in common form, payable to the order of Dunlap State Bank, signed by defendant, as sole maker. The answer is in two divisions: one a general denial, and the other by separate division:
"This defendant, Gertrude M. Curtis, alleges that her husband, who was an officer in the said bank on or about the date of the note set out in Count II of said petition, presented the said note to her and asked her to sign it; that she never did receive anything of value from said bank, and never agreed to sign said note as surety or otherwise for her said husband; that she had no transaction of any kind or nature with said bank at the time she signed said note; that, by reason of these facts, the said note for $ 1,000, a copy of which is set forth in said Count II of said petition, is without consideration, and is null and void."
The only evidence in support of this plea is that of defendant and her daughter, as follows: Defendant testifies:
It was stipulated that the daughter "would testify to the same state of facts as her mother, the defendant, has testified to herein as to the execution of the note, Exhibit 2, and that it is to be considered by the court that her testimony as to said matter had been given, and is the same as her mother's testimony as to that matter."
Book entries claimed to be those of the bank were received in evidence, without laying proper foundation. Plaintiffs contend that, regardless of error in the admission of evidence offered by them to sustain the note as on sufficient consideration, consideration was presumed, defendant's evidence failed to negative consideration, plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as matter of law, and errors in admission of evidence offered by them were without prejudice. In her reply argument, defendant takes the position that, by separate division of her answer, she alleged, as a separate and complete defense, the matters which have been quoted; that her evidence proves them; and that, as the sufficiency of the answer was not questioned in the trial court, it cannot be questioned here; that, as the undisputed evidence sustains her allegations, she was entitled to judgment, under the doctrine of Ormsby v. Graham, 123 Iowa 202, 98 N.W. 724; Heiman v. Felder, 178 Iowa 740, 751, 160 N.W. 234; Roberts v. Ozias, 179 Iowa 1141, 1143, 162 N.W. 584; State Bank of Chicago v. Oyloe Piano Co., 195 Iowa 1152, 1154, 193 N.W. 403.
It appears from the allegations of the division of the answer in question that they are intended to raise the defense of want of consideration. The premised facts, as alleged therein were not sufficient to sustain the conclusion alleged, that the note was, by reason of them, without consideration. Consideration might consist not merely in benefit to defendant, but inconvenience or detriment to or waiver by the bank. Downey v. Gifford, 206 Iowa 848, 218 N.W. 488. The defendant admits signing the note and intrusting it to her husband, who was the managing officer of the bank. That it was delivered to the bank is not questioned. Its delivery was for some purpose. Whether or not there was consideration for the note would depend not merely on whether defendant received, or was promised, anything from her husband or from the bank for her signature, not merely on whether she herself owed the bank anything, or up to that time had borrowed any money from the bank, or had transacted any business of any kind herself with the bank. Consideration would not depend on whether she transacted "any of the business in which I [she] gave this note in the Dunlap State Bank." Consideration would depend upon facts attending the delivery to and acceptance by the bank: on whether, for instance, the note was credited to the husband's account on which defendant was entitled to draw; on whether, as is suggested, the note was received by the bank to take up a note to which defendant's name was forged by the...
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