Miller Aviation v. Milwaukee County Bd. of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 07 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1891,00-1891
• Citation: 273 F.3d 722
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2001) Miller Aviation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors, Robert Jackson, Sheila Aldrich, et al., Defendants-Appellants, and Milwaukee County, Defendant-Third/Party Plaintiff- Appellant, v. Air Vehicle Transportation, LLC, Third/Party Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 722

273 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2001)

Miller Aviation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors, Robert Jackson, Sheila Aldrich, et al., Defendants-Appellants, and Milwaukee County, Defendant-Third/Party Plaintiff- Appellant, v. Air Vehicle Transportation, LLC, Third/Party Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-1891

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Argued September 7, 2001¹

Decided November 27, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 94 C 1329--Patricia J. Gorence, Magistrate Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Howard B. Schoenfeld, Steiner & Schoenfeld, Milwaukee, WI, for appellee.

Jeremy P. Levinson (argued), Friebert, Finerty, & St. John, Timothy R. Karaskiewicz, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Howard B. Schoenfeld, Steiner & Schoenfeld, Milwaukee, WI, for appellants.

Before Bauer, Easterbrook, and Manion, Circuit Judges.

Manion, Circuit Judge.

Miller Aviation owns and operates a corporate airplane hangar on land that it leases from Milwaukee County. Miller sued the County² alleging that, during the course of the lease, the County violated numerous federal and state laws. After five years of litigation, seven of Miller's twelve claims were dismissed by the district court on the pleadings or by summary judgment. In its final order, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Miller's five remaining claims, as well as the County's supplemental counterclaims and third-party claims, remanding them instead to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(c)(3). The County appeals the district court's remand of these claims. We reverse and remand.

I.

Miller Aviation is a Wisconsin partnership that owns and operates a corporate airplane hangar at General Mitchell International Airport. Miller's hangar is located on a parcel of land that it leases from Milwaukee County, a political subdivision of the State of Wisconsin. This lease prohibits Miller from subleasing any portion of the premises without the express written consent of the County,³ or using the hangar for commercial purposes. Six months after executing this lease, Miller sought the County's permission to engage in various commercial activities at the hangar, and to sublease a portion of the facilities to third parties. The County refused to grant Miller's request due to the possible negative effects on the airport's commercial "fixed based operator."⁴ Shortly thereafter, Miller initiated the underlying civil action claiming that the County's denial of its request constituted a violation of several federal and state laws, and was unreasonably withheld in breach of contract.⁵ At the heart of Miller's complaint is its contention that, since at least 1987, the County has treated general aviation lessees unequally, discriminating with regard to matters such as insurance coverage requirements, required size of leased property, duration of leases, and the right to perform minor and major maintenance in hangars. The County disputes these allegations, and contends that its reasons for denying Miller's request were reasonable and nondiscriminatory.

The procedural history of this case is lengthy, spanning over a period of five years. During this time, the district court held several hearings, considered numerous motions, oversaw a contentious discovery process, waded through countless briefs, and issued a host of orders--two of which are relevant to this appeal.

On November 10, 1997, the district court issued a detailed order partially granting the County's motion for judgment on the pleadings. This order resulted in the dismissal of four Miller claims.⁶ On March 6, 2000, the district court issued an exhaustive 71-page memorandum and order that dismissed three more of Miller's claims on summary judgment,⁷ but remanded the remaining five,⁸ as well as the County's state law counterclaims and third-party claims,⁹ to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(c)(3). The district court gave three reasons for remanding the remaining claims in this litigation: (1) when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, a district court should generally relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state law (i.e. supplemental) claims; (2) the resolution of these claims involves disputed factual issues;¹⁰ and (3) the claims involve issues of state law that are most properly resolved by the state courts. The County appeals the district court's decision remanding the remaining claims in this case to state court.

II.

The County argues on appeal that the district court erred in remanding the remaining claims in this litigation to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367(c)(3). Section 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [pendent state law] claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."¹¹ The County contends that the district court erred in remanding these claims for four reasons: (1) one of Miller's remaining claims was a federal claim that the district court was required to exercise jurisdiction over; (2) the other, supplemental claims could not be remanded by the district court, pursuant to sec. 1367(c)(3) without the court first disposing of the federal claim; (3) all of Miller's remaining claims are subject to dismissal as a matter of law; and (4) because the district court already expended a substantial amount of judicial resources, a remand of the remaining claims in this litigation forces the state court to unnecessarily duplicate this effort. We conclude that the district court erred in failing to retain jurisdiction over the remaining claims in this litigation, and in remanding them to state court.

A district court's supplemental jurisdiction ruling under sec. 1367(c) is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1999). We review de novo, however, the underlying basis of a sec. 1367(c) remand to the extent that question is a legal one. See, e.g., Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Aetna U.S. Healthcare v. Lazorko, 121 S.Ct. 2552 (2001); Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1351 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998).

We begin our analysis in this case by addressing the County's contention that Miller's claim for "Violation of sec. 114.14, Wis. Stat., Subject to Constraints by Federal Law, 49 U.S.C.A. sec.40116" is a federal claim over which the district court had original, not supplemental, jurisdiction. In bringing this claim, Miller alleged the following:

That Milwaukee is empowered by the [sic] Wisconsin Law to "adopt regulations, and establish fees or charges," for the use of General Mitchell International Airport pursuant to sec. 114.14, Wis. Stat. or authorize an office, board or body to do so . . . . That Milwaukee in setting such fees is subject to the constraints of 49 U.S.C.A sec. 40116. That, as such, Milwaukee's fees and charges must be "reasonable rental charges . . . for airport facilities of an airport owned and operated by that State or subdivision" pursuant to 49 U.S.C.A. sec. 40116(e)(2). . . . That, as a result, Milwaukee has violated sec. 114, Wis. Stat. by charging the plaintiff unreasonable rental fees . . . . That as a result of the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff has been damaged . . . . R53, 28-29.

It is unclear from the face of the "well pleaded"complaint whether Miller is attempting to allege a state or federal claim--the complaint is captioned as a state law claim but the key allegation is that the County violated a federal statute. Miller confused the matter further with cryptic descriptions of the claim in the briefs it filed with the district court.¹² Fortunately, we need not decide whether this claim is based on federal or state law because neither Wis. Stat. sec. 114.14 or 49 U.S.C. sec. 40116 provide Miller with a private right of action upon which relief can be granted.¹³ Whether a statute contains a private right of action is a question of law that we review de novo. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 1993) (questions of statutory construction are subject to de novo review).

A. Wis. Stat. sec. 114.14

Wis. Stat. sec. 114.14 provides that "[t]he governing body of a city, village, town or county may adopt regulations, and establish fees or charges for the use of [an] airport or landing field . . . ." Miller alleges that the County violated sec. 114.14 by "charging [it] unreasonable rental fees." There is nothing in the text of sec. 114.14, however, explicitly providing for a private right of action to challenge any "fees or charges" established by municipalities pursuant to this statute. Therefore, Miller's claim under sec. 114.14 is viable only if the statute contains an implied private right of action.

Under Wisconsin law, "[a] determination of whether a statute creates a private right of action is dependent on whether there is a clear indication of the legislature's intent to create such a right." Grube v. Daun, 563 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Wis. 1997). The legislative intent to grant or withhold a private right of action for the violation of a statute, or the failure to perform a statutory duty, "is determined primarily from the form or language of the statute." Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, "[t]he nature of the evil sought to be remedied, and the purpose it was intended to accomplish, may also be taken into consideration." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, "the general rule is that a statute which does not purport to establish a civil liability, but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a construction establishing a civil liability." Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, an implied private right of action does not arise under Wisconsin law unless "(1) the...