Miller v. Abramson

• Decision Date: 29 August 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-P-514,18-P-514
• Citation: 95 Mass.App.Ct. 828,131 N.E.3d 863
• Parties: Gary MILLER & another v. Christoffer ABRAMSON & another.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

95 Mass.App.Ct. 828

131 N.E.3d 863

Gary MILLER & another¹

v.Christoffer ABRAMSON & another.²

No. 18-P-514

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex..

Argued January 11, 2019.

Decided August 29, 2019.

Jeffrey P. Allen (Katharin M. Unke Smith also present) for the defendants.

Leonard M. Davidson, Newton, for the plaintiffs.

Present: Massing, Desmond, & McDonough, JJ.

McDONOUGH, J.

The defendants, Christoffer and Cheryl Marie Abramson, appeal from a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs, Arlene and Gary Miller, acquired by adverse possession a thin slice of the Abramsons' land situated just across the parties' shared lot line. The Abramsons argue that the Millers' only open and adverse use of the disputed area occurring continuously for the required time period amounts to nothing more than basic suburban landscaping -- mowing, fertilizing, and occasional trimming of trees and shrubs. The Abramsons claim that under Massachusetts law, this sort of yard work is simply not enough to satisfy the elements of adverse possession. We disagree and affirm.

Background. The facts we recite are taken from the judge's findings, made after a jury-waived trial, and are supplemented by uncontroverted evidence in the record.³ The plaintiff Millers live in a single-family home at 11 Fellsmere Road in Newton, on a corner lot at the intersection with Ward Street. The defendant Abramsons live at 211 Ward Street in Newton. Fellsmere Road dead-ends onto Ward Street. As shown in the plan of land we include as an appendix to this opinion, the back of the Millers' property directly abuts one side line of the Abramsons' lot. The parties' shared lot line is straight, running from Ward Street to the back of the Abramsons' property. The area disputed by the parties forms a thin triangle, about 492 square feet in size, the base of which is along the Abramsons' back lot line and one side of which is along the parties' shared lot line.

The Millers' use and occupation of the disputed land was interrupted for purposes of adverse possession by June 15, 2016, when the Millers filed this action, in which the Abramsons counterclaimed. See Pugatch v. Stoloff, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 536, 542 n.8, 671 N.E.2d 995 (1996) (complaint to establish title immediately interrupts adverse possession). Accordingly, the Millers' goal at the parties' jury-waived trial was to prove their continuous use and occupation of the disputed area⁴ over a twenty-year period prior to or ending in June 2016.⁵ See G. L. c. 260, § 21.

The Millers purchased their home in 1986 and moved in the following year. At the time they moved in, there was a line of shrubs and small trees along one edge of the disputed triangle, shown as a dashed line in the appendix (i.e., along the side of the triangle closest to the Abramsons' house; not along the shared boundary). This line of vegetation extended along the edge of the disputed area in a straight line from the Abramsons' back boundary to the apex of the triangle, where it jogged slightly, then followed the parties' shared lot line the rest of the way to Ward Street. The line of vegetation "formed a natural boundary between one yard and the next." Until November 2015, when the Abramsons complained to the Millers that they were encroaching on the Abramsons' land, the Millers assumed this line of shrubbery represented the legal boundary between the two lots.

At the time of trial in October 2017, the assortment of vegetation found between the two homes showed signs of having being pruned on the Millers' side. The shrubs and trees were also substantially larger and denser than when the Millers moved in. Between 1987 and the trial date, some of the plants had died and some had been replaced, but most had grown to be taller than an adult person -- with some trees or shrubs reaching as high as the second story of the Millers' house, and one reaching the peak of the building.⁶

In 1987, when they first moved in, the Millers retained Santangelo Landscaping (Santangelo) to care for their lawn and plantings and to remove leaves. Beginning in that year and in each year thereafter, a three-person crew from Santangelo performed yard work at the Millers' property every week from April 1 through November 1 -- and in some years even later, depending on when the leaves fell. From 1987 through the present, a Santangelo crew mowed the lawn, following a spiral course starting from the perimeters and working inward.⁷ The mowed area included the disputed triangle, inside of the line of vegetation. The landscaping crew also fertilized the lawn, exterminated pests as necessary, and trimmed the shrubs and trees forming the vegetative border.⁸

From when the Millers first moved in, neither the Abramsons nor their predecessors ever used the disputed area.⁹ Moreover, the Millers never asked or received permission to use the disputed area.

Discussion. Although we accept the judge's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, "we scrutinize without deference the legal standard which the judge applied to the facts." Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 621, 602 N.E.2d 206 (1992). "Title by adverse possession can be acquired only by proof of nonpermissive use which is actual, open, notorious, exclusive and adverse for twenty years." Id. at 621-622, 602 N.E.2d 206, quoting Ryan v. Stavros, 348 Mass. 251, 262, 203 N.E.2d 85 (1964). "Acts of possession which are ‘few, intermittent and equivocal’ do not constitute adverse possession." Kendall, supra at 624, 602 N.E.2d 206, quoting Parker v. Parker, 1 Allen 245, 247 (1861).

1. Finding as to the tree and shrub line. As a threshold matter, the Abramsons argue that the judge made a clear error in finding that, for more than twenty years, the line of vegetation between the parties' houses "formed a natural boundary between one yard and the next, signaling clearly to the adjoining neighbors that the Millers claimed what is now the disputed area, as their own." More specifically, the Abramsons claim that because the parties do not know who first installed the trees and shrubbery, it is impossible to know whether the Abramsons' predecessors regarded it as identifying a boundary between the two yards.

As the Abramsons acknowledge, however, this finding is only partially factual, and was included among the judge's legal conclusions. We see no error (clear or otherwise) in the first clause of the judge's statement (i.e., that the tree and shrub line formed a "natural boundary"). This proposition is readily supported by the testimony at trial. The next clause, about what the vegetative barrier "signal[ed]," is not a factual finding -- it is, instead, a legal conclusion about the significance of a found fact.

The judge made no comment here about the actual state of mind of the Abramsons or their predecessors (or even the Millers) at any particular time, which is not a relevant inquiry in any event.

See Totman v. Malloy, 431 Mass. 143, 145, 725 N.E.2d 1045 (2000) ("The guiding principle behind the elements of adverse possession is not to ascertain the intent or state of mind of the adverse claimant, but rather to provide notice to the true owner, allowing for the legal vindication of property rights"). See also Kendall, 413 Mass. at 622-624, 602 N.E.2d 206. The point is simply that the existence of the vegetative boundary allowed for easy identification of what land was being openly used and possessed by the Millers, where the Millers' landscaper maintained the lawn and plantings only on one side of it. This bolsters the judge's ultimate conclusion that the Millers' use of the land was sufficiently open and notorious so as to put the Abramsons and their predecessors on notice as to the existence and extent of the Millers' claim.¹⁰ See Lawrence v. Concord, 439 Mass. 416, 421, 788 N.E.2d 546 (2003) ("The purpose of the requirement of ‘open and notorious’ use is to place the true owner ‘on notice of the hostile activity of the possession so that he, the owner, may have an opportunity to take steps to vindicate his rights by legal action’ " [citation omitted] ). We see no clear error in the judge's factual finding, and no legal error in his application of the law as to the effect of the continuously existing boundary.

2. Sufficiency of yard maintenance. The bulk of the Abramsons' argument is directed to their contention that "lawn/brush maintenance is wholly insufficient to establish adverse possession under Massachusetts law." This proposition is not correct. Our cases do not hold that lawn mowing and other yard work is insufficient in all instances to establish ownership. As the trial judge aptly put it, the proper inquiry is "more nuanced than this."

"The nature and the extent of occupancy required to establish a right by adverse possession vary with the character of the land, the purposes for which it is adapted, and the uses to which it has been put." La Chance v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Greenfield, 301 Mass. 488, 490, 17 N.E.2d 685 (1938). Moreover, "[e]vidence insufficient to establish exclusive possession of a tract of vacant land in the country might be adequate proof of such possession of a lot in the center of a large city." Id.

In other words, the context supplied by the surrounding landscape is significant in an adverse possession case -- a use that is sufficient to establish ownership in a densely populated neighborhood may be inadequate in an isolated, wooded setting. Establishing title requires only that "the possessor must use and enjoy the property continuously for the required period as the average owner would use it, without the consent of the true owner and therefore in actual hostility to [the true owner] irrespective of the possessor's actual state of mind or intent." Kendall, 413 Mass. at 624, 602 N.E.2d 206, quoting Ottavia v. Savarese, 338 Mass. 330, 333, 155 N.E.2d 432 (1959). Accordingly, in MacDonald v. McGillvary, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 902, 904, 616 N.E.2d 138 (1993), adverse possession was found where the claimant's use...