Miller v. Bank of America
Decision Date | 19 August 1976 |
Docket Number | No. C-75-2680SW.,C-75-2680SW. |
Citation | 418 F. Supp. 233 |
Parties | Margaret MILLER, Plaintiff, v. BANK OF AMERICA, a corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Stuart A. Wein, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.
Theodore Sachsman, Robert A. Padway, William J. A. Weir, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant.
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment, duly noticed, argued and submitted.
Plaintiff, a black woman, was an NCR operator for defendant Bank. She claims that her operations supervisor, a white male, promised her a better job if she would be sexually "cooperative", and caused her dismissal when she refused.
Plaintiff failed to avail herself of the services of Bank's Employer Relations Department that was established to investigate employee complaints, including complaints of sexual impropriety and sexual advances. Instead, she filed a written charge with the EEOC and, upon receiving her right-to-sue letter, filed the instant action.
Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay and attorney's fees for alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
It is undisputed that Bank has a policy of discouraging sexual advances of the sort here alleged and of affirmatively disciplining employees found guilty of such conduct.
Section 2000e-2(a) provides that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to . . . discharge . . any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . sex . . .."
The issue before the Court is whether Title VII was intended to hold an employer liable for what is essentially the isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct1 of one employee to another.
Little can be gleaned from the legislative history of the specific prohibition against sex discrimination. It was never the subject of Legislative Committee hearings but was added to the 1964 Civil Rights Act by amendment offered during debate in the House. And the debate on the amendment (see, 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-2584) was devoted primarily to its possible adverse impact on the balance of Title VII. The Congressional Record fails to reveal any specific discussions as to the amendment's intended scope or impact. In addition, the great bulk of reported cases, unlike the instant case, concern established company policies that have been found either to violate, or not to violate, the prohibition against sex discrimination.
The parties have been able to present, and the Court has been able to find, but two reported cases which address the question of employer liability for unauthorized isolated sex-related acts by one employee against another.
In Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161 (D.Ariz.1975), the court found that unwelcome verbal and physical sex advances by a male supervisor to two female employees, which compelled them to terminate their employment, created no rights to relief under Title VII. In granting defendant's motion to dismiss, the court stated:
390 F.Supp. at 163.
In Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. 654 (D.D.C.1976), the court, in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, held that retaliatory actions, taken because a female employee declined her supervisor's sexual advances, constitute sex discrimination within Title VII. However, in so ruling, the court stated:
And in footnote 8, following the above quote, the court noted:
(Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, the two affidavits of L. G. Zugnoni, Bank Vice-President, categorically allege that it is the policy of the Bank to prevent and prohibit moral misconduct, including sexual advances, and to suspend and/or dismiss and/or reprimand in some other manner employees who have made sexual advances to their co-employees, subordinate employees or superior employees.
No affidavits filed by plaintiff controvert these factual allegations. In her affidavit, plaintiff alleges that:
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