Williams v. Saxbe
| Decision Date | 20 April 1976 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 74-186. |
| Parties | Diane R. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. William B. SAXBE et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Michael D. Hausfeld, Jerry S. Cohen, Herbert E. Milstein, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Thomas G. Corcoran, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert Ford, Chief, Civil Div., Washington, D. C., for defendants.
Plaintiff, Diane R. Williams, brings this action to recover damages and for other relief as a result of defendants' alleged violations of the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and other acts of Congress; specifically, plaintiff alleges that she has been denied equal employment opportunities in the Department of Justice because of her sex. Plaintiff was a female employee of the Community Relations Service ("CRS") of the Department of Justice from approximately January 4, 1972 to September 22, 1972, at which time her employment with the CRS was terminated. Defendants are the Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the CRS of the Department of Justice.
This action is before the Court at this time for review of the administrative record. Pending before the Court are defendants' motion to dismiss, defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff's motion for judgment. While plaintiff originally sought a trial de novo, plaintiff has since stipulated to have the Court render a final decision on the agency record.1
This Court perceives there being two issues presented for resolution. The first issue is whether the retaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken because a female employee declined his sexual advances, constitutes sex discrimination within the definitional parameters of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The second issue is twofold: how should the administrative record be reviewed, and what result should be reached based on the record.
In order to properly address the first issue, the factual and procedural background of this action must be considered.
On January 4, 1972, plaintiff began her employment with the CRS as a public information specialist ("PRO"), Grade GS-7, under a temporary appointment not to exceed one month. Within a short time after her employment commenced, the Civil Service Commission reviewed plaintiff's status and converted her appointment to a career conditional, Grade GS-8, effective January 23, 1972, subject to a one-year probationary period, retroactive from January 4, 1972. During plaintiff's employment, her immediate supervisor was a Mr. Harvey Brinson. On September 11, 1972, Mr. Brinson advised the plaintiff of his intention to terminate her and, by notice dated September 21, 1972, her termination was made effective on September 22, 1972. In the interim, September 13 to be exact, plaintiff filed a formal complaint alleging sex discrimination.
Plaintiff's discrimination complaint alleged, in essence, that she had had a good working relationship with Mr. Brinson up until she refused a sexual advance made by Mr. Brinson in June. She asserted that thereafter Mr. Brinson engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of harassment and humiliation of her, including but not limited to, unwarranted reprimands, refusal to inform her of matters for the performance of her responsibilities, refusal to consider her proposals and recommendations, and refusal to recognize her as a competent professional in her field. On the other hand, the alleged basis for terminating plaintiff was her poor work performance during this same period.
After an investigation of plaintiff's allegations was conducted, plaintiff received notice from an Equal Employment Opportunity officer that a finding of no discrimination was proposed and that she had various options to pursue, including an administrative hearing. Plaintiff elected to have the hearing, which was held in May and June of 1973. On September 11, 1973, the Complaints Examiner issued his recommended decision, which was a finding of no discrimination based on sex. This recommendation was adopted by the Complaint Adjudication Officer on December 21, 1973, apparently because in the agency's view the evidence did not establish "any causal relationship" between her rejection of Mr. Brinson and his subsequent treatment of her and her ultimate termination. Plaintiff then filed the instant action.
Upon its initial review of the record, this Court determined that the record revealed proof suggestive of discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court also found that at the agency level the government made no attempt to show an absence of discrimination, but rather, the onus appeared to have been placed on the plaintiff to affirmatively prove sex discrimination. The Court therefore remanded the case to the agency for additional administrative hearings wherein the government would have the burden to affirmatively establish the absence of discrimination by the clear weight of the evidence, citing Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F.Supp. 1247 (D.D.C.1973).
On remand, the second Hearing Examiner found that the agency had not met its burden. Additionally, the Examiner concluded that plaintiff "was discriminated against because of sex in the acts of her immediate supervisor in intimidating, harassing, threatening and eventually terminating her." Hearing Examiner's decision of Feb. 21, 1975, at 4-5. The Examiner based his decision on a finding that Mr. Brinson was of a disposition to and did make personal advances towards the plaintiff and that these advances were rejected by the plaintiff," id. at 4, and that at that time, May 1972, he could not conclude that Mr. Brinson was "truly experiencing work performance and/or conduct difficulties with the plaintiff." Id. at 3. In concluding his analysis, the Examiner stated:
Id. at 4. The Examiner therefore recommended that the plaintiff be reinstated with back pay.
The Complaint Adjudication Officer, who was the same officer that reviewed the first Complaints Examiner's recommendation as well, rejected the recommendation of the second Hearing Examiner in an opinion dated March 12, 1975. After expressing some consternation over the fact that the Court did not specifically identify what evidence was suggestive of discrimination, the Complaint Adjudication Officer reviewed the Examiner's recommendation, and found that he could not "conclude that the plaintiff's termination resulted from sex discrimination within the meaning of the Department's equal employment opportunity regulations." Complaint Adjudication Officer's decision of March 12, 1975, at 7.
It is obvious to this Court, and apparently to the parties, that it was the opinion of the Complaint Adjudication Officer, and thus the agency, that the conduct complained of in this case does not come within the definitional parameters of sex discrimination. Defendants have reasserted this opinion, claiming that the complaint therefore does not state a cause of action and should be dismissed.
As noted above, the motion to dismiss presents the issue of whether the retaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken because a female employee declined his sexual advances, constitutes sex discrimination within the definitional parameters of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. This Court finds that it does. Defendants, however, make a cogent and almost persuasive argument to the contrary.
The defendants' argument is bottomed on locating the "primary variable" in the alleged class, which must be the gender of the class member to come within the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Defendants reason that:
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