Miller v. Boone Cnty.

• Decision Date: 23 May 1895
• Citation: 63 N.W. 352,95 Iowa 5
• Parties: MILLER v. BOONE COUNTY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

95 Iowa 5

63 N.W. 352

MILLER

v.BOONE COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 23, 1895.

Appeal from district court, Hamilton county; S. M. Weaver, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages for a personal injury alleged to have been sustained by reason of a defective approach to a county bridge. There was a trial by jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.J. L. Kamrar, J. R. Whitaker, and Gatch, Connor & Weaver, for appellant.

J. M. Goodson, Wesley Martin, and J. F. Martin, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J.

1. On the evening of December 8, 1888, the plaintiff, her son, aged about 19 years, her daughter, aged 13 years, and a young lady, left the city of Boone, to go to their home in the country. They were traveling in a buggy drawn by one horse, and as they approached a county bridge they met a team and wagon, near the bridge, and the horse which was driven by the plaintiff's son backed upon the elevated roadway or approach to the bridge so that the buggy, horse, and the plaintiff were precipitated down a steep bank, a distance of 10 or 12 feet, and she received the injuries for which she seeks to recover damages. The trial in the court below was had nearly three years after the injury, and the plaintiff testified as a witness in regard to her injuries as follows: “Had both arms broken. Nose was broken. That lip was turned down that way. My face was numb. That wrist was broken here, and left my wrist crooked. The fingers of my right hand are a little stiff. Wrists were broken about two inches above joints. My right limb was injured. Have no use of my hip at all, and I suffered more from my breast than I do anything else. I rested good enough nights before, but now I do not rest at all. Can't lay down good. Can't lay down in bed at all. Have a cough most of the time. Have a kind of a bad feeling in my chest. Don't know that it is a pain. Did not have it before injury. Then I could do as much work as any woman. Did my own work. Used to wash, keep boarders, and run a knitting machine. Earned $6 or $7 per week washing, and $2 a day on knitting machine, and at same time kept boarders. Did not keep boarders and do washing at same time. Now I can't do anything at all, nor have from the time of the injury. Cannot dress myself entirely. Cannot put on my shoes. Cannot walk without crutches. Cannot step up on anything. Cannot stand without leaning on something. Have no use of my right limb at all.” There is no real controversy as to the extent of the injuries. It is true that the plaintiff was slightly lame before the accident. It appears that early in life she was injured in one of her ankles, from which she never entirely recovered. She was about 44 years old when she received the injury for which she seeks to recover.

A great many objections are made to rulings of the court pending the trial, and to instructions given to the jury. Those which we think are material will be considered after we have disposed of two questions which arise upon the evidence. The first proposition we will consider is whether the verdict was excessive. It was for the sum of $6,565. There is one fact disclosed in evidence which, in a certain degree, tends to show that the plaintiff was not properly treated for the injury to her hip, but the general course of the surgical treatment does not appear to be objected to or questioned. In other words, there is no evidence of surgical malpractice; and the court, in the instructions to the jury, makes no reference to that subject. It is our judgment that we ought not to interfere with the verdict because it is excessive. The evidence which we have recited fully justifies the recovery. No evidence was introduced to the effect that plaintiff might, in time, recover from her injuries; and there was really no evidence introduced to show that the injuries are permanent. The lapse of time between the accident and the trial and the condition of the plaintiff at the trial left no room for doubt upon that question.

2. As we go through this record, we are impressed that the only question of doubt in the case is whether the verdict has sufficient support in the evidence. The pivotal question of fact is whether the injury was proximately caused by an insufficient and defective approach to the bridge. It was contended in the court below, and is insisted upon here, that the evidence shows the place of the accident was not on the approach to the bridge, but that it was on the public highway, and beyond the approach. The proposition in behalf of the plaintiff is that it was on the approach. This court has frequently held that the approaches to a county bridge are a part of the bridge, and a county is liable, in a proper case, for negligence in the construction of the approach. Albee v. Floyd Co., 46 Iowa, 178;Nims v. Boone Co., 66 Iowa, 272, 23 N. W. 663;Yordy v. Marshall Co., 80 Iowa, 407, 45 N. W. 1042. No question is made in this appeal as to the instructions of the court upon this feature of the case. As we have said, the contention of appellant is that the evidence shows that the injury was not caused by a defective approach, but in the public road leading to the approach. It would be a difficult undertaking to set out the facts as to the precise location and extent of what was properly the approach to the bridge, so that the reader would understand the situation. It is enough to say that the bridge was constructed not over any well-defined stream of water. It is a ravine called “Godwin Hollow.” On the east of the bridge, where the accident happened, there is a hill or elevation the top of which is much above the level of the bridge. This hill is broken by a ravine running through it to the east. The approach to the bridge is raised up to a level with the top of the bridge, and runs back east, and strikes the hill on the side of the...