Miller v. Campbell County

• Decision Date: 24 September 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 89-8100,90-8014,s. 89-8100
• Citation: 945 F.2d 348
• Parties: H. Douglas MILLER, et al, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CAMPBELL COUNTY, et al, Defendants-third-party-plaintiffs/Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al, Third-party-defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 348

945 F.2d 348

H. Douglas MILLER, et al, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CAMPBELL COUNTY, et al, Defendants-third-party-plaintiffs/Appellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al, Third-party-defendants.

Nos. 89-8100, 90-8014.

United States Court of Appeals,

Tenth Circuit.

Sept. 24, 1991.

Gary L. Shockey of Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Jackson, Wyo., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Rick A. Thompson (Richard J. Barrett, assisting on the brief), of Hathaway, Speight, Kunz, Trautwein & Barrett, Cheyenne, Wyo., for defendants-appellees.

Before MOORE, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiffs-appellants, former homeowners in the Rawhide Village subdivision of Campbell County, Wyoming, seek damages for harm suffered when Rawhide Village was declared uninhabitable by the county commissioners of Campbell County. The plaintiffs filed suit against the Campbell County commissioners in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming raising a battery of interrelated constitutional claims. ¹ The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all the plaintiffs' claims.

The plaintiffs on appeal argue that the district court erred in dismissing their Fifth Amendment takings claim and their Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process claims. We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs' takings claim is not ripe for review. We also find that the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process claims. We therefore affirm the district court.

FACTS

In February 1987, methane and hydrogen gasses were discovered seeping from the By the end of May, it had been reported that a number of Rawhide residents were contracting strange maladies. In addition, the County Health Officer, Dr. George B. McMurtrey, sent a letter to the Governor of Wyoming suggesting that he declare the subdivision a disaster area based partly upon "information he had received from primary care physicians related to specific problems within the Rawhide Village subdivision." On May 29, the commissioners held an emergency meeting and passed a resolution declaring the subdivision uninhabitable. The commissioners nevertheless decided to wait until June 2 to make a final decision as to the timetable they would adopt for the evacuation. On June 2, the commissioners passed a resolution requiring that the subdivision be evacuated by July 31, 1987.

                ground in the southern end of the Rawhide Village subdivision located in Campbell County, Wyoming.   On February 24 through 26, 1987, the county commissioners ordered the immediate evacuation of nine homes in the subdivision.   On March 6, 1987, an additional twenty-two homes were ordered evacuated.   Later, on March 26, all but seven of these thirty-one displaced homeowners were allowed to return to their homes
                

At the end of July, the Federal Emergency Management Authority ("FEMA") issued a statement to the effect that the subdivision was not uninhabitable. As a result, on July 28, 1987, the commissioners rescinded the July 31 deadline for evacuation. However, the commission left intact that portion of the June 2 resolution declaring the subdivision to be uninhabitable. Finally, on September 4, 1987, President Reagan declared the subdivision a disaster area, thereby paving the way for the disbursement of federal relief aid to the Rawhide residents. ²

The plaintiffs contend that the Rawhide subdivision was not uninhabitable and that the commissioners declared the subdivision uninhabitable only in order to procure federal assistance from FEMA. They claim, therefore, that the defendants wrongly deprived them of their property in violation of the Constitution. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. ³ The plaintiffs now appeal to this court. ⁴

DISCUSSION

The plaintiffs have raised three constitutional claims. They claim first that the evacuation orders of May 29 and June 2 constituted a taking in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights as incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, they claim that their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were violated by the defendants' actions. Third, they claim that their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were similarly violated. We

will address each of these in turn. ⁵

I. Fifth Amendment Takings Claim

The plaintiffs claim that the defendants violated their Fifth Amendment rights by "taking" the plaintiffs' homes from them. The district court dismissed this claim on the grounds that it was not yet ripe for review. We agree. The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the government from taking its citizens' property; it merely prohibits the government from taking property without paying just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. Before a federal court can properly determine whether the state has violated the Fifth Amendment, the aggrieved property owner must show first that the state deprived him of his property, and second, that the state refused to compensate him for his loss. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-97, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3120-22, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). In those states that allow aggrieved property owners to bring an inverse condemnation action in order to recover compensation for property taken by the state, a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe until the aggrieved property owner "has used the procedure and been denied just compensation." Id. at 195, 105 S.Ct. at 3121.

In the instant case, the plaintiffs have pending under Wyoming law an inverse condemnation action to recover compensation for the loss of their homes. Appellee's Br. at 13. Because the plaintiffs have not yet been turned away empty-handed, it is not clear whether their property has been taken without just compensation. Therefore, under Williamson County, we affirm the district court holding that plaintiffs Fifth Amendment takings claim is not yet ripe for review in federal court.

II. Due Process Claims

In addition to invoking the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants' actions violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment embodies three different protections: (1) a procedural due process protection requiring the state to provide individuals with some type of process before depriving them of their life, liberty, or property; (2) a substantive due process protection, which protects individuals from arbitrary acts that deprive them of life, liberty, or property; and (3) an incorporation of specific protections afforded by the Bill of Rights against the states. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337, 106 S.Ct. 662, 677, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).

Because the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes very specific obligations upon the government when it seeks to take private property, we are reluctant in the context of a factual situation that falls squarely within that clause to impose new and potentially inconsistent obligations upon the parties under the substantive or procedural components of the Due Process Clause. It is appropriate in this case to subsume the more generalized Fourteenth Amendment due process protections within the more particularized protections of the Just Compensation Clause. ⁶ The Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), supports our analysis. In Graham, the plaintiff accused law enforcement officers of injuring him during an investigatory stop. He claimed that the excessive force used violated both his Fourth Amendment and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. The Supreme Court rejected his Fourteenth Amendment claim: "Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional We are aware of the Ninth Circuit case of Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1317, 108 L.Ed.2d 493 (1990). There, the plaintiffs alleged that their privately owned dam and lake was destroyed by California authorities in violation of the Fifth Amendment as well as the substantive and procedural branches of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' takings claim as being unripe. However, it held that the plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process claims were viable. ⁷ Because the facts of that case are so different from the facts of this case, we cannot say that we are in conflict with Sinaloa Lake. All that can be said is that under the facts of our case we conclude that the Just Compensation analysis is controlling whereas in Sinaloa Lake the Ninth Circuit felt that the conduct there went beyond the penumbra of the Just Compensation Clause.

protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. at 1871; cf. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (refusing to consider Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim by prison inmate for excessive force because Eighth Amendment "serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners" in such cases).

In any event, even if we were to evaluate plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process claims separately from their Just Compensation claim, we would find no due process violation here.

The Supreme Court has stated that "due process ordinarily requires an opportunity for 'some kind of hearing' prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining...