Miller v. Carson

• Citation: 524 F. Supp. 1174
• Decision Date: 28 October 1981
• Docket Number: No. 74-382-Civ-J-S.,74-382-Civ-J-S.
• Parties: Richard Franklin MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Dale CARSON, etc., et al., Defendants. T. Edward Austin, Amicus Curiae.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

524 F. Supp. 1174

Richard Franklin MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Dale CARSON, etc., et al., Defendants T. Edward Austin, Amicus Curiae.

No. 74-382-Civ-J-S.

United States District Court, M. D. Florida, Ocala Division.

October 28, 1981.

Robert G. Alexander, Asst. Gen. Counsel, City of Jacksonville, Jacksonville, Fla., for city defendants and sheriff.

Paul C. Doyle, Dist. Counsel, Jacksonville, Fla., Donna H. Stinson, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, Tallahassee, Fla., for HRS.

William J. Sheppard, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiffs.

OPINION

CHARLES R. SCOTT, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court for consideration of what is, in essence, a crossclaim brought on behalf of the City Defendants against defendant Alvin J. Taylor, in his capacity as Secretary, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter `HRS'). The question the Court has been called upon to resolve is relatively simple: who, under Florida law, bears the responsibility of caring for and keeping custody of state prisoners who have been declared mentally incompetent to stand trial?¹ It has already been determined that the Court has ancillary jurisdiction of the City Defendants' claim and that the Court will exercise that jurisdiction. See Miller v. Carson, 515 F.Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla.1981).

On March 17, 1981, the City Defendants filed a notice of violation and motion for order to show cause directed against HRS, claiming HRS was in violation of the terms of the Court's permanent injunction entered July 17, 1975, governing conditions of confinement at the Duval County Jail (`DCJ'). Specifically, the City Defendants pointed to Section VI, paragraph 6 of the injunction which provides:

Any inmate requiring hospitalization due to a potentially infectious or contagious disease, mental illness, or any other ailment requiring hospitalization, shall not be housed in the Duval County Jail, Jacksonville Correctional Institution or Fairfield House. Any inmate of the Duval County Jail, Jacksonville Correctional Institution or Fairfield House who is adjudicated incompetent shall be transferred to an institution capable of providing appropriate care within 48 hours of the entry of the state court order.

The alleged violation lies in the fact that HRS has refused to take custody of inmates of the DCJ within 48 hours after such inmates have been declared mentally incompetent. As a result, the City Defendants have been forced to assume the financial burden of housing mentally incompetent inmates at University Hospital in Jacksonville while awaiting word from HRS that a bed has become available at a state institution. Representatives of HRS, at an evidentiary hearing held June 29 and 30, 1981, testified that the sole reason for the delay on behalf of HRS in accepting custody of mental incompetents is a lack of adequate bed space. From 1977 through 1980, the average waiting period from the time an inmate has been declared mentally incompetent until he is transferred to the custody of HRS has been 16.11 days. City Defendants have projected that the combined costs of transporting, housing and providing security for mentally incompetent inmates will approach $540,000 for 1981.

On April 3, 1981, the Court ordered Taylor, in his capacity as Secretary of HRS, to show cause within 20 days why he should not be held in contempt for violating the Court's permanent injunction. At the show cause hearing, held June 2, 1981, the Court expressed concern as to whether it was the proper forum to consider the City Defendants' claim against HRS, inasmuch as the claim focuses essentially upon questions of state law. In an opinion entered June 18, 1981, the Court determined that it had ancillary jurisdiction over the state law claim and that it was appropriate for the Court to exercise that jurisdiction. Miller v. Carson, 515 F.Supp. 1375 (M.D.Fla.1981).

On June 29 and 30, 1981, an evidentiary hearing was held at which each side presented live witnesses and documentary evidence supporting their respective positions. There has never been any question that, pursuant to the terms of the Court's permanent injunction as it now stands, a mentally incompetent inmate must be removed from the DCJ within 48 hours of entry of the state court order adjudicating the inmate to be incompetent.² Rather, the instant dispute centers upon the relative responsibility for these inmates, as between the City Defendants and HRS, upon expiration of the 48 hour period, that is, upon their removal from the DCJ.

The City Defendants argue that state law places the burden upon HRS to care for and keep custody of mentally incompetent inmates. They maintain that to fulfill this duty, HRS is obligated to either assume custody of the inmates within 48 hours of entry of the state court order of commitment or pay the expense of housing the inmates at University Hospital or another appropriate facility pending availability of bed space at a state institution. The Court agrees with the City Defendants.

Florida law provides the controlling legal authority for resolution of this dispute.³ The state court orders of commitment, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Chapter 916 of Florida Statutes all contain specific provisions bearing on the question at issue. A perusal of these three sources of state law leads to only one conclusion— the responsibility of caring for and keeping custody of mentally incompetent inmates lies with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.

An appropriate point to commence our analysis of the Florida commitment process for mentally incompetent inmates is at the beginning, that is, with an examination of the state court order adjudicating the inmate to be mentally incompetent to stand trial. These orders generally serve two important functions. First, as noted, they adjudicate the particular inmate to be mentally incompetent. Second, and of critical importance to this analysis, they commit the inmate to the custody of HRS. They accomplish this latter function in no uncertain terms. The relevant language of a typical state court order of commitment reads as follows:

Defendant is hereby committed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and the Sheriff of Duval County shall forthwith transport and deliver defendant to a treatment facility designated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ....

Order of Commitment entered in State of Florida v. Joan Charlene Baddour, Case No. 80-9065CF, Fourth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Florida (February 3, 1981).

Several paradigmatic orders of commitment were admitted into evidence as the City Defendants' Composit Exhibit No. 7. Each of these orders contains language similar to that quoted above. It is apparent from these state court orders that once an inmate has been adjudicated mentally incompetent to stand trial, he is committed to the custody of HRS, not the City Defendants. This is not surprising. The state judges are merely complying with the terms of Rule 3.212(b)(1), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows:

If the court decides that a defendant is not mentally competent to stand trial and meets the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth by law, it shall order the defendant to be transferred to a treatment facility as defined in Florida Statutes, or residential services as set forth in Florida Statutes, or may order that he receive out patient treatment at any other appropriate facility or service on an involuntary basis.

Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.212(b)(1) (Emphasis added).

Florida Statutes § 394.455(11) (1979) defines "treatment facility" as any "state-owned, state-operated, or state-supported hospital, center, or clinic designated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for the treatment and hospitalization of persons who are mentally ill ...." Understandably, although Rule 3.212(b)(1) specifies three alternative means of commitment for inmates declared mentally incompetent to stand trial, it appears that state judges generally select the most secure option, choosing to commit incompetents charged with criminal offenses to treatment facilities designated by HRS.

Rule 3.212(b)(3) provides that, once a person has been committed to a treatment facility as set forth in Rule 3.212(b)(1), "the treatment facility shall admit the defendant for hospitalization and treatment and may retain and treat the defendant." The Committee Notes to Rule 3.212(b)(3) explain that the section "mandates, as does the statute, that the treatment facility must admit the defendant for hospitalization and treatment." (Emphasis added). These provisions of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure track the statutory language of Section 916.13(1), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.).

It is apparent at this point in the discussion that state law requires HRS to admit for hospitalization and treatment all inmates adjudicated incompetent and found to meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in Florida Statutes.⁴ Stated in broader terms, it is clear that Florida law places the responsibility of providing for mentally incompetent inmates upon HRS. Counsel for HRS does not vigorously contest that state law places the ultimate burden upon HRS to care for and keep custody of inmates declared incompetent to stand trial. Indeed, in light of the overwhelming legal authority to the contrary, it would be somewhat absurd to adopt such a position. Rather, counsel contends that a Florida statutory provision grants HRS 45 days to assume custody of such inmates.

Florida Statutes § 394.459(1) (1980 Supp.), captioned "Right to Individual Dignity" contains the following sentence: "In criminal cases, a jail may be used as an emergency facility no longer than 45 days." In the final analysis, HRS' entire argument upon the substantive issue involved herein boils down to a reliance on this one...