Miller v. City of Fort Lauderdale
Decision Date | 24 June 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 4-86-1239,4-86-1239 |
Citation | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1551,508 So.2d 1328 |
Parties | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1551 Mark MILLER, Appellant, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Timothy J. Hmielewski of Atty. Timothy J. Hmielewski, Chartered, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Clark J. Cochran, Jr., of Billing, Cochran & Heath, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant-city. The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff's automobile struck a street light pole following a collision with another motorist. Appellant asserts that the pole, located eighteen inches from the curb on an in-town commercial boulevard, was located dangerously close to the road when it was installed in 1965. There is nothing to distinguish the location of this pole from the others similarly placed along the street.
The plaintiff contends that the city does not enjoy sovereign immunity for the allegedly negligent placement of the light pole. He asserts that this function was proprietary rather than governmental in nature, applying the test utilized prior to Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979), and that it is an operational rather than a planning level activity, applying the Commercial Carrier test. Plaintiff relies on several cases involving municipal negligence in the location or condition of certain public poles. See Hardie v. City of Gainesville, 482 So.2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. denied, 488 So.2d 67 (Fla.1986); Austin v. City of Mt. Dora, 417 So.2d 807 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Griffin v. City of Quincy, 410 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), rev. denied, 434 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1983); Crislip v. Holland, 401 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 411 So.2d 380 (Fla.1981). However, we do not find these cases controlling. In Crislip, the plaintiff was injured by a metal spike protruding from a utility pole at an intersection. The city's liability was predicated on the location of the spike on that particular pole, and the issue was foreseeability. In Austin, negligence was based on the placing of a particular utility pole at an extremely dangerous location. Griffin and Hardie involved power line electrocutions. Each of these cases is thus factually distinguishable.
The city asserts that the location of street lighting is a planning level function, and that in any event, at the time of installation, such a decision would have been considered governmental, rather than proprietary in nature. Therefore it contends it is immune from suit. We agree and affirm.
At the time of the pole installation there was municipal sovereign immunity for governmental, but not proprietary functions. The waiver of immunity statute, section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1985), does not apply retroactively. Windham v. Florida Department of Transportation, 476 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. denied, 488 So.2d 69 (Fla.1986). There is no Florida case holding that street lighting has been considered either a proprietary or operational function.
There are a number of cases involving determinations analogous to the location of street lighting poles, which conclude that such decisions constitute planning level or governmental action rather than operational level or proprietary activity. See Department of Transportation v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1982) ( ); Avey v. City of West Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So.2d 881 (Fla.1943) ( ); Barrera v. State Department of Transportation, 470 So.2d 750 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 480 So.2d 1293 (Fla.1985) ( ); City of Delray Beach v. Watts, 461 So.2d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), rev. denied, 475 So.2d 696 (Fla.1985) ( ); Osorio v. Metropolitan Dade County, 459 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), rev. dismissed, 469 So.2d 749 (Fla.1985) ( ). Hyde v. Florida Department of Transportation, 452 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) ( ); Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) ( ). See also A.L. Lewis Elementary School v. Metropolitan Dade County, 376 So.2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) ( ). Accord Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 184 S.E.2d 239 (1971); Ochoa v. Taylor, 635 P.2d 604 (Okl.1981); Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 266 S.E.2d 885 (1980). To the extent that it may not be distinguishable, we recognize a conflict with Austin v. City of Mt. Dora.
The plaintiff concedes that a municipality has immunity for the initial decision of whether to install light poles in a given neighborhood. However, he contends that once that decision is made, the negligent choice of location is not privileged. However, this was precisely the type of reasoning that was rejected by the supreme court in Department of Transportation v. Neilson. In that case, the plaintiff argued that Commercial Carrier did not immunize all discretionary decisions of governmental...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Scott v. Florida Dept. of Transp.
...not actionable because [any] defects are inherent in the overall project itself. (Emphasis added); see also Miller v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 508 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). To the extent that no decision was made to change the location of the pole, but rather the installation simply fa......
-
Allen v. Port Everglades Authority
...in the median of Eisenhower Boulevard had been knocked down by motor vehicles. The trial court relied on Miller v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 508 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) and Department of Transportation v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1982) in granting summary judgment. In Miller, this......
-
Hosey By and Through Hosey v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 87-2609
...the city's exemption. We therefore affirm. Cf. Department of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071 (Fla.1982); Miller v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 508 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); City of Delray Beach v. Watts, 461 So.2d 142 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Barrera v. State Dept. of Transp., 470 So.2d 7......