Miller v. City of Manchester, 61316

• Decision Date: 11 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 61316,61316
• Citation: 834 S.W.2d 904
• Parties: Daniel MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF MANCHESTER, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 904

834 S.W.2d 904

Daniel MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF MANCHESTER, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 61316.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Three.

Aug. 11, 1992.

Thomas J. Prebil, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Patrick R. Gunn, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.

STEPHAN, Judge.

Daniel Miller ("Miller") and Arlan Held ("Held"), fur trappers, filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the City of Manchester, Missouri ("the City"), challenging the validity of an ordinance which reads:

... It shall be unlawful for any person to employ a steel trap or similar device, the purpose of which is to harm, mutilate or kill an animal, with the exception of mouse traps, rat traps, mole traps, or gopher traps.

Manchester, Mo., Ordinance 89-404 (May 15, 1989). The trial court upheld the ordinance. It further determined that neither Miller nor Held had standing to bring the suit. We reverse.

The parties submitted their case to the trial court upon a "Joint Stipulation of Facts". In this stipulation, the parties agreed that Miller: (1) had trapped within the City's limits, on public right-of-ways; (2) had sold furs from animals trapped within the City; and (3) would suffer an economic detriment if he were prohibited from trapping within the City. The parties also agreed that although Held has not trapped within the City, he joined the suit both as an individual trapper and in his capacity as the President of the Missouri Trappers Association, a non-profit corporation dedicated to the safe and humane trapping of animals. The parties further stipulated that neither Miller nor Held: (1) resided in the City; (2) owned property there; (3) operated a business there; (4) possessed a City business license; or (5) paid taxes to the City, except for sales taxes on occasional purchases there.

Appellate courts usually review a case to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding, whether the finding was against the weight of the evidence; whether the law was erroneously declared; or whether the law was erroneously applied. Sheldon v. Bd. of Tr. of Pol. Ret. Sys., 779 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo. banc 1989). However, when the case is tried on a stipulation of the facts not involving resolution by the trial court of conflicting testimony, the only question before the appellate court is whether the trial court drew the proper legal conclusions from the facts stipulated. Id.

We address Miller's and Held's two points in the opposite order that they presented the points to us because their second point addresses a threshold issue: whether the trial court erred in finding that they did not have standing to bring suit. A party has standing to challenge the validity of an ordinance only if standing is conferred by statute or another applicable ordinance or if the party can demonstrate that he is directly and adversely affected by the ordinance. City of Bridgeton v. Ford Motor Cr. Co., 788 S.W.2d 285, 290 (Mo. banc 1990).

Miller had standing to bring this declaratory judgment action for two reasons. First, § 527.020, RSMo.1986, provides:

Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a ... municipal ordinance ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... ordinance ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

Second, Miller has demonstrated that he has been and will continue to be directly and adversely affected by the ordinance since he has suffered and will continue to suffer an economic detriment if he is prohibited from trapping with steel traps in the City. The preservation of business opportunities and economic well-being are sufficient interests to confer standing. See Real Estate Bd. v. City of Jennings, 808 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo.App.1991) (wherein the court determined that the Real Estate Board of Metropolitan St. Louis ("the Board") had standing to challenge a city ordinance restricting the size of "for sale" signs since: (1) Board members have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the preservation of its members' business opportunities and economic well-being are germane to the Board's purpose; and (3) the requested declaratory relief does not require the participation of the Board's individual members). Thus, the trial court erred in determining that Miller did not have standing to bring this declaratory judgment action. The City's motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of standing is, therefore, denied. Moreover, since we have determined that Miller has the requisite standing, we need not determine whether Held has standing to maintain this action. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 562, n. 9, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977).

Miller's remaining point is that the trial court erred in denying their motion for declaratory judgment because: (1) the City is preempted by the Missouri Constitution from enacting an ordinance attempting to regulate trapping since the Missouri Constitution vests exclusive control of all wildlife resources of the State in the Missouri conservation commission; and (2) the ordinance in question conflicts with the...