Miller v. Davis, 33268

Decision Date14 April 1965
Docket NumberNo. 33268,33268
PartiesHarold T. MILLER, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Richard C. DAVIS, Justice of the Peace, Second District, and Charlie Cates and Betty Cates, his wife, Respondents.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

N. David Korones, Largo, for petitioner.

Page S. Jackson, Clearwater, for respondent.

CALDWELL, Justice.

The following questions have been certified from the Pinellas Circuit Court for our consideration:

1. Is Section 3 of Chapter 61-648 Laws of Florida 1961 constitutional in view of Article XVI, § 15 of the Constitution of the State of Florida?

2. Is Section 2 of Chapter 61-648 Laws of Florida 1961 constitutional in view of Article V, § 11(2) of the Constitution of the State of Florida?

3. Is Chapter 61-648 Laws of Florida 1961 constitutional?

The statute under attack is a special population act creating in Pinellas County Small Claims Courts having jurisdiction of cases at law where the demand does not exceed $300.00. The act further provides that there shall be as many Small Claims Courts in the county as there are Justice of the Peace districts and that the person duly elected or appointed Justice of the Peace in each such district shall act as Judge of the Small Claims Court.

Certified question number one (1) would have this Court determine the validity of Chapter 61-648, § 3, in view of Fla.Const. Art. XVI, § 15, F.S.A., which provides that a person may not hold more than one office under the government of the state at the same time. Respondent contends that Fla.Const. Art. XVI, § 15, although prohibiting a person from holding more than one office, does not restrict the Legislature from designating officials to act ex officio in other official capacities not inconsistent with the duties of their office.

In the light of former decisions of this Court 1 and the controlling factors of this particular cause we have concluded the statute here in question, relating to Justice of the Peace and Small Claims Courts, is not in violation of the constitutional prohibition against the holding of more than one office. Section 3 of Chapter 61-648, Laws of Florida 1961 does not create two distinct offices. It requires the Justice of the Peace for district to act as Judge of the Small Claims Court. The duties involved are not inconsistent.

In State ex rel. David Bialectk, Inc. v. Ferguson, 58 So.2d 145 (Fla.1952), we held an almost identical act applicable to Dade County in violation of § 22 of Art. V (now § 11 of Art. V) which fixes the upper limits of Justice of the Peace jurisdiction at $100.00. That act provided, as does the act here, that the jurisdiction of the newly created small Claims Courts would be $300.00, and that Justices of the Peace would act as Small Claims Judges. The question of whether the act violated Art. XVI, § 15 of the Constitution was not raised.

Repondent contends that the language of Fla.Const. Art. V § 11(2) is more reasonably read as a grant of jurisdiction rather than a limitation and that the Legislature under Fla.Const. Art. V § 1, has plenary power to enact the special act in question.

We find, however, that the Ferguson case is controlling as to certified question number two (2). Section 2 of Chapter 61-648 Alws of Florida 1961, insofar as it attempts to set a jurisdictional limit in excess of $100.00, must be stricken as unconstitutional. 2

No specific grounds of unconstitutionality, other than those discussed above are alleged in connection with certified question number three (3).

The certificate is granted and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

Ti is so ordered.

DREW, C. J., and THOMAS and THORNAL, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, J., agrees in part and dissents in part.

ROBERTS, J., dissents.

O'CONNELL, J., dissents with opinion.

ERVIN, Justice (agreeing in part and dissenting in part).

There are numerous cases decided by this Court which hold that additional duties and ex officio authority may be vested in an official, whether serving in the executive or judicial branch of the government, where such official has already been commissioned through the elective or appointive process.

See Whitaker v. Parsons, 80 fla. 352, 86 So. 247; Lainhart v. Catts, 73 Fla. 735, 75 So. 47; Hardee v. State ex rel. Gaines, 83 Fla. 544, 91 So. 909, and Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308. In the last cited case, on page 335 (So.Rep.) the Court points out these examples:

'* * * The trustees of the internal improvement fund, board of commissioners of Everglades drainage district, Okeechobee flood control district, the railroad assessment board, the pension board, insurance commissioner, the 'Blue Sky' board, state livestock sanitary board as first created, and others are common instances in which administrative boards have been composed of one or more constitutional state officers and been vested with additional governmental functions.' Neither § 27 of Art. III, nor § 15, Art. XVI, of the State Constitution, has presented any impediment to this Court in reaching the above stated conclusion.

In State ex rel. Landis, Atty. Gen. v. Reardon, 114 Fla. 755, 154 So. 868, the Court held a statute may require county officers to perform duties for a district extending over more than one county without violating the foregoing constitutional provisions. See 9th headnote.

In Flood v. State ex rel. Board of County Com'rs, etc., 100 Fla. 70, 129 So. 861, it was held no violation of § 15, Art. XVI to constitute the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Record of Dade County also the Clerk of the Civil Court of Record of said County, since it amounted merely to imposition of additional duties upon him as a former officer. See headnote 8.

In State ex re. Gibbs v. Gordon, 138 Fla. 312, 189 So. 437, a statute creating a county air base authority and designating county commissioners as its ex officio governing body was held not violative of § 15 of Art. XVI.

In State ex rel. Watson, Atty. Gen. v. Caldwell, 156 Fla. 618, 23 So.2d 855; our Court held a statute designating the chairman of the State Road Department as an ex officio member of the State Improvement Commission did not violate § 27 of Art. III because the Legislature may impose additional duties on constitutional or statutory officers so long as such duties are not inconsistent with their duties imposed by the Constitution or statutes. See 1st and 2nd headnotes.

In State v. Florida State Turnpike Authority (Fla.), 80 So.2d 337 (1955), the Court held there was no violation of either § 27, Art. III or § 15 of Art. XVI, in an act creating the Florida State Turnpike Authority, which provided that one member thereof should be a member of the State Road Department upon designation as such by the Governor. See 10th headnote.

Many courts or the judges thereof act or sit in a dual capacity in our state. For example, County judges in many counties also serve as juvenile judges (F.S. Chapter 39, F.S.A.). Attention is called to a specific example expressly approved by our Court. The Legislature, by Ch. 25574, Acts of 1949 established a civil claims court in Hillsborough County and authorized the senior circuit judge of the county to be the presiding judge thereover to try civil claims cases ranging in jurisdictional amounts from $100 to $1,000. This act was upheld in State ex rel. Murphy-McDonald Builders' Supply Co. v. Parks (Fla.), 43 So.2d 347, the Court following State v. Sullivan, 95 Fla. 191, 116 So. 255, which held constitutional an act creating a court of crimes in Hillsborough County giving it concurrent jurisdiction of misdemeanor cases with the criminal court of record of said county.

In State v. Sullivan this Court in construing Art. V of the State Constitution said:

' Jurisdiction then 'is not like a grant of property which cannot have several owners at the same time.' Two or more courts may have concurrent jurisdiction of the same subject matter, and the rule is well settled that when the Constitution or the statute in specific terms vests jurisdiction in any tribunal without the qualifying term 'exclusive,' or words of equivalent import, the Legislature may in its discretion vest the like jurisdiction in another court or tribunal. * * *

'* * * and so long as the jurisdiction of other courts named in the Constitution is not exclusive it is within the power of the Legislature to vest such courts or commissions as it may see fit to establish with jurisdiction original or concurrent with the jurisdiction of those courts recognized in the Constitution. To authorize additional courts as the exigencies of the times and conditions demand was a perfectly reasonable thing to do, but to undertake to write in the fundamental law the jurisdiction of a court or courts to be established in the next decade or the next generation in a rapidly developing commonwealth with all the varied resources of Florida was impractical if not impossible to do.

' As to the scope of the term 'inferior courts' employed in section 11 of article 5, it is sufficient to say that it had reference to any or all of those courts inferior to circuit courts provided for in the Constitution at the time of its adoption, but we think that said term may now embrace not only those originally provided for, but all those which may be established pursuant to section 1 of article 5, as amended in 1914.'

In that case it said specifically with respect to the Court of Crimes of Hillsborough County:

' We therefore conclude that the power to create 'such other courts or commissions as the Legislature may from time to time ordain and establish' was ample authority for the Legislature to provide a court of crimes in Hillsborough county and to clothe it with jurisdiction concurrent with the criminal court of record in all cases of misdemeanor, that the jurisdiction of the criminal court of record in 'all criminal cases not capital,' as defined in section 25 of article 5, is not equivalent to or co-ordinate with 'exclusive' jurisdiction...

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    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • July 23, 1969
    ...of the 4th District and His elected successors to that office are to preside as the ex officio judges of the new court. See Miller v. Davis (Fla.), 174 So.2d 8, including my dissent therein which outlines several judicially approved instances where existing judges have served ex officio in ......

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