Smith v. Farley
Decision Date | 27 July 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 3:93cv00165 AS.,3:93cv00165 AS. |
Parties | Leslie A. SMITH, Petitioner, v. Robert FARLEY, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Leslie Allen Smith, pro se.
Michael A. Hostettler, Office of Indiana Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for respondent.
On March 10, 1993, this pro se petitioner, Leslie A. Smith, filed for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana. The petitioner is challenging the disciplinary action from a CAB proceeding. On May 24, 1994, the Attorney General of Indiana filed a "Return to Order to Show Cause" in compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.1982). On May 31, 1994, the petitioner filed a traverse.
In his first petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner challenged the disciplinary hearing held before the CAB on February 18, 1992. The petitioner asserted that the CAB violated his due process rights by failing to allow the petitioner to examine a letter. The letter was a major part of the evidence considered by the CAB. On July 22, 1993, this court found that the abovementioned CAB proceeding and specifically the handling of the letter contravened the petitioner's due process rights. See Appendix "A". The court remanded the case to the CAB of the Indiana State Prison, specifically noting that the CAB's prior decision to not allow the petitioner access to a confidential letter was a violation of the petitioner's rights to due process. On October 28, 1993, pursuant to this court's order, a CAB rehearing was held. The CAB found the petitioner guilty on the charge of trafficking marijuana within the prison. On January 20, 1994, Petitioner re-filed this petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
It needs to be emphasized that this court does not sit as a trier de novo for cases of this nature and does not sit as a court of general common law review. The collateral review that is envisioned by § 2254 focuses on violations of the federal Constitution. The specific burden on this court for this review is found in such cases as Hamilton v. O'Leary, 976 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.1992), Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.1992), Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir.1992), and Harris v. Duckworth, 909 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.1990). See also Billops v. Wright, 803 F.Supp. 1439 (N.D.Ind.1992). The petitioner must also pursue the available administrative remedies mandated in Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (1992).
In seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner asserts that several of his due process rights were violated during the CAB proceeding. The record of this proceeding is before the court and must be examined under the constitutional standards established in Supt., Mass. Corr. Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). This court notes the decision in Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357 (7th Cir.1992). In Rasheed-Bey, the Seventh Circuit listed the applicable due process requirements for a CAB hearing:
The petitioner challenges the sufficiency of this evidence. First, the petitioner asserts that he presented evidence on "his style of writing, his signature, and the typewriter he had owned." See Petitioner's Motion to Show Cause Traverse/Response. The thrust of this evidence, according to the petitioner, illustrates that the inculpatory letter could not have been written by the petitioner. In addition, the petitioner asserts that another inmate set him up in order to have the petitioner "locked up, and believing that he would be transferred to another institution." Id.
The petitioner's abovementioned claims actually contain both a procedural element and a substantive element. "A prison disciplinary body may not arbitrarily refuse to consider exculpatory evidence offered by a prisoner simply because the record already contains the minimal evidence suggesting guilt required by Hill." Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328, 1336 n. 2 (7th Cir.1989). "In this connection, where a prisoner believes he was denied a meaningful opportunity to contest the charges against him due to a disciplinary board's refusal to consider evidence or allow the prisoner access to relevant material, the challenge is one of procedural due process rather than sufficiency of the evidence." Id. The petitioner indicates that the CAB heard testimony and took evidence on both these concerns. Therefore, there is no procedural violation insofar as the petitioner has been given a meaningful opportunity to contest the abovementioned charges.
The petitioner's claim must also be reviewed in light of the Supreme Court in Supt., Mass. Corr. Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). In Hill, the Court outlined and explained the requisite standards for evaluating the proceedings. In Hill, a prison guard discovered an inmate who had been assaulted and observed three inmates fleeing the area. All three inmates were found guilty of assault based on the prison guard's report of the event. Clearly, the prison disciplinary officials could fit the abovementioned facts into a plethora of scenarios. In resolving this quandary, the Hill Court explained:
The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board. Instead, due process in this context requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings made by the disciplinary hearing. Although the evidence in this case might be characterized as meager, and there was no direct evidence identifying any one of the three inmates as the assailant, the record is not so devoid of evidence so that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.
Id. at 457, 105 S.Ct. at 2775.
In finding that the evidence adduced at the prison disciplinary hearing met the due process requirement, the Court concluded:
We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if "there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. ..." Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require the examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.
Id. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774-75 (citations omitted).1
The petitioner presented his evidentiary arguments concerning the typewriter and the purported scheme by a fellow inmate to set him up to the CAB. The CAB found that the petitioner was guilty of the charge. This court must review the result in light of Hill. In Rights of Prisoners by Professor Michael Mushlin, the author indicates that the "some evidence" standard of Hill has been interpreted in various ways. See Michael Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners at...
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