Miller v. Dyer
| Decision Date | 29 January 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 5--4425,5--4425 |
| Parties | B. E. MILLER, Appellant, v. William R. DYER, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Henry & Boyett, Searcy, for appellant.
Chapman & Wiley, Searcy, for appellee.
This appeal involves the question whether a lessee in possession of a motor vehicle is liable for damages thereto by reason of a collision not due to fault or carelessness on his part. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the lessor in the sum of $650.00 for such damages.
Appellee leased a 1957 GMC truck to appellant by written lease. The lease contains the following pertinent sentences:
Both parties were engaged in the business of operating riding devices at out-of-doors shows over several states. The truck was returned to appellee at the termination of the lease in its damaged condition. He instituted this action to recover the difference between the value of the truck at the time of the lease and its value when returned.
Appellee had carried comprehensive insurance covering his trucks, but it was automatically terminated when the vehicles were parked for the off season, as this one was when the lease was executed. Appellee admits that there was no insurance on the truck at that time, unless appellant had taken it out. Appellee stated that he was sure that appellant had comprehensive insurance on the truck in force at the time of the collision and claimed to have seen the policy. He did not read the policy, however, and could only say that 'it must have been the right kind of policy.'
The trial judge cut off further evidence along this line, stating that he construed the contract to mean that appellant was required by the terms of the contract to carry comprehensive insurance of the type appellee had carried in the past, and that the fact that the insurance was not effective during the time the vehicle was stored on a lot during the off season was immaterial.
The court's ultimate findings were incorporated in its judgment and included the following:
'The defendant breached the terms of the written lease between the parties by his failure to return the 1957 Chevrolet tractor in a good condition and by his failure to carry collision and comprehensive insurance; the plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $650.00.'
Appellant relies on three points for reversal. They are:
'I. The court erred as a matter of law in construing the contract to require appellant unequivocably to carry collision and comprehensive insurance on the leased vehicle.
II. Defendant was a bailee for hire and only liable to the plaintiff if his negligence proximately caused the damage to the leased property.
III. Assuming ambiguity in the lease there is no substantial evidence to support the judgment of the court.'
We treat two of these grounds jointly, after which we will discuss the other.
We agree with appellant that the court's construction of the contract is erroneous. The contract called on appellant to 'keep in full force and effect the liability, collision and comprehensive insurance' which was then 'in effect.' (Emphasis ours.) We find no evidence that any collision insurance was ever carried on the vehicle. Appellant testified that neither he nor Dyer ever carried any collision insurance. This was the only testimony about collision insurance. Comprehensive insurance affords coverage of all property damage to motor vehicles, exclusive of collision losses. 5 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 3222, p. 375. This distinction is recognized in the lease contract by the specific reference to both collision and comprehensive insurance. This court has said many times that words in a contract must be given their obvious meaning. Ramsay v. Roberts, 240 Ark. 943, 403 S.W.2d 57. It has also been said that where parties make a contract in clear and unambiguous language, it is the duty of the courts to construe it according to the plain meaning of the language employed. Roth v. Prewitt, 225 Ark. 466, 283 S.W.2d 155. When we give the words in the contract their plain and obvious meaning, this clause only required appellant to carry such liability, collision and comprehensive insurance as was then in effect. Appellee argues that the clause is thus deprived of any meaning. The lease covered 18 trucks and 11 trailers, and we do not know what type of insurance covering the other vehicles was in effect at the time of the lease. Appellant testified, however, that fleet liability insurance protecting both parties was in effect at the time of the lease. Consequently, the clause would not necessarily be nullified by our construction. If we should say that these words required appellant to carry collision insurance, regardless of whether such insurance was in effect on the date the lease was executed, then we would necessarily read the words 'which is now in effect' out of the contract. In view of the fact that there is no evidence that collision insurance was carried on this vehicle, the trial court was in error on this point.
As a bailee of the truck, appellant was not an insurer, but was held only to ordinary care and diligence in the absence of any contractual liability. Bigger v. Acree, 87 Ark. 318, 112 S.W. 879; Bertig Bros. v. Norman, 101 Ark. 75, 141 S.W. 201; Turner v. Weitzel, 136 Ark. 503, 207 S.W. 39. The court found, however, that defendant breached the contract requirement that appellant surrender the truck at the expiration of the term of the lease in good condition. While appellee does not make any argument or cite any authority supporting the court's judgment on this basis, we cannot reverse the trial court if its judgment is correct for any reason. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Reed, 231 Ark. 759, 332 S.W.2d 615; Reamey v. Watt, 240 Ark. 893, 403 S.W.2d 102.
There is no doubt that a bailee's...
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