Miller v. Eatmon, G-244

• Decision Date: 20 July 1965
• Docket Number: No. G-244,G-244
• Parties: Lillian Ruth MILLER, etc., Appellant, v. George C. EATMON et ux., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 523

177 So.2d 523

Lillian Ruth MILLER, etc., Appellant, v. George C. EATMON et ux., et al., Appellees.

No. G-244.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 20, 1965.

Greene, Ayres, Swigert & Cluster, Ocala, for appellant.

Randolph C. Tucker, Jr., of Law Offices of William G. O'Neill, Ocala, for appellees.

WIGGINTON, Acting Chief Judge.

Appellant filed her complaint in chancery seeking equitable relief. From a final decree on the pleadings entered in favor of defendants, this appeal is taken.

The complaint filed by appellant contains allegations which, if accepted as true, form a proper basis for granting the relief prayed. Defendants answered admitting the material facts alleged in the complaint, denying the legal conclusions as alleged, and pleaded new matters in avoidance of the relief sought. Thereafter, defendants filed their motion for final decree on the pleadings, which motion was granted and decree entered.

Appellant first contends that from a procedural standpoint the chancellor erred in entering the final decree appealed. The motion made by appellees was pursuant to provisions of Rule 1.11(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A. ¹ In considering such a motion all well-pleaded material allegations of the opposing party's pleading are to be taken as true, and all allegations of the moving party which have been denied are taken as false. Conclusions of law are not deemed admitted. Judgment of the pleadings may be granted only if, on the facts as so admitted, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment. Hence, a defendant may not obtain a judgment on the pleadings on the basis of the allegations in his answer where no reply is required, since under Rule 1.8(e), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, these allegations are deemed denied; nor may defendant move on the basis of an insufficient denial of the allegations of his answer in plaintiff's reply, where the reply was not required or ordered by the court. ²

Were it not for the matters hereinafter stated, we would be compelled to hold that the final decree on the pleadings herein appealed was erroneously rendered. The decree itself recites, however, that at the hearing before the chancellor the parties agreed that there was no dispute between them as to any of the material facts alleged in the pleadings filed in the case, and the court found that the material facts were not in dispute. The decree adjudges that the complaint and answer of the parties as filed in the cause contain all of the material facts in the case, and are taken as established. Because of such stipulation appellant waived her right to insist that the above-stated principles be strictly observed by the chancellor in passing upon the motion for final decree on the pleadings. In view of the stipulation of the parties the chancellor might have more appropriately treated the motion as one for summary final decree rather than for final decree on the pleadings, since the issues to be tried were framed by the pleadings and the evidence on which each party relied for relief consisted of the agreed facts alleged in the complaint and answer. For the reasons hereinabove stated, we hold that the chancellor was justified in proceeding to consider the merits of the complaint with the view of entering final decree on the pleadings in favor of defendants if the admitted facts revealed that defendants were entitled to a final decree as a matter of law.

Appellant next contends that on the admitted facts the court erred in holding that defendants were entitled to a final decree as a matter of law. With this contention we cannot agree. Appellant's entire claim for relief is based upon an order for support entered by the County Judge of Marion County pursuant to F.S. Section 744.65, F.S.A., at a time when appellant's husband was an adjudged incompetent and prior to the time his competency was restored and the parties were divorced.

The petition for support filed by appellant in the county judge's court alleged that appellant's husband was adjudged incompetent and from whose estate she was entitled to support under the provisions of the statute. The petition further alleged that the defendant guardian of her husband's estate had collected the proceeds of a fire insurance policy on furniture in which appellant owned an interest, and to a portion of which proceeds appellant was lawfully entitled. In disposing of appellant's claim for relief in that cause, the county judge entered an order reading in pertinent part as follows:

'* * * the parties having stipulated that said guardian may be ordered to pay to the said Lillian Ruth Eatmon forthwith, the sum of $1,500.00 in full settlement of all claims by the said Lillian Ruth Eatmon for support and for any portion of the proceeds of said fire insurance policy, and ...