Miller v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authority

• Citation: 618 A.2d 1095,152 Pa.Cmwlth. 64
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
• Decision Date: 02 December 1992
• Parties: Sylvia MILLER and Walter Miller, v. ERIE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant.

Page 1095

618 A.2d 1095

152 Pa.Cmwlth. 64

Sylvia MILLER and Walter Miller, v. ERIE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Oct. 22, 1992.

Decided Dec. 2, 1992.

Timothy M. Sennett, for appellant.

John M. Bonanti, for appellees.

Before PELLEGRINI and FRIEDMAN, JJ., and NARICK, Senior Judge.

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

Erie Metropolitan Transit Authority (EMTA) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, denying its Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that it was not immune from liability under the vehicle exception to sovereign immunity found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1).

This appeal arises as a result of injuries suffered by Sylvia Miller (Miller) on May 4, 1990, after she slipped on the steps of an EMTA bus and fell into the street while exiting the bus. Miller filed a complaint against EMTA alleging that her injuries were the result of EMTA's negligent maintenance of the aisles and steps of the bus, which were worn, as well as wet and slippery due to an accumulation of water from the rainfall earlier that day.

EMTA filed an Answer and New Matter denying Miller's allegation of negligence and raising immunity as a defense. EMTA subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that it was immune from suit, and the vehicle liability exception to sovereign immunity did not apply as Miller was not injured while the bus was operating. Miller filed an Answer to EMTA's motion, arguing that the discharge of a passenger along a regularly scheduled route while in traffic constitutes "operation" of the bus, thereby bringing Miller's cause of action within the vehicle liability exception to sovereign immunity.

EMTA's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. EMTA filed a Motion for Reargument/Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal which was also denied. EMTA again filed a Motion for Reargument on its Motion for Summary Judgment, but this time in light of new case law. The trial court denied EMTA's renewed Motion for Reargument on its Motion for Summary Judgment. However, it granted EMTA's previous request to certify the case for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b) ¹ on the issue of the vehicle liability exception to sovereign immunity because there were grounds for differences of opinion on that issue based on case law. EMTA then filed with this court a petition for permission to appeal from the trial court's order denying its Motion for Summary Judgment which we granted.

Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521, ² Commonwealth parties ³ are immune from suit except in those instances itemized under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522. One of those exceptions, which is the focus of this case, is the vehicle liability exception. The vehicle liability exception is found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1) and provides that the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by the operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of a Commonwealth party. In particular, questions have been raised regarding the interpretation of the word "operation."

The leading case which discusses the definition of the word "operation" is Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370, 543 A.2d 531 (1988). In Love, an elderly woman fell as she was alighting from the steps of a city-owned van. In concluding that the City of Philadelphia was immune from suit and the vehicle liability exception did not apply, our Supreme Court determined that because the statute did not define the word "operation", it was required to strictly construe that word according to common usage. Because the word "operate" was commonly defined as a mode of action or to run or control the function of, the van clearly was not operating at the time of the accident as it had ceased movement. As such, the vehicle liability exception did not apply. Our Supreme Court noted that alighting from the van was merely an act by Love that was ancillary to the actual operation of that vehicle.

However, in Sonnenberg v. Erie Metropolitan Transit Authority, 137 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 533, 586 A.2d 1026 (1991), where a passenger was injured when the doors of the bus closed on her as she attempted to alight from the bus which had temporarily stopped to discharge her, we held that the even if the entire bus was not moving, the physical movement of the doors of the bus constituted operation of the vehicle. We stated, "Nothing in Love ... requires that an entire vehicle be in motion to establish 'operation' for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to the Code. The movement of parts of a vehicle, or an attachment to a vehicle, is sufficient to constitute 'operation'." Sonnenberg, 137 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 536-537, 586 A.2d at 1028. Additionally, we determined, "[T]he bus driver's closing of the bus doors is an act normally related to the 'operation' of a bus." Sonnenberg, 137 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 537, 586 A.2d at 1028.

EMTA argues that the trial court erred in not granting its Motion for Summary Judgment because under Love and Sonnenberg, the vehicle liability exception does not apply to this case, as Miller has neither alleged injury resulting from the movement of the bus or any part of the bus nor from an act normally related to the operation of the bus. Miller, however, argues that Love is inapplicable to this case because it involved a van rather than a common carrier such as a bus, which is held to a higher duty of care. Miller further argues that even if Love is applicable, under Sonnenberg, we interpreted Love to include the act of alighting from the steps of a bus to be within the vehicle liability exception because it is an activity normally related to the operation of a bus. ⁴

Even if we hold EMTA to a common carrier duty of care standard, that does not vitiate the...