Miller v. Everett

Decision Date12 June 1972
Docket NumberNo. 5--5934,5--5934
Citation252 Ark. 824,481 S.W.2d 335
PartiesJames MILLER, Appellant, v. Amos EVERETT et al., Appellees.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Macom, Moorhead & Green, Stuttgart, for appellant.

Daggett & Daggett, Marianna, for appellees.

FOGLEMAN, Justice.

Appellant James Miller received a compensable injury on October 25, 1968, while employed by Everett and Newby. Appellee Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, the employer's compensation carrier (to which we will refer as the appellee), made certain voluntary payments to the claimant for temporary compensation through January 3, 1969. Also paid by the carrier were medical expenses incurred by appellant up to December 11, 1968. The last payment made was by a draft dated January 6, 1969, which covered temporary compensation payments from December 15, 1968, through January 3, 1969. On February 19, 1969, Charles B. Mills, appellee's District Claims Supervisor, wrote the Workmen's Compensation Commission advising it that Southern Farm Bureau had made all payments required by the act and that it would controvert any compensation or medical bills incurred on or after December 11, 1968. Appellant was informed of Southern Farm Bureau's action by a letter from the commission dated February 24, 1969. No action was taken by appellant until December 31, 1970, at which time his present attorneys filed a claim for payment of medical expenses incurred by appellant from December 11, 1968, through January 15, 1969. This claim was denied by the referee for failure to bring an action for additional compensation within the prescribed statutory period. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81--1318(b) (Supp.1971). That decision was affirmed by the full commission and was again affirmed on appeal to the circuit court. On appeal we review the decision of the commission. Lane Poultry Farms v. Wagoner, 248 Ark. 661, 453 S.W.2d 43. We agree that the claim was barred.

Appellant argues that his claim for payment of medical and hospital bills incurred from December 11, 1968, through January 15, 1969, was not a claim for additional compensation under § 81--1318(b) but rather a claim for medical and hospital expenses accruing within the six-month period after the injury. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81--1311 (Repl.1960). In a similar situation we rejected the theory that, because medical bills are a part of compensation, the one-year limitation would not begin to run until the last such bill was paid. Phillips v. Bray, 234 Ark. 190, 351 S.W.2d 147. In Phillips, we said, 'No one can reasonably contend that a doctor could, by carelessness or connivance, keep the case in suspense for an unlimited time by merely failing to present his bill to the Commission. It seems perfectly obvious that the primary purpose of the one year statute of limitations is to give the claimant that much extra time in which to decide whether he has been fully compensated for his injury, and not for the purpose of paying belated medical bills.' The same holds true in this case. Appellant cannot toll the statute of limitations by alleging that his claim is not for additional compensation when he did not present it for more than one year after the last payment was voluntarily made by appellee.

Although at one point in his argument appellant seems to concede that his claim is barred by § 81--1318(b), he contends that appellee knew of these expenses for which it was allegedly liable at the time it sent its letter to the commission controverting any further payments to appellant. It would appear then that appellant is contending in the alternative that the running of the statue of limitations was tolled by appellee's wrongful refusal to make further payments.

A claim for additional compensation must be filed within one year from the date of the last payment of compensation or two years from the date of the accident, whichever is greater, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81--1318(b), unless there is some action on the part of the employer or the compensation carrier which will toll the statute or will estop either from asserting it as a defense. McFall v. United States Tobacco Co., 246 Ark. 43, 436 S.W.2d 838. The correctness of appellee's assertion that it would not be liable for...

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9 cases
  • Clark v. Peabody Testing Service
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • April 16, 1979
    ...of compensation. In any event, we review the decision of the commission without regard to the action of the trial court. Miller v. Everett,252 Ark. 824, 481 S.W.2d 335; Allied Telephone Co. v. Rhodes, supra. See also, Lane Poultry Farms v. Wagoner, supra. Therefore, the failure of the circu......
  • Minnesota Min. & Mfg. v. Baker
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • March 25, 1999
    ...cannot extend the period of the statute of limitation on appeal, despite the fact that a claim may be meritorious. Miller v. Everett, 252 Ark. 824, 481 S.W.2d 335 (1972). We thus conclude that although substantial evidence existed to support the Commission's finding that appellee proved his......
  • Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, CA97-1403
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • October 7, 1998
    ...cannot extend the period of the statute of limitations on appeal, despite the fact that a claim may be meritorious. Miller v. Everett, 252 Ark. 824, 481 S.W.2d 335 (1972). Here, appellant became aware of his hearing loss in February 1978. In my opinion, the statute of limitations began to r......
  • International Harvester Co. v. Burks Motors, Inc.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 12, 1972
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