Miller v. Folsom

Decision Date22 June 1915
Docket Number6122.
Citation149 P. 1185,49 Okla. 74,1915 OK 512
PartiesMILLER v. FOLSOM.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

Where in a suit to set aside a deed on the ground of fraud and mental incapacity to execute it, the evidence discloses that plaintiff had just reached his majority; that he was a Choctaw Indian of average intelligence for one of his age and quantum of blood; that for some time prior thereto he wanted to sell his allotment to keep the money out of the hands of his guardian for fear he would appropriate it to his own use and to get the money himself and have a good time on it; that before arriving of age he had executed a deed thereto to B for a recited consideration of $2,500, with the understanding that he was to get $1,100 and a house and lot, and on the same day executed to him a lease in the name of another as lessee, whereupon B. paid him a small sum of money, and the conveyances were a sham to enable B. to be in a better position to buy the land when plaintiff became of age; that defendant met plaintiff with a deed conveying his allotment prepared for his signature and acknowledgment, and bought the land from him for a consideration of $1,250, which was paid whereupon, having signed, he acknowledged the deed after the nature and effect of the transaction had been explained to him by the notary; that, on the same day, in the presence of a field clerk with the Interior Department, defendant offered to rescind the transaction and return the deed if plaintiff was dissatisfied therewith and would return the purchase money, which he refused to do after the nature and effect of the transaction had been explained to him by the field clerk, and that plaintiff knew nothing of the values of land or other property-- held that the evidence did not reasonably tend to show mental incapacity on the part of the plaintiff sufficient to set aside the deed. Held, further, in the absence of fraud, or undue influence, that inadequacy of consideration was not sufficient for that purpose.

The test of capacity to make a deed is that the grantor shall have the ability to understand the nature and effect of the act in which he is engaged and the business he is transacting. To invalidate a deed it must appear that the grantor was incapable of comprehending that the effect of the deed, when made, executed, and delivered would be to divest him of the title to the land set forth in the deed.

Error from District Court, Choctaw County; Summers Hardy, Judge.

Action by Grover C. Folsom against C. W. Miller. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded.

I. L. Strange, of Hugo, for plaintiff in error.

Charles E. McPherren and Charles B. Cochran, both of Durant, and Works & Copping, of Hugo, for defendant in error.

TURNER J.

On May 8, 1913, Grover C. Folsom, defendant in error, in the district court of Choctaw county, sued C. W. Miller, plaintiff in error, to set aside a warranty deed, conveying to said Miller, on May 5, 1913, his allotment in that county, on the ground of fraud and his mental incapacity to contract. After answer filed, in effect a general denial, there was trial to the court and a general judgment for plaintiff that the deed "should be canceled and set aside on account: First, of the incompetency of the said Grover C. Folsom; and, second, because of the grossly inadequate consideration paid for the said conveyance"--whereupon the deed was set aside as prayed, upon terms, and defendant brings the case here.

We say this is a general judgment, in keeping with plaintiff's contention, for the reason both sides concede, and the record discloses, that at the close of the testimony on December 17, 1913, the court rendered and entered judgment as stated. On December 19th defendant filed motion for new trial, and on December 20th, without request of either side, the court made and filed special findings of facts and conclusions of law, and thereafter overruled the motion for a new trial, thereby failing to give either side an opportunity to except to his findings of fact and conclusions of law. We will therefore not consider them, but will treat the judgment as a general judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

In setting aside the deed on the grounds stated, the court in effect failed to find any fraud in its procurement on the part of the grantee, and it is not urged by either side that any existed. After a careful examination of the evidence, we can find none, and so that feature may pass out of the case. But the court in effect found that plaintiff was without mental capacity to make the deed in question, and set the same aside on that ground. Plaintiff assigns that such finding is not supported by the evidence, and of this we will now inquire. On this point there is no conflict. The evidence discloses that plaintiff is a mixed-blood Choctaw and had reached his majority on the day before he executed the deed assailed, which conveyed his allotment to defendant; that he had theretofore been under guardianship, but did not like his guardian very well, owing to the fact that he thought his guardian was trying to take advantage of him, which seems not to have been without foundation. While not living with his guardian he attended school, worked on a farm and in a drug store at odd times, perhaps 12 months in all, and thereby earned about $100, which he spent for clothing and trifles. He was also a newsboy on a train. In all he attended school about six or seven years at Armstrong Academy. He wrote a good hand, and completed his ninth grade there, and, just before he was of age, he bought a half interest in a rooming house at Hugo, for which he agreed to pay $500. All the witnesses who testified on the subject state, and the court finds, that he seemed to be as normal as any other Indian of his degree of blood. Ever since receiving his allotment the evidence discloses that he wanted to sell it for two reasons: First, to keep the money out of the hands of his guardian for fear he would appropriate it to his own use; and, second, to get the money and have a good time on it. Accordingly, on February 8, 1913, he executed a deed to the land to one Bronaugh for a recited consideration of $2,500, with the understanding that he was to get $1,100 and a house and lot, and on the same day a lease to him was taken in the name of one Simmons for five years for a consideration of $40 for the first year. On March 17, 1913, he mortgaged it to Bronaugh in the name of his father-in-law, Moseley, for $1,500. All of which was a blind to enable Bronaugh, by paying plaintiff some money, which he did, but not much, to be in a better position to buy the land when plaintiff became of age. On February 13, 1913, he executed a mortgage thereon to one Snow for $500, perhaps in payment of his half interest in a rooming house. A few days before becoming of age, and while sitting in the rooming house with Snow, the latter suddenly arose and said: "Let's go to Ft. Smith; there goes the train now"--whereupon they arose and caught the train and left and went, not only to Ft. Smith, but to other points in Arkansas and other states. On the trip they had a good time on Snow's money, plaintiff being without funds. It seems that the object of the trip was to keep plaintiff out of the hands of Bronaugh and others, who were seeking to get a deed from him to his allotment and play him into the hands of parties other than defendant, who wanted to do the same thing. Upon returning to Ft. Smith, on their way home, they met one Cook, connected in some way with the Indian service, and perhaps acting under instructions from Mr. Bozarth, field agent for the Interior Department, located at Hugo, who took plaintiff in charge. About that time defendant, a real estate dealer well informed as to land values in that country, and who is in the habit of buying cheap land whether he had seen it or not, learning in some way that plaintiff was in Ft. Smith, prepared a deed for his allotment and went to that city. There he met plaintiff and Cook, whereupon Cook turned plaintiff over to defendant, with instructions to turn him over to Mr. Bozarth, which, undertaking to do, they got on the train and started for Hugo. Up to that time plaintiff had received $490 on his land from Bronaugh and, still being anxious to sell his land, purposed to defendant that he buy it for $1,250, which he did, whereupon plaintiff signed the deed which is sought to be set aside. After that defendant wired ahead for a notary public and debarked at Goodland, where they met him. The notary swears, and it is undisputed, that he first explained the nature and effect of the transaction to plaintiff and, after he had thoroughly understood it, took his acknowledgment and later thereto affixed his seal. Upon their arrival at Hugo they went to defendant's office, after plaintiff had deposited the purchase money in the bank, from whence he sent for Mr. Bozarth and, in the presence of plaintiff, told what had been done, after which he requested Mr. Bozarth, in effect, to take plaintiff apart and advise him, and that if plaintiff then wanted to rescind, he would take back his check, given for the purchase money, and return plaintiff his deed. This Mr. Bozarth did, but the trade was not rescinded because plaintiff refused to do so, and expressed himself satisfied therewith. Right along here plaintiff testified:

"Q. Do you know whether when you sold your land for $1,250 you got what it was worth? A. No, sir. Q. Why did you agree to take that for it? A. I was told that was all it was worth. Q. Who told you that? A. Miller. Q. If that was true and when Mr. Bozarth told you it was worth $4,000 and Miller said he was willing to trade back, why didn't you trade back; you heard Mr. Bozarth's
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