Miller v. Grandy

• Decision Date: 11 November 1865
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Tobias Miller v. William O. Grandy, Sylvester H. Cranson and Joshua C. Griffin

13 Mich. 540

Tobias Miller v. William O. Grandy, Sylvester H. Cranson and Joshua C. Griffin

Supreme Court of Michigan

November 11, 1865

November 2, 1865; November 3, 1865; November 7, 1865, Heard [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Appeal in chancery from Jackson circuit.

The facts appear in the opinion.

Decree affirmed, with costs.

John D. Conely, and D. Johnson, for complainant:

1. The meeting of the electors was void, for the reason that less than fifteen days intervened between the time of making the order by the township board and the time the meeting was therein directed to be held; also, for the reason that said order was made without any request in writing, signed by twelve electors, that a special meeting be called for the purposes designated in said order; and for that no copy of said order was posted by the town clerk of said town: Comp. L., vol. 1, p. 231, §§ 25-26-27-28.

The words "legal meeting," in laws of 1865, page 477, § 2, have the same sense as when used in the act referring to the powers and duties of townships; and every statute must be so construed that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant: Comp. L., vol. 1, p. 227, §§ 495-496; Smith on Stat. Con., 518; People v. Burns, 5 Mich. 114, 117; Bishop on Crim. L., vol. 1, § 70; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 253.

2. No part of the money proposed to be re-assessed was at any time voted by the electors, or by the town board, as a bounty, either by tax, loan or otherwise, but was money contributed by individuals to save themselves from the draft. This is a question of construction. The complainant contends that the words "such sums paid," etc., must be restricted to those cases where the township has voted money, raised a tax, levied money or issued bonds, and individuals have advanced or pledged sums of money upon the faith of such township action: Laws of 1865, p. 477, §§ 1-2.

The above view is strengthened by considering the word "such," in the second section, and the word "other," before "ordinary claims," in the third section. The word "other" clearly shows that the allowances intended by this act were in the nature of legal or equitable claims against the township: Smith on Stat. Con., p. 656.

Where, of two constructions, one is reconcilable with the performance of a public duty, and the other tends to divest individuals of their property, to be given to others, the first construction will prevail: People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244; Woodbridge v. City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 276; Smith on Stat. Con., p. 263, 272.

In the construction of an instrument, the whole of it is to be considered, and a construction of a detached part, without reference to the rest, is erroneous: Norris v. Showerman, Walker's Ch., 206; Norris v. Showerman, 2 Doug. Mich., 16; Paddock v. Pardue, 1 Manning Mich., 421.

3. The act is unconstitutional.

The legislature shall provide a uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific taxes: Constitution, Art. 14, § 11.

The county of Jackson forms but part of an enrollment district. This act undertakes to provide that this part of the enrollment district shall be subjected to taxation, from which the other part is exempted. This is in violation of the above provision: People v. Auditor-General, 7 Mich. 84; Woodbridge v. City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 274; People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 Comstock 417.

This tax applies only to the county of Jackson, and is not uniform, even in Jackson county, because one town may have given larger bounties than another, and because there is no way of carrying out the act in the city of Jackson: Cases above, and Laws of 1865, 29 and 30; Laws of 1865, 478; Laws of 1857, 240, et seq.

Courts of equity have jurisdiction to restrain the action of municipal bodies, when such action will be inequitable and injurious to the public interest: Chaffee v. Granger, 6 Mich. 51.

The Supreme Court has assumed that injunction is the proper remedy: Williams v. Mayor of Detroit, 2 Gibbs 560; Lefevre v. Mayor of Detroit, 2 Gibbs 586; Bagg v. City of Detroit, 5 Mich. 336; Woodbridge v. City of Detroit, 8 Mich. 276; Sisters of Charity v. City of Detroit, 9 Mich. 94; Jackson v. City of Detroit, 10 Mich. 248; Palmer v. Rich., 12 Mich. 414.

Bill may be filed by a private individual: Milhau v. Sharp, 27 New York, 611.

W. K. Gibson, and G. V. N. Lothrop, for defendants:

The bill does not present a case of imminent and irreparable injury. The injury complained of is too remote, and may never happen. It rests on contingencies which may never occur. No tax had been levied, and there was no cloud on complainant's title: 6 John. Ch. R., 497; 26 Wend. 135; 4 Barb. 9; 7 Barb. 508; 1 Barb. Ch. Prac., 609; 14 N.Y. 534; Walker's Ch. R., 85.

The complainant has no right to file a bill in behalf of himself and other tax payers. Such a bill can be regarded in no other light than to protect the public interests, and must be filed by the attorney-general of the state: Spooner v. McConnel, 1 McLean 337; 18 New York Rep., 155; 32 Barb. 410; 14 New York, 534, 506; 5 Metcalf's Rep., 425.

A court of equity will exercise its power with great caution towards municipal corporations. It will not even restrain an illegal tax where the illegality is apparent on the face of the proceedings, and such as to render the tax void. Nor for manifest errors or irregularities, but only where a tax appears to be valid, but by some extrinsic reason is void. Nor will a court review the proceedings of such bodies on the ground of irregularity, but will leave the party to his writ of certiorari, or action at law: 9 Paige Ch. Rep., 388; 6 John. Ch. R., 28; 4 John. Ch. R., 352; 1 Paige Ch. R., 114; 26 Wend. 132; 14 New York, 534, 506; 33 Barb. 322; 20 Howard's Prac., 416; 24 New York, 345; 10 Paige Ch. R., 539; 4 Barb. 9, 17, 18; 3 Denio 117; 25 Conn. 232; 3 Jones Miss. R., 20; 22 Ill. 33, 574, 594.

Neither will a court of equity interfere to prevent the levy and collection of a tax out of goods and chattels: 2 Mich. 584; 5 Rhode Island, 472; 4 E. D. Smith, 675.

If it shall be determined by the court that the complainant has presented a proper case for the equitable interference of a court of equity, still the defendants insist their action has been under, and in accordance with an act of the legislature of this state, and that such act is valid and constitutional, and its provisions are binding upon them.

The proper construction of a statute depends upon the due observance of the legal rules and maxims applicable to such construction, among which are the following:

The legislature is presumed to intend a reasonable and beneficial construction of its acts: Richards v. Daggett, 4 Mass. 534; Somerset v. Dighton, 12 Mass. 383; 7 Mass. 523; 23 Pick. 93; 22 Pick. 271; 24 Pick. 366; 3 Mass. 523.

Such a construction ought to be given, if possible, as will not suffer the statute to be defeated: 15 Johnson's Rep., 358.

The whole of the statute must be considered to judge of its particular provisions: 1 Pick. 248.

A statute will not be declared void, unless the necessity be clear, decisive, and unavoidable, and of two constructions, that which will render the statute good is to be given: 7 Clark Iowa, 262; 2 Cowan 550; 18 Mich. 320; 15 New York, 549.

The legislature has also the power to impose a tax upon the taxable property of a town, and appropriate the same to a payment of a claim by an individual of the town, and this conflicts with no constitutional restriction: 3 Kernan 143; 13 Pick. 60; 19 New York, 116; Law Reporter, September, 1865.

The above authorities recognize a distinction between the right of taxation and the taking of private property for public uses, or to give to another person.

Campbell, J. Martin, Ch. J. and Christiancy, J. concurred. Cooley, J. concurred.

OPINION

Campbell J.:

Complainant, who describes himself as a resident tax payer, owning real and personal property, subject to taxation, in the township of Napoleon, in Jackson county, files his bill in behalf of himself and all residents and tax payers of that town, against the members of the town board, to restrain them from allowing any accounts of individuals for money pledged or advanced for bounty and enlistment purposes, and to restrain the clerk from issuing orders on said accounts, if allowed, and the supervisors from inserting any amount so allowed on the assessment roll. The case comes up on demurrer.

An act was passed by the legislature of 1865, entitled "An act to legalize the action of the several townships, city and wards in the county of Jackson in paying bounties to volunteers, and to refund money to pay bounties:" L. 1865, p. 477. Under this act a vote of the township of Napoleon was had, to refund bounties, as provided for by the act, at a meeting which the complainant claims to have been irregularly called. He further states that a number of persons had contributed to procure enlistments of volunteers and substitutes, to avoid the necessity of a draft, to the amount of from seven thousand to eight thousand dollars, none of which was voted by the electors or town board, by way of tax, loan, or otherwise; that the board have appointed a meeting, and intent to allow all of these claims as valid, and that the clerk intends to draw negotiable warrants, and the supervisors to insert the amount when certified upon the tax rolls. He claims this action will injure the tax payers by clouding their titles, or compelling them to pay such illegal assessments, and prays for an injunction.

The notice of the meeting was more than six days; and as that is the time required by the statute for this particular purpose the general statutes, fixing a different time, are protanto suspended. ...