Miller v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 03 May 1930
• Citation: 128 So. 416,99 Fla. 976
• Parties: MILLER et al. v. GRIFFIN et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

128 So. 416

99 Fla. 976

MILLER et al. v. GRIFFIN et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

May 3, 1930

Suit by Dewey Griffin and others against Fred C. Miller and George A Burris and R. L. Black, doing business under the name of R L. Black & Co. The court overruled a demurrer to the amended bill of complaint, and granted a motion to strike defendants' answers, and, from the orders and the decree defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bradford County; A. V. Long, judge.

COUNSEL

F. Y. Smith, of West Palm Beach, and Thomas W. Fielding and J. C. Adkins, both of Gainesville, for appellants.

J. L. Frazee, of Starke, for appellees.

OPINION

ELLIS J.

In November, 1925, Dewey Griffin, Endeka Griffin Altman, by her husband and next friend Harvey Altman, and Thelma Griffin Lee, by her husband and next friend Owen Lee, all citizens of Bradford county, exhibited their bill in the circuit court for that county against Fred C. Miller and George A. Burris and R. L. Black, doing business under the name and style of R. L. Black & Co.

The bill was for the partition of certain lands described in the bill and lying in township 4 south, range 22 east in Bradford county, and said to contain 7,375.47 acres. The complainants claim an undivided one-fourth interest in the land as the only heirs at law of J. A. Griffin, deceased, who died August 18, 1905, seized and possessed of such interest in the land. The bill alleges that R. L. Black acquired an undivided three-fourths interest in the land after the death of Griffin and conveyed it to Fred C. Miller and George A. Burris, who executed to Black a mortgage on the land to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price. That balance is alleged to be $74,824.72 on the purchase price of Black's interest.

It is alleged that the lands are 'wild lands' and unoccupied and in the actual possession of no one, but at the time of Griffin's death the lands were in his actual possession and that of his cotenants, and were being farmed by him in the manufacture of turpentine and naval stores. The bill alleges that the complainants own a one-fourth interest and the defendants Miller and Burris own a three-fourths interest.

The bill concluded with appropriate prayers for the relief sought.

The defendants Miller and Burris answered, denying the interest of the complainants, and averring that J. A. Griffin more than seven years prior to his death had 'abandoned and forfeited any and all claim' to the lands, and had not been in possession of them for more than seven years prior to the time of his death. Other material allegations of the bill were denied. In an amended answer it was averred that on October 31, 1905, R. L. Black and J. B. Padgett acquired the fee-simple title to the lands, and since that time Miller and Burris have held the title.

The bill was amended in June, 1926, alleging that on November 9, 1905, after Griffin's death, Black and Padgett obtained a deed from D. M. Gornto, as commissioner, attempting to convey the complainants' interest in the land which they had inherited from their father. It is alleged that the deed was null and void, and that Black, nearly twenty years afterwards in April, 1925, conveyed to Miller and Burris. According to the dates set out in the bill, Black and Padgett acquired the interests of the complainants three months after the death of their father when they were infants; Dewey Griffin was seven years old, Endeka Griffin Altman was four years of age, and Thelma Griffin Lee about four days old.

Black answered that he obtained the deed from Gornto as commissioner, immediately went into possession of the land, and had continuously since that time held possession of it. It is averred that O. J. and W. J. Griffin were appointed administrators of the estate of J. A. Griffin, deceased, on September 12, 1905, applied by petition to the county judge for leave to sell the land setting forth the price which could be obtained for it; that Gornto was appointed commissioner to sell it, and that he did sell it at private sale to Black and Padgett; that the county judge directed a deed of conveyance to be made which was done. A demurrer was incorporated to the bill in the answer. Miller and Burris also answered the bill as amended setting up the same defense. Thereupon the complainants again amended their bill, in which it was alleged that Black and Padgett acquired after the death of Griffin a three-fourths interest in the land by purchase from those who were his cotenants, by which transaction he became a cotenant with complainants who had inherited their father's interest. After taking possession of the land, he then sought to acquire the interest of complainants in the manner set out in the answer. The reasons are set forth in the amendment why the deed from the commissioner, Gornto, was invalid. It is urged that lands of a decedent were not assets in the hands of the administrator, and that the complainants were at the time of the commissioner's deed infants in the custody and under the guardianship of their mother, and that the deed of the commissioner was void. It is also alleged that Black and Padgett abandoned the possession of the lands many years before, and the same were unoccupied and vacant until April, 1925, when Black and the widow of Padgett conveyed to Miller and Burris.

Demurrers to the bill as last amended, interposed by Black and Miller and Burris, were overruled, and defendants were allowed further time to answer.

The defendants answered that on the 28th day of April, 1927, which was about a year and a half after the bill for partition was filed, R. L. Black, Carrie W. Padgett, widow of J. B. Padgett, and the surviving daughters and sons of Padgett, setting out their names, and Miller and Burris and Elmira-Florida Investment Company, filed their bill in the district court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida against Dewey Griffin, Thelma Griffin Lee, and her husband, Endeka Griffin Altman and her husband, all citizens of Georgia, to restrain the defendants from asserting title to the lands described in the bill, and that the title thereto be quieted. It is averred that the federal court assumed jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter, and on the 12th day of August, 1927, entered its decree declaring the equities to be with the complainants and quieting the title to the land described in the decree, which is not an exact description of the lands sought to be partitioned, and certain other lands located in Baker and Clay counties and enjoining the defendants from asserting or claiming any title or interest in the lands.

Complainants moved to strike the answers upon the ground that the answers constituted no defense to the bill for partition because the state court in which the suit for partition had been begun had taken jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter of the litigation, and that there was no prayer in the bill filed in the federal court that the complainants in the cause pending in the state court should be enjoined from prosecuting their suit. The motion to strike was granted, and the answers were stricken. The order was made on December 23, 1927, to which an appeal to this court was taken as well as to the order overruling the demurrers to the amended bill of complaint.

The first question presented by the appellants in the brief filed is whether the court erred in striking the answer setting up the final decree of the federal court quieting the title of the appellants to the land and enjoining the complainants in this cause from asserting or claiming any title to the lands.

The decree described the lands by sections, township, and range according to United States survey, which sufficiently described the property as being located in Bradford county. See Black v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 53 Fla. 1090, 43 So. 919; Peacock v. Feaster, 52 Fla. 565, 42 So. 889.

The remaining point in the question then is whether the decree of the federal court as set up in the answer constituted a complete defense to the bill, or was it sufficient for any purpose and not wholly irrelevant. Guggenheimer & Co. v. Davidson, 62 Fla. 490, 56 So. 801; Tripp v. Wade, 82 Fla. 325, text 329, 89 So. 870; Lightsey v. Butts, 89 Fla. 185, text 187, 104 So. 852.

If the federal court, in entertaining jurisdiction of the suit by Black and others against Dewey Griffin and others, ousted the state circuit court of its jurisdiction in the case at bar, the answer was a good defense, and should not have been stricken; if it did not, then the answer was no defense, because the decree of the federal court, based upon a violation of the rule of comity between the sovereignties which gives to the court first taking and having jurisdiction of the parties, the subject-matter, and control and dominion of the property, exclusive control of the property sought to be subjected, is without effect to control the judgment of that court or in any manner affect its decree.

'The rule * * * simply demands as a matter of...