Miller v. Gulf Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 02 October 1942 |
| Parties | MILLER v. GULF LIFE INS. CO. et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
On Rehearing Feb. 16, 1943.
Rehearing Denied March 11, 1943.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; George W Tedder, judge.
J. A Fitzsimmons, of Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
C. E Farrington and Otis Farrington, both of Fort Lauderdale, and LeRoy Collins and Ausley, Collins and Ausley, all of Tallahassee, for appellees.
A complete statement of the facts in this case may be found in Miller v. Gulf Life Insurance Co. et al., 148 Fla. 1, 3 So.2d 519. On the going down of the mandate therein, the case was tried and judgment was entered in favor of appellee Edrie V. Strickland. This appeal is from the latter decree.
The controversy is over the proceeds of a certain life insurance policy of Gilbert John Higgins and turns on the proposition of whether or not the insured changed the beneficiary therein before his death in compliance with the terms of the policy as follows:
Appellant is the duly appointed administrator of the estate of Gilbert John Higgins and sues as such in behalf of Lucille Higgins, a sister and sole surviving heir. Edrie V. Strickland was the fiancee of Gilbert John Higgins. The policy was made to the estate of the insured.
It is shown that no written assignment of the policy was made to Edrie V. Strickland but she contends that there was a gift of the policy to her and that she was made the beneficiary as provided in the policy. The evidence shows an intent to make Edrie V. Strickland the beneficiary and this with the purported gift were the considerations that induced the chancellor to decree in her favor.
To support the centended change of beneficiary, two letters are relied on, the first dated February 29, 1940, and addressed to Gilbert John Higgins, signed by Clifford Wilson, an agent of Gulf Life Insurance Company as follows:
'Mr. Gilbert John IIiggins
'Hollywood Fire Department
'Hollywood, Florida
'Dear Mr. Higgins:
'Relative to our conversation concerning beneficiary change of your contract from Estate to present fiancee, Edrie Strickland, I would suggest that you write a letter to me as representative of the Gulf Life Insurance Company to the effect that it is your intention in the event of your death to make Miss Strickland beneficiary rather than Estate.
'We can hold this letter in our files pending any changes you may wish to make from time to time in the future.
'Sincerely yours,
'Clifford Wilson'
The letter of Gilbert John Higgins, the insured, in response to the foregoing is as follows:
'Miami, Florida
'Dear Sir:
'This is to advise that in the event of my death I want by fiancee, Edrie V. Strickland, as the beneficiary of my policy No. 401 001 012.
'Sincerely yours,
'Gilbert John Higgins'
These letters do not meet the requirement of the policy as here quoted for a change of beneficiary. Their contents show that they were not intended to be transmitted to the main office of the Insurer, the policy was not sent in for endorsement by the company, nor was the company ever apprised of the intended change. The letter of Clifford Wilson shows by its very terms that it was not intended to make any change at the time and a gift of the policy could not be otherwise accomplished.
This court is committed to a strict interpretation of policy requirements for change in beneficiaries in life insurance policies of this kind. Sheppard v. Crowley, 61 Fla. 735, 55 So. 841; Warren v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 138 Fla. 443, 189 So. 412.
We do not mean to be critical but we cannot refrain from calling counsel's attention to the fact that this would have been an ideal case for a stipulated record under Rule Eleven. By so doing, at least seventy-five per cent of the record here need not have been brought up.
The decree appealed from must be and is hereby reversed on authority of the latter cases.
Reversed.
On Rehearing.
This case is now before the court on a rehearing.
From the record, it appears that Gilbert John Higgins, a single man, died intestate, leaving a policy of life insurance payable to his estate. Soon after its issuance, he made a parol gift of the policy to his fiancee, Edrie V. Strickland. She accepted delivery of the policy, reimbursed assured for premiums paid thereafter, and retained the policy in her exclusive possession until the time of his death.
By the terms of the policy the insured was given the right, without the consent of the beneficiary, 'to receive every benefit, exercise every right and enjoy every privilege' conferred by the policy. It was expressly declared that the beneficiary should have no vested interest in the policy until after the death of the insured and the policy became a claim.
The policy also provided:
No written assignment of the policy was ever made to Edrie V. Strickland; nor was written notice designating her as beneficiary ever filed at the home office of the company, or endorsed on the policy.
Upon the death of assured, Edrie V. Strickland made claim to the proceeds, as owner of the policy. W. Gerry Miller made claim to the proceeds, as administrator of the estate of assured. The insurance company being in doubt as to whom payment should be made, filed its bill of interpleader and was allowed to bring the fund into court to await the determination of ownership. See Miller as Administrator v. Gulf Life Insurance Company et al., 148 Fla. 1, 3 So.2d 519.
The lower court found that Edrie V. Strickland was entitled to the fund. The administrator appealed from the decree. The case is now before this court on the rights of the claimants to the fund, as between themselves.
All of the essential elements of a completed valid parol gift of the life insurance policy to Edrie V. Strickland are present. Garner v. Bemis, 81 Fla. 60, 87 So. 426; Shannahan v. Shannahan 127 Fla. 718, 173 So. 902. As fiancee of Gilbert John Higgins, Edrie V. Strickland had an insurable interest in the life of assured. 29 Am.Jur. 321; Harden v. Harden, 191 Ky. 331, 230 S.W. 307, 17 A.L.R. 580; 2 Couch on...
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