Miller v. Harless

• Decision Date: 19 September 1929
• Citation: 153 Va. 228
• Parties: E. C. MILLER AND R. H. GRAHAM v. QUINN M. HARLESS, BY ETC.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 228

153 Va. 228

E. C. MILLER AND R. H. GRAHAM v. QUINN M. HARLESS, BY ETC.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Staunton.

September 19, 1929.

Absent, West, J.

1. ARREST — Action for False Arrest — Evidence as to Conduct of Plaintiff Leading to the Arrest — Plaintiff Trespassing in Order to see a Football Game — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action for false arrest against defendants, the business manager of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute who was in charge of the grounds and the officer who made the arrest. Plaintiff claimed that he only went from one gate to the other of a ball field and that he explained his reason for this to a officer who told him there would be no objection and that he did not stop to look at the game in progress. Defendants sought to introduce evidence to the effect that plaintiff persistently in the face of a number of warnings trespassed on the grounds in his attempt to overlook the game. The trial court refused to admit this evidence of defendant and instructed the jury to disregard and not to consider any evidence in the case of any events prior to the order of the business manager to arrest plaintiff.

Held: That this action of the court was error.

2. ARREST — Action for False Arrest — Evidence — Facts Showing Motice for Arrest — Case at Bar. — In an action for false arrest without a warrant the motives of the defendants in causing the arrest and what transpired immediately before the arrest are admissible where plaintiff seeks to recover punitive damages, and in the instant case although the plaintiff asked for no instruction as to punitive damages nevertheless, where it was manifest that the jury in fact imposed punitive damages, such evidence was admissible.

3. ARREST — Action for False Arrest — General Reputation of Plaintiff for Veracity. — In an action for false arrest it was no error on the part of the court to admit evidence of the general reputation of the plaintiff for truth and veracity.

4. WITNESS — Character of Witness — General Reputation for Truth and Veracity. — Whenever the character of a witness for truth is attacked, either by direct evidence of want of truth, or by cross-examination, or by proof of contradictory statements, in regard to the material facts, or by disproving by other witnesses the material facts stated by him in his examination; or in general, whenever his character for truth is impeached in any way known to the law, the party calling him may sustain him by evidence of his general reputation for truth.

5. ARREST — Action for False Arrest — Instruction that Trespass by Plaintiff Constituted a Misdemeanor — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for false arrest, defendants asked that the jury be instructed that if plaintiff went upon the grounds of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and after being warned continued to knowingly and wilfully trespass on the grounds then plaintiff was guilty of a misdemeanor.

Held: That the refusal to give this instruction was error under section 3338 of the Code of 1919, as amended, Acts of 1922, page 208.

6. ARREST — Action for False Arrest — Instruction as to Unlawful Trespass Constituting a Misdemeanor — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for false arrest, defendant asked for instruction based upon section 4479 of the Code of 1919, and section 864 of the Code of 1919, to the effect that if plaintiff went upon the grounds of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and after having been warned to leave continued to trespass thereon and in committing such trespass injured or destroyed property he was guilty of a misdemeanor.

Held: That the refusal of the court to give this instruction was error.

7. TRESPASS — Criminal Law — When Trespass Amounts to a Crime. — A mere trespass upon real or personal property, which is also the subject of a civil action, is not always a crime at common law; but it is a crime at common law if it amounts to a breach of the peace, or if it tends to or threatens a breach of the peace.

8. TRESPASS — Criminal Law — When Trespass Amounts to a Crime — Case at Bar. — The instant case was an action for false arrest. Plaintiff and his companion, if the evidence for the defendants was true, went upon the grounds of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and sought to overlook a football game. They were repeatedly warned to cease trespassing.

Held: That this conduct of plaintiff was exasperating, tended to violence and breach of the peace, and hence was a misdemeanor at common law, for which they were liable for arrest.

Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery county, in an action of trespass on the case. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants assign error.

The opinion states the case.

H. C. Tyler and Hall & Buford, for the plaintiffs in error.

Harless & Calhoun and John B. Spiers, for the defendant in error.

PRENTIS, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendants in the trial court are here complaining of a judgment against them in favor of Quinn M. Harless, in an action for an alleged false arrest. In order to comprehend the legal questions involved, it is necessary to state in some detail the substance of the testimony relied upon by both the plaintiff and the defendants, because one of the assignments of error is that nearly all of that offered for the defendants was excluded.

This is the substance of the testimony relied upon by the plaintiff: Quinn M. Harless, at the time of the arrest seventeen years old, and John Hawley, at that time about twenty years old, went from their homes in Christiansburg to Blacksburg for the purpose of attending the parade of the new cadets, which in the college vernacular is called the "Rat Parade," which usually occurs at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute shortly after the beginning of each session. This parade did not occur as was anticipated on that afternoon, but there was another attraction, a football game, played with a rival college at the athletic grounds. When the plaintiff arrived in Blacksburg, he went upon the college premises with a friend. They met one of the students and after being together for a short period, the three went to the north gate of the athletic field, where the ticket office is maintained, which is also the principal entrance to the athletic field. When the three reached this entrance, two of them went in, leaving the plaintiff at the gate. Plaintiff was then joined by John Hawley and James Haymaker, and Haymaker went in to the game, leaving the plaintiff and Hawley together at the gate. It is claimed by the plaintiff and Hawley that the plaintiff did not intend to go to the game, and that Hawley, while he wished to go, did not have the money to pay the admission fee. They claim that when Haymaker went in to the game, it was arranged that he would get from his father a sufficient sum of money for Hawley in order to pay his admission fee, and that he would meet Hawley at the south gate for the purpose of delivering the money to him. The plaintiff agreed to go with Hawley to the south gate, because told that if he did not get the money to pay his admission to the game he would return with the plaintiff to Christiansburg. They had no definite plan as to their method of getting back to Christiansburg, but expected to find some friend going in that direction who would carry them. It does not appear what became of Haymaker, but plaintiff and Hawley testified that before leaving the north gate they told the keeper there that they wanted to go to the south gate for the purpose indicated, and asked him if there would be any objection to their going around the fence to the south gate, and he replied that there was none. They claim that they started to go from the north gate to the south gate and that they went around the east fence, and that although the football game was then in progress they did not stop or even look at the game, and that when they reached a point near the south gate they were arrested by the defendant, officer Graham, who acted under the direction of the defendant, Miller.

It is necessary then to review the testimony relied upon by the defendants, because the chief assignments of error are based upon the rulings of the court in refusing to admit nearly all of this testimony offered for and by the dfendants, and in refusing to give the jury any instructions based thereon.

The defendant, Miller, is the business manager of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and as such has charge of the grounds and buildings, required to see that the premises are properly policed, and that the property is not injured by persons who come into the grounds. Upon the occasions of athletic games, he arranges to have a number of special officers stationed in and around the field to preserve order, to prevent trespass, and to prevent persons from going to high places just outside of the athletic grounds where the games and other events can be observed without paying the required admission fees. On this occasion, an officer, Sisson, was on duty on the west side of the athletic grounds at a point about two-thirds of the way south of the north end of the grounds. He testified that the plaintiff and Hawley came along, and that he asked them if they knew they were trespassing, and they said that they wanted to go to the south gate to see some one or to get a ticket. He told them that they could go on, but that there was another officer stationed above him nearer the south gate. Hall, this other officer, was offered to testify that he saw the plaintiff and Hawley on the west side of the grounds, near the south gate, looking at the ball game, and that he told them that he had orders to keep anybody from trespassing; that he turned them back and they went in the direction of the north gate. It does not appear that they told this officer that they wanted to go to the south gate to meet some one or to get a ticket. When turned back by this officer, they went in the direction of the point where...