Miller v. Indiana Dept. of Workforce Devel.

• Decision Date: 21 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. 93A02-0704-EX-316.,93A02-0704-EX-316.
• Citation: 878 N.E.2d 346
• Parties: Andrew W. MILLER, Appellant-Claimant, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, Unemployment Insurance Review Board and United Parcel Service, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

878 N.E.2d 346

Andrew W. MILLER, Appellant-Claimant, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, Unemployment Insurance Review Board and United Parcel Service, Inc., Appellees.

No. 93A02-0704-EX-316.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

December 21, 2007.

William R. Groth, Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Anita Wylie, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

Andrew Miller appeals from the decision of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development Review Board (the "Board") affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who found Miller ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Miller raises two issues, which we restate as whether Miller was denied due process based on inadequate notice of the issues to be decided at his hearing before the ALJ and whether the Board's decision was unsupported by its findings. Concluding that Miller was denied due process and that the Board's findings do not support its decision, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

On December 1, 2006, Miller, who had been working for United Parcel Service, Inc., ("UPS") since 1994, was involved in an accident while driving his UPS truck. Miller stopped at a stop sign and proceeded into an intersection, not seeing a car approaching from his right side. The vehicles collided, and both occupants of the other car were injured and required medical attention. The estimated damage caused by the accident was between $5,000 and $10,000.

Following the accident, Miller was taken out of service and eventually terminated on December 29, 2006. UPS based the termination on its claim that Miller violated Article 17(d) of the Labor Agreement between UPS and Teamsters Local 135 (the "Agreement"). Article 17(d) indicates that an employee may be suspended or discharged without prior warning for:

gross negligence, resulting in a serious accident. A serious accident is defined as one in which there is a fatality, a bodily injury to a person who, as a result of the injury, receives immediate medical treatment away from the scene of the accident, or $4,400.00 or more in damages.

Appellant's Appendix at 16-17.

Following his suspension, Miller filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the "Department"). On December 21, 2006, a Claims Director from the Department approved Miller's claim, finding that UPS had failed to carry its burden of establishing willful misconduct on Miller's part. On January 2, 2007, UPS appealed this determination and requested a hearing before an ALJ. On January 11, 2007, a Notice of Hearing (the "Notice") was sent to Miller. The Notice indicated that the issue at the hearing would be: "Whether the Claimant was able, available, and making an effort to secure full-time work. Ind.Code 22-2-14-3." Appellant's App. at 27. On January 25, 2007, the ALJ held a hearing at which the matter argued was whether UPS had just cause to terminate Miller. At the hearing, after UPS presented its case and the ALJ asked Miller questions regarding the accident, the following exchange took place between Miller (the Claimant) and the ALJ:

Claimant: . . . I was under the impression that this hearing was under the fact that I wasn't able to find a job. That I was supposed to be looking for a job, not the accident.

Judge: Well, that's what this is about, the suspension for misconduct. It has nothing to do with the work search. Claimant: Oh. I, I received a letter . . . I'm sorry, sir.

Judge: That's not . . . uh, people are getting confused. That's what the issue is listed but if you read the little box it says, "Suspended for misconduct in connection with the work."¹

Claimant: I've had it.

Judge: Right there on the second page you're holding in your left hand.

Claimant: Yeah, but I . . .

Judge: That's what we're talking about at this point.

Claimant: Okay, so that's what you guys had filled out. Okay, I'm sorry because I was under the, um . . . that this was cleared up by the, uh, claims adjuster (inaudible).

Judge: No.

Claimant: It said that it was, uh . . . determination that it was not misconduct. That's what I thought right there.

Judge: They appealed and now it's at my decision.

Claimant: Okay. I'm sorry. I didn't fully . . . didn't understand it.

Judge: Anything else?

Claimant: No, sir.

Transcript at 7-8. The ALJ then reversed the claims adjuster's determination pursuant to the following findings and conclusions:

FINDINGS OF FACT: . . . The claimant was discharged for negligence resulting in a serious accident. A serious accident is defined as one where there is a fatality, bodily injury to a person who, as a result of injury, receives immediate medical treatment away from the scene of the accident, or results in more than $4,400.00 in damages. Violation of the rule results in discharge on the first occurrence. The employer's rule exists. This rule exists as part of a collective bargaining agreement between the Teamster's Local 135 and the employer. As a negotiated rule it is reasonable. No employee has been allowed to remain employed with this employer after violating the rule. The rule is uniformly enforced. The claimant was a member of the union. The claimant had knowledge of the employer's rule. On December 1, 2006 at approximately 4:00 pm the claimant came to an intersection. The claimant's road had a stop sign. The claimant states that he stopped and looked both ways. The claimant proceeded into the intersection and struck another vehicle. The intersecting road did not have a stop sign. The claimant did not know where the car came from and felt that it must have been in a blind spot. The car flipped more than once. The driver of the car was seriously injured and had to be taken to the hospital from the accident scene for treatment. The damage for the accident was estimated to be between $5,000.00 and $10,000.00.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

* * *

The employer has established that its rule exists, serves a reasonable purpose and is uniformly enforced. The claimant had knowledge of the employer's rule. The claimant has knowingly violated the rule. While the claimant's actions may not have been intentional they meet the definition of a serious accident as defined by the collective bargaining agreement. If the claimant had a blind spot he should have taken more care in looking both ways before he proceeded into the intersection. . . .

Appellant's App. at 4-5.

Miller then appealed the ALJ's decision to the Board, which affirmed, adopting the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Miller now appeals.²

Discussion and Decision

I. Due Process

"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." NOW Courier, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 871 N.E.2d 384, 387 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007). Whether a party was denied due process is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

Parties to a disputed claim for unemployment benefits are required to be afforded "a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing." Ind.Code § 22-4-17-3. A "fair hearing" inherently includes reasonable notice of the hearing. See Scott v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 725 N.E.2d 993, 996 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). Miller argues that he was denied due process because the Notice indicated that the issues to be addressed at the hearing were different than the issue actually addressed. The Appellees argue: 1) Miller was not entitled to notice of the issues to be addressed at the hearing; 2) the Notice did inform Miller that whether he was dismissed for just cause would be addressed at the hearing; 3) Miller waived the issue by not objecting or requesting a continuance; and 4) any error was harmless as Miller has failed to point to prejudice. We will address each argument in turn.

A. Notice of the Issue

In arguing that Miller was not entitled to notice of the particular issues to be addressed at the hearing, the Appellees cite the administrative regulation indicating that after a hearing before an ALJ is scheduled, "notices of the hearing shall be mailed to the claimant . . . ." 646 Ind. Admin. Code § 3-12-1(d), available at www. in.gov/legislative/iac. The Appellees argue that because this regulation does not specify what must be included in the notice, the notice need not include the issue. However, the Appellees disregard the statutory requirement that when a party appeals an initial determination of eligibility for benefits, "each party to a hearing before an administrative law judge . . . shall be mailed a notice of the hearing at least ten (10) days before the date of the hearing specifying the place and time of the hearing and identifying the issues to be decided." Ind.Code § 22-4-17-6 (emphasis added). Besides this clear statutory directive, notice of the issues to be addressed at a hearing is a fundamental requirement of a fair hearing. See FTC v. Nat'l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 427, 77 S.Ct. 502, 1 L.Ed.2d 438 (1957) ("It goes without saying that the requirements of a fair hearing include notice of the claims of the opposing party and an opportunity to meet them."); Securities Com'n of Ind. v. Holovachka, 234 Ind. 135, 137, 124 N.E.2d 380, 381 (1955) ("The right to a hearing includes the right to know and meet the charges."). We conclude that Miller was entitled to be notified of the issues to be addressed at the hearing.

2. Whether the Notice Identified the Issues

The Notice indicated that the hearing would address "[w]hether the Claimant was able, available, and making an effort to secure full-time work. Ind.Code 22-2-14-3." Appellant's App. at 27. The Appellees argue that this statement should have alerted Miller that the hearing would address whether UPS had just cause to terminate him because the statute cited "discusses an individual's...