Miller v. Miller

• Citation: 200 Iowa 1070,205 N.W. 870
• Decision Date: 24 November 1925
• Docket Number: No. 36755.,36755.
• Parties: MILLER ET AL. v. MILLER (MARTHA A. MILLER ET AL., GARNISHEES; PAUL S. MILLER ET AL., INTERVENERS).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

200 Iowa 1070

205 N.W. 870

MILLER ET AL.

v.MILLER (MARTHA A. MILLER ET AL., GARNISHEES; PAUL S. MILLER ET AL., INTERVENERS).

No. 36755.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 24, 1925.

Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; H. B. Boies, Judge.

On May 31, 1923, the defendants, Martha A., J. J., and Clyde S. Miller, who had in their possession or control a considerable sum, the proceeds of several insurance policies on the life of Lewis Miller, deceased, were garnisheed on execution issued out of the district court of Black Hawk county on a judgment entered February 15, 1923, against Martha A. Miller for $17,650. Answers were filed by the garnishees, and same were controverted by plaintiff. On September 25, 1923, the other parties named who are children of Lewis Miller, deceased, filed a petition in intervention setting up the terms and provisions of the will of their father disposing of the funds in controversy in trust to Martha A. Miller, as trustee, and J. J. and Clyde S. Miller as advisory trustees, and asking that the terms and provisions of the will be carried out. Issues were joined upon the petition in intervention, amendments thereto, and other pleadings filed, and by agreement of the parties these were consolidated and tried to the court upon a stipulation of facts. The court rendered judgment in favor of the garnishees and interveners and dismissed the garnishment proceedings. From the judgment thus entered, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.Clark & Clark and Pickett, Swisher & Farwell, all of Waterloo, for appellants.

P. H. Paulsen, of Waterloo, and Stipp, Perry, Bannister & Starzinger, of Des Moines, for appellees.

STEVENS, J.

At the time of his death on November 21, 1921, Lewis Miller held six policies of insurance upon his life, as follows: Two in the Union Central Life Insurance Company for $10,000 each, one payable to “my estate, if living at my death, otherwise to my administrators, executors or assigns,” and the other to “the administrators, executors or assigns of the insured.” Two policies in the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company for $10,000, each payable to “the executors, administrators or assigns with right of revocation.” Two policies in the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company for $5,000 each, payable to the “executors or administrators if living, or to such other beneficiary as may be finally substituted under the conditions hereof.”

By item of his will, he disposed of the proceeds of his life and accident insurance as follows:

“All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property, of whatever kind and description, both real and personal, which I may own at the time of my death, including my life and accident insurance policies payable to myself or to my estate, and all of the proceeds therefrom including my homestead, subject to item I hereof, I give, devise and bequeath in equal shares to my eight children, Mary Grace Labarre, Clyde S. Miller, Glenn W. Miller, Max W. Miller, Paul S. Miller, Martha June Miller, Julia Abigail Miller, and Lewis Junior Miller, to be held in trust as hereinafter mentioned and to be administered as a trust as hereinafter mentioned and to be administered as a trust as hereinafter specified.”

The testator was survived by his wife and all of the children named as legatees in the will, several of whom were and still are minors. The will was duly admitted to probate in Black Hawk county, and Martha A. Miller qualified as executrix and also as trustee as provided by the will. The two sons named as advisory trustees also qualified as such and assumed the duties thereof. Martha A. Miller elected to take under the terms of the will. Insurance in the sum of $47,362.72 was paid to the executrix, and, at the time of the garnishment, she was administering the same as trustee; the estate having been closed. All of the policies provided that the beneficiary named therein might be changed at any time by written notice to the company at its home office upon forms furnished thereby. The policies of the New England Mutual Life and the John Hancock Mutual Life further provided that the change of beneficiary should become effective only upon indorsement thereof on the policy. Each of the policies specifically reserved the right of revocation to the insured. Appellees do not controvert the claim of appellant that, unless the disposition made of the proceeds of the insurance policies by the will is carried out, a substantial amount, which would otherwise go to the surviving widow, under section 1805 of the Code of 1897, is subject to garnishment and should be so disposed of by the court. On the other hand, appellants do not claim that if effect be given to the terms of the will the ruling complained of is erroneous.

[1] I. The theories of counsel for the respective parties are widely divergent; counsel for appellants contending that the attempt of the insured to dispose of the proceeds of the policies in the manner stated was, in effect, nothing more than an attempt to change the beneficiaries named in the policies by will. The law is well settled in this state that, where a method of changing beneficiary is contained in the policy, such method is exclusive and must be followed, and that a change cannot in such case be made by will. Wendt, Administrator, v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 72 Iowa, 682, 34 N. W. 470;In re Estate of Ensign, 181 Iowa, 1081, 165 N. W. 319;Brotherhood of Am. Yeomen v. Shine, 196 Iowa, 554, 194 N. W. 362;Brinsmaid v. Traveling Men's Ass'n, 152 Iowa, 134, 132 N. W. 34, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1282;Townsend v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 163 Iowa, 713, 144 N. W. 574, L. R. A. 1915A, 109;Hull v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen (Iowa) 202 N. W. 6;Ehlerman v. Bankers' Life Co. (Iowa) 200 N. W. 408, and cases cited. But, if the policy does not prescribe a method for changing the beneficiary, a change thereof may, under some circumstances at least, be made by will. Brinsmaid v. Traveling Men's Ass'n, supra; Townsend v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., supra.

As has already been observed, all of the policies in question were made payable to the estate, or to the executors or administrators of the insured. The argument of counsel for appellee proceeds on the theory that the avails of the policies were a part of the estate of the insured and, like any other personal property, subject to be disposed of by will under the provisions of section 3270 of the Code. The term “estate” has been in some instances held to not include life insurance. Golder v. Chandler, 87 Me. 63, 32 A. 784. But this definition, it seems to us, is too narrow to give effect to the usual and ordinary meaning of the word. Wolf v. Wolf, 152 Iowa, 121, 131 N. W. 882.

[2][3] It is true that the proceeds of an ordinary life policy, payable to the estate of the deceased, can never come into his possession and is payable to his executors or administrators only after his death. Nevertheless, it is a valid and subsisting contract and ripens immediately upon his death into a chose in action, and, unless the distribution thereof is controlled by statute, the proceeds of a policy payable to the estate or executors or administrators of the insured would pass, under the general statute of descent, to his heirs. The executors or administrators of the estate of the insured are not beneficiaries, but in their representative capacity the proceeds are payable to them for the purpose of distribution to the beneficiaries. It seems to us, therefore, quite clear that the will in question did not attempt merely to effect a change of beneficiaries, but that it operated upon the estate of the insured and must be given full effect as a testamentary disposition thereof, unless the proceeds of life insurance policies can, in no case, be disposed of by will or the disposition attempted in this case is prohibited by section 1805 of the Code. We shall dispose of these questions in order.

II. The question as to whether the insured may dispose of the avails of insurance on his life by will has never been passed upon by this court. We have held, however, in effect that, where the policy is payable to his personal representatives, the proceeds is a part of his estate. McClure v. Johnson, 56 Iowa, 620, 10 N. W. 217;Kelley v. Mann, 56 Iowa, 625, 10 N. W. 211;Rauen v. Insurance Co., 129 Iowa, 725, 106 N. W. 198.

Language is to be found in McClure v. Johnson and Rauen v. Insurance Co., supra, which apparently assumes, but does not decide, that life insurance, when not payable to another than the insured or his personal representatives, may be disposed of by will. The disposition of life insurance is controlled in many jurisdictions by statute, and but few cases in point have been called to our attention. The right to do so is recognized by text-writers. 1 Underhill on Wills, § 56; Joyce on Wills, vol. 2, § 736.

To what extent, if at all, the holding in the following cases, which sustain the right of testamentary disposition, was controlled by statute, is not disclosed by the opinions: Blouin v. Phaneuf, 81 Me. 176, 16 A. 540;Catholic Knights of America v. Kuhn, 91 Tenn. 214, 18 S. W. 385;Watson v. Watson, 183 Ky. 516, 209 S. W. 524, 3 A. L. R. 1575;German-Am. State Bank v. Godman, 83 Wash. 231, 145 P. 221;Fox v. Senter, 83 Me. 295, 22 A. 173; Re Pruner's Estate, 222 Pa. 179, 70 A. 1000, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561;Haynes v. Walker, 111 Tenn. 106, 76 S. W. 902;Hamilton v. McQuillan, 82 Me. 204, 19 A. 167. Under some of the above cases, the holding of the court is qualified while others may...