Miller v. Miller
| Citation | 298 So.2d 704 |
| Decision Date | 05 August 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 47555,47555 |
| Parties | Merton Edward MILLER v. Janice Haydell MILLER. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Bourdeaux & Jones, Meridian, for appellant.
Robert W. Bailey, Daniel P. Self, Jr., Meridian, for appellee.
The parties formerly were husband and wife, the relationship having been terminated by divorce.
For some two years following their marriage in 1956, the parties lived in a home in New Orleans, purchased for $10,000, title to which was taken in the husband's name. The parties then moved to Meridian, where another home was purchased, the proceeds from the sale of the New Orleans house having been used to make the down payment. Title to this new home was conveyed to the parties as joint tenants, with the right of survivorship. This was done, according to appellant, upon the advice of his own counsel and for the purpose of obtaining the benefits of that type of ownership. Some time later, this house was sold, and another purchased, title to this latter property also having been conveyed to both husband and wife as joint tenants, with the right of survivorship, the proceeds of the former home owned by them as joint tenants having been applied upon the purchase price. After a time, a new house was constructed upon this property, which was held by the parties, as stated, in joint tenancy. In 1972, after sixteen years, the marriage was terminated by divorce, the appellant having been the aggrieved party.
The parties hereto have agreed to a sale of the property now owned by them and to a division of the proceeds. Therefore, the present controversy involves only the question as to the respective proportions in which the parties shall share in the proceeds. This issue was submitted to the Chancery Court of Lauderdale County. From a decree of that court holding that the parties were entitled to equal shares, Merton E. Miller appeals.
Appellant claims that his contributions in money toward the eventual acquisition of the property presently owned represents 80/91 of the total, and that therefore, he is entitled to 80/91 of the proceeds of the sale. On the other hand, appellee contends that her interest in the land, under the clear terms of the deed, is an equal share. She contends that she made substantial contributions, both in work and money, toward their eventual acquisition of the property during the sixteen years of marriage, and that she is entitled to one-half of whatever the sale may bring. The chancellor found for the appellee, the wife, and appellant, the husband, has appealed.
In Mississippi it is settled that dissolution of a marriage by divorce does not, of itself, affect title of the respective parties to real estate owned by them.
Notwithstanding that appellant, the former husband, may have contributed a greater sum in cash toward the purchased property, now owned by the parties, than did his wife, the fact is undeniable that appellee, the former wife, also earned and contributed over the years a substantial sum in money. And, while the husband was the principal 'breadwinner,' as in most cases, the wife performed work and services as the feminine partner to the marriage union, including work directly relating to the joint property, such as landscaping, decorating and the like.
Appellant cites Jezo v. Jezo, 23 Wis.2d 399, 129 N.W.2d 195 (1964), in support of this argument that he is entitled to a share in proportion to his cash contributions. However, in Jezo, the Court said:
Evidence of unequal contributions by way of money or services is a factor to be considered but is not necessarily controlling. The reason that unequal contributions alone may not be sufficient to rebut the presumption is that it might have been the intention of the party making the greater contribution to make a gift of that part of his or her contribution which exceeded one-half of the acquisition cost. Even where one of the parties furnished all the consideration, a gift might likewise have been intended of the one-half.
Here appellant admits that he knowingly, advisedly and intentionally had title to the property conveyed to himself and wife as joint tenants. Moreover, the estate of each, under the clear terms of the deed itself, is that of an equal joint tenant, with the right of survivorship. Also, this was true as to the property formerly owned by them, the proceeds of the sale of which was applied toward the purchase of the presently owned property.
A legally enforceable agreement to the contrary not having been established, the grantor's conveyance vested in each of the parties, as grantees, an equal estate in joint tenancy. Further, while the conveyance to husband and wife perhaps more accurately might be said to have created in them an estate by the entirety, dissolution of the marriage did not have the effect of altering the character, extent or attributes of the estate conveyed, and upon divorce, it remained one in equal joint tenancy, with the right of survivorship, under the express terms of the instrument which created it.
This Court has held:
When it is sought to destroy the sanctity of an instrument, such as a deed, by parol proof, and change its form from the absolute to...
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