Miller v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.
Decision Date | 05 April 2011 |
Docket Number | No. WD 72699.,WD 72699. |
Citation | 338 S.W.3d 400 |
Parties | Darrell MILLER, Appellant,v.MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kent E. Gipson and Reed L. Wycuff, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant.Chris Koster, Attorney General, Stephen D. Hawke, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Before Division I: MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge, and THOMAS H. NEWTON and ALOK AHUJA, Judges.MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge.
Darrell Miller (“Miller”) appeals the dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment by the DeKalb County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Miller requested additional credit for time served in custody prior to the commencement of his sentence on a fifteen-year prison term for a drug charge, arguing that the Missouri Department of Corrections (the “DOC”) improperly calculated and credited time served in custody. We affirm.
The facts are not disputed. They are:
On July 15, 1999, in Jackson County, Miller pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to ten years in prison (“Case A”). On August 3, 2001, also in Jackson County, Miller pleaded guilty to trafficking in drugs in the first degree and received another ten-year sentence, which the court ordered to run concurrently with the first ten-year sentence (“Case B”). On April 7, 2003, Miller was released on parole for Case A and Case B. On May 5, 2004, in Ray County, Miller pleaded guilty to attempted manufacturing and producing a controlled substance, for which he received a sentence of fifteen years, and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use, for which he received a sentence of four years (“Case C”). Both sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Execution of both sentences was suspended, and Miller was ordered to complete a section 217.362 1 drug treatment program in the custody of the DOC beginning on May 6, 2004. Miller successfully completed the drug treatment program and was conditionally released on probation on December 8, 2005.
On February 14, 2007, Miller was once again arrested in Ray County on a charge of second-degree assault (“Case D”).2 Miller's arrest for assault violated both his probation conditions in Case C and parole conditions in Case A and Case B. On February 16, 2007, pursuant to a parole violation warrant, Miller was placed under arrest for violation of his parole conditions. On March 2, 2007, Miller's probation in Case C was suspended, and a warrant issued for his arrest for violation of his probation conditions. The probation violation warrant was served on March 6, 2007. Miller's Case C probation was revoked on December 7, 2007, and Case C sentencing was ordered executed.
On July 28, 2009, Miller filed a petition for declaratory judgment, requesting a declaration that the DOC credit Miller's fifteen-year sentence 3 for additional time Miller spent in custody related to the fifteen-year sentence before commencement of the sentence.4 The DOC subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court held a hearing and granted the motion to dismiss on June 1, 2010. Miller timely appealed.
“In reviewing the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action for failure to state a claim, this court deems all well-pleaded facts to be true and determines whether they invoke principles of substantive law that would entitle the petitioner to relief.” Monroe v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 105 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). Stated differently, if the petition contains facts supporting its allegations, and not mere conclusions, and those facts demonstrate a justiciable controversy, then we will reverse the trial court's dismissal and remand the cause for a determination of the parties' rights. Id. When supplemental information is attached to the petition, the petition must be interpreted in light of the attachments. Id. at 922. We will affirm the trial court's judgment under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence, even if the reasons advanced by the trial court are wrong or insufficient. Trimble v. Pracna, 167 S.W.3d 706, 716 (Mo. banc 2005). Our primary concern is with the correctness of the trial court's result, not the route taken to reach that result. Id.
Section 558.031.1 mandates credit “for all time in prison, jail or custody after the offense occurred and before the commencement of the sentence, when the time in custody was related to that offense.” § 558.031.1 (emphasis added). “In construing [§ 558.031.1], we are guided by the principle that criminal statutes must be ‘construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the defendant.’ ” Goings v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 6 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Mo. banc 1999) (citations omitted).
In its judgment below, the trial court explained its dismissal ruling as follows, in pertinent part:
[Miller] contends that he is entitled to this credit under § 558.031.1, RSMo.2000. But that statute applies to periods in custody after the offense occurs but before sentence. [Miller] alleges he was sentenced on May 5, 2004 (Petition, page 3, paragraph 9). Accordingly, § 558.031.1, RSMo.2000 does not authorize [DOC] to give credit for the requested time, a period after sentencing.
(Emphasis added.)
Initially, we note that the trial court's reasoning erroneously assumes that the triggering event for section 558.031.1 “in custody” sentencing credit is before sentence, not before the commencement of the sentence. The statute does not fix the triggering event as the date of sentencing. Instead, the triggering event is “commencement of the sentence.” There is, of course, a difference between the two. That difference is important to the analysis of this appeal.
Mr. Goings was on parole for Charge 1 when he was arrested for Charge 2. Because of his arrest for Charge 2, his parole on Charge 1 was revoked and he was placed in prison. He remained in prison while awaiting his trial on Charge 2, of which he was eventually convicted. This Court held that the time that Mr. Goings spent in custody prior to receiving his sentence on Charge 2 was “related to” that sentence because it was Goings' arrest on Charge 2 that resulted in revocation of parole on Charge 1 and returned him to custody.
State ex rel. Nixon v. Kelly, 58 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Mo. banc 2001) (emphasis added). Goings highlighted the legislature's choice of the broad language “related to” instead of the stricter phrases “caused by” or “the result of.” 6 S.W.3d at 908. However, “related to” is only established where the subsequent offense is one of the causes of time in custody, as opposed to the only cause.Pettis, 275 S.W.3d at 317 (citing State ex rel. Gater v. Burgess, 128 S.W.3d 907, 910 (Mo.App. W.D.2004)). “Under section 558.031, it is to ‘the time in custody’ that the second conviction must be related.” Kelly, 58 S.W.3d at 518–19. Goings and subsequent case law relying on Goings all involve situations where the defendant requested credit on “2nd offense” sentence for time served on “1st offense” sentence after probation/parole was revoked. See, e.g., Gater, 128 S.W.3d at 910; Pettis, 275 S.W.3d 313; Monroe, 105 S.W.3d 915.
In the present case, there are three instances of time served “in custody” that Miller argues he is entitled to credit for with respect to his Case C fifteen-year prison sentence: (1) jail time prior to sentencing; (2) time served in the custody of the DOC after sentencing and while on probation for the section 217.362 drug treatment program; and (3) time served in the custody of the DOC for parole and probation violations but before probation was revoked and his Case C fifteen-year prison sentence was ordered to be executed.
In the first instance, it is undisputed that Miller served 111 days in a county jail awaiting sentencing on Case C. The “only cause” for this time in custody is the “subsequent offense” from Case C that resulted in a fifteen-year prison sentence. Thus, Miller is entitled to credit for this time served in jail prior to sentencing on Case C, and it is likewise undisputed that the DOC has, in fact, credited this time in custody toward Miller's fifteen-year prison sentence.
In the second instance, Miller was sentenced on May 5, 2004, for Case C. With regard to the relevant Case C drug offense, Miller was sentenced to a fifteen-year prison sentence. However, execution of the...
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