Miller v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n
| Decision Date | 08 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-03973 |
| Parties | ROSANNA L. MILLER, Plaintiff, v. OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Vascura Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Ohio Civil Rights Commission's (the “Commission”), Melody Smith's (collectively, the “Commission Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14); and Orthopedic One's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No 22). For the reasons set forth more fully below, this Court GRANTS the Commission Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), and Orthopedic One's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 22).
The Court incorporates by reference the facts and procedural background set forth in its previous Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 29; Opinion & Order). The relevant procedural history follows. After this action was removed to federal court, Plaintiff proceeding pro se filed her Complaint on July 20, 2021. (ECF Nos. 1, 7). There, Plaintiff asserts several legal theories, including challenges to Defendants' conduct via[1] 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, 12203 and existing state law analogues, Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(G); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(A)-(C), OAC 4112-5-02(H), Ohio Revised Code 4112.01(A)(13), and 28 CFR § 35.108 et. seq.; federal informed consent regulations under 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; Ohio's promulgation of emergency mask orders under Revised Code § 119.03(G); and a relief provision under 28 C.F.R. § 36.504.
On July 27, 2021, Orthopedic One filed its Answer. (ECF No. 9). Subsequently, the Commission Defendants timely filed its Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), and Orthopedic One timely filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22). After retaining counsel, Plaintiff's attorney filed his Notice of Appearance on February 05, 2022. (ECF No. 31). This Court then granted counsel additional time to respond to the previously filed Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 41).
Plaintiff timely filed her Response in Opposition to both outstanding Motions. (ECF Nos. 44, 47). Both Defendants timely filed their Replies. (ECF Nos. 46, 49). Defendants' Motions are now ripe for review.
Rule 12(b)(1) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss based on a court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Jurisdiction in the federal courts is limited: it may be based on a federal question, which is one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, ” or on diversity of citizenship where the sum in controversy exceeds $75, 000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction when it is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1). Rogers v. Stratton Indus., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986). Where a motion to dismiss presents alternative arguments, such as improper venue or failure to state a claim, the court must address subject matter jurisdiction first. City of Heath v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 834 F.Supp. 971, 975 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (citing Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). And although the court “must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, ” the court “need not accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, “[t]he defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Raymond v. Avectus Healthcare Sols., LLC, 859 F.3d 381, 383 (6th Cir. 2017); Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2019).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In evaluating such a motion, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Tysinger v. Police Dep't of City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2006)). This Court then asks “whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute is about a material fact that is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative, ” however, is not enough to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 249-50.
On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden rests upon the movant to present the Court with law and argument in support of its motion as well as identifying the relevant portions of “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56). If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
The Commission moves to Dismiss on three bases under Rule 12(b): lack of subject matter jurisdiction under (1); failure to state a claim under (6); and improper service of process under (5). (ECF No. 14). The Court addresses these arguments in turn.
a. § 1983
First, to the extent Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 USC § 1983, the Commission Defendants argue they are either: (1) excluded by definition as to those a Plaintiff can assert a §1983 suit against; or (2) otherwise immune from suit. The Commission construes Plaintiffs Complaint as potentially asserting a § 1983 claim when she states that “[r]espondents are individually and collectively … engaged in and continue to be engaged in, a pattern and practice of deliberately … retaliatory/coercive acts and conduct in violation of the Petitioner's Federal rights.” (Id. at 4) (citing ECF No. 7 at 7). Assuming that Plaintiff intended to assert a claim on this basis, the Commission Defendants correctly states that they cannot be sued via this vehicle.
Plaintiff does not respond directly to the Commission Defendants' arguments regarding the applicability of §1983. Instead, she lodges a general critique that the Commission Defendants' motion was “founded on the assumption that the claims arose out of § 1983, granting the motion to dismiss on these grounds would be inappropriate under the applicable ADA law.” (Id.). These non-responsive assertions, however, do little to disturb the Commission Defendants' arguments.
The Commission Defendants correctly articulate the law: “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[t]he need for this court to undertake a broad sovereign immunity analysis with respect to the § 1983 claims is obviated by the fact that the defendants in their official capacities are not recognized as “persons” under § 1983.”). Generally, absent either a waiver from the state or Congress's abrogation of the state's immunity pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will, 491 U.S. at 66. (citing Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472-473 (1987) (plurality opinion)). But “[e]ven if [Ohio's] sovereign immunity has been properly waived or abrogated for the purposes of the federal statute the defendants allegedly violated, a § 1983 claim against the defendants in their official capacities cannot proceed because, by definition, those officials are not persons under the terms of § 1983.” Gean, 330 F.3d at 767 (6th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, this Court need not address the Defendants' arguments as to immunity because to the extent Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 against the Commission Defendants, it fails as a matter of law. The Commission Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on this claim is GRANTED.
b. Judicial Review of Commission's Investigation
The Commission Defendants also argue that to the extent Plaintiff seeks judicial review of its “no probable cause” decision, this Court lacks...
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