Miller v. One 2001 Pontiac Aztek

• Decision Date: 16 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. C8-02-613.,C8-02-613.
• Citation: 669 N.W.2d 893
• Parties: Debra Jane MILLER, Appellant, v. ONE 2001 PONTIAC AZTEK, # GHS-186, VIN: 3G7DA03E41S500032, Defendant, City of Bloomington, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

669 N.W.2d 893

Debra Jane MILLER, Appellant, v. ONE 2001 PONTIAC AZTEK, # GHS-186, VIN: 3G7DA03E41S500032, Defendant, City of Bloomington, Respondent.

No. C8-02-613.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 16, 2003.

Leonard Castro, Chief Fourth District Public Defender, Barbara S. Isaacman, Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Sandra Henkels Johnson, Associate Bloomington City Attorney, Bloomington, MN, for Respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

GILBERT, Justice.

The facts in this case are undisputed. On June 6, 2001, in the City of Bloomington, Debra Jane Miller, appellant, was arrested for gross misdemeanor driving while impaired (DWI) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2000). Approximately 7 months earlier, on November 16, 2000, appellant was arrested for gross misdemeanor DWI, having a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of .26. On January 25, 2001, appellant was convicted of the first offense and, on July 11, 2001, appellant was convicted of the second DWI offense.

Appellant's second DWI conviction qualified as a "first-degree" conviction. A person is guilty of first-degree DWI if "two or more aggravating factors" are present. Minn.Stat. § 169A.25, subd. 1 (2000)¹. Aggravating factors include a second DWI conviction within a 10-year span and with a BAC higher than .20. Minn.Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 3 (2000). Appellant's first-degree DWI constituted a "designated offense," which qualified appellant's vehicle for forfeiture. See Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(d)(1) (2000) (stating that "designated offense" includes a violation of section 169A.20, driving while impaired, under circumstances described in section 169A.25, first-degree driving while impaired), Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 2 (2000) (providing for seizure of motor vehicle involved in designated offense).

Appellant filed a demand for judicial determination per Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 8 (2000). The City of Bloomington moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the City's motion for summary judgment and ordered an evidentiary hearing. At appellant's January 14, 2002, forfeiture hearing, she provided her financial information. She testified that she was laid off from her employment in September 2000, and received a severance package worth $79,200, of which she spent $16,000 on the 2001 Pontiac Aztek that was subject to forfeiture. Appellant remained unemployed and collected state unemployment benefits. Appellant had no dependents, but argued that she would be severely restricted without the proceeds of her automobile forfeiture.

After the hearing, the district court held that, due to appellant's financial condition, any forfeiture of appellant's vehicle exceeding $1,000 would violate the Excessive Fines Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. It ordered the City to sell appellant's vehicle, waive any storage fees, keep $1,000, and remit all remaining funds back to appellant.

The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision. It held that the district court erred in considering appellant's personal financial situation. After applying a gross disproportionality test, the court of appeals determined that the forfeiture was not excessive. It remanded with instructions to order the vehicle forfeited pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 169A.63. We affirm.

I.

Cases involving the constitutionality of a statute are questions of law which we review de novo. State v. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d 407, 412 (Minn.2000); Matter of Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1993); State Farm Ins. Cos. v. Seefeld, 481 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn.1992).

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions both protect individuals from excessive fines. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); Minn. Const. art. I § 5 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). We have previously stated that "[a] large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to impose penalties sufficient to prevent the commission of an offense, and it would have to be an extreme case to warrant the courts in holding that the constitutional limit has been transcended." State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 59 N.W. 1098, 1100 (1894).

The United States Supreme Court extensively explored the Excessive Fines Clause pertaining to a forfeiture in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998). In Bajakajian, customs officers stopped the defendant as he attempted to leave the United States. The customs officers found $357,144 in currency and confiscated it. Id. at 324, 118 S.Ct. 2028. Bajakajian was charged with one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1994), requiring travelers to declare their belongings if they are transporting more than $10,000 from the United States. 524 U.S. at 325, 118 S.Ct. 2028. If a person is in violation of the statute, a court has discretion to order that person to "forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense * * *." 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994).

Relying on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court adopted a standard of gross disproportionality articulated in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a fine is unconstitutional if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 344, 118 S.Ct. 2028.

To determine proportionality, the Supreme Court in Solem utilized three factors: 1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 2) a comparison of the contested fine with fines imposed for the commission of the other crimes in the same jurisdiction; and 3) comparison of the contested fine with fines imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91, 103 S.Ct. 3001. Applying the Solem test to Bajakajian, the Supreme Court held that the forfeiture of Bajakajian's money would violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 344, 118 S.Ct. 2028.

We first substantially applied the Excessive Fines Clause to Minnesota statutes in Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d at 412. In Rewitzer, we were asked whether postconviction fines and surcharges totaling $273,600 amounted to an unconstitutionally excessive fine. Similar to the United States Supreme Court in Bajakajian, we adopted the three-part test established in Solem for evaluating the constitutionality of a fine under the Excessive Fines Clause. The fines in Rewitzer were levied against the defendant for selling drugs with a street value of less than $200. Id. at 414 n. 4.

Applying the "gross disproportionality" standard found in Solem and Bajakajian, along with the three-part test articulated in Solem and relied on in Bajakajian, we held that: (1) the punishment was largely disproportional to the crime, as the fine was grossly larger (1,368 times) than the value of the drugs and the severity of the offense; (2) the fines imposed on Rewitzer were substantially higher than the fines authorized for other similarly ranked offenses; and (3) Rewitzer's fine far exceeded the recommended fine for a similar offense under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ($273,600 versus $500-$5,000). Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d at 414-15.

We have previously validated the practice of vehicle forfeitures as long as a sufficient nexus exists between the crime and the vehicle. In Riley v.1987 Station Wagon, 650 N.W.2d 441 (Minn.2002), the district court ordered the forfeiture of a motor vehicle after the owner was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The court ordered forfeiture on the basis that the vehicle had been used in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit the murder. We held that "in Minnesota, an action for forfeiture is a civil in rem action. The property seized becomes the defendant based on the legal fiction that it is the inanimate object itself, not its possessor or owner, that is guilty of wrongdoing." Id. at 443 (citations omitted). Because the sole connection between the vehicle and criminal activity in Riley was a remote transportation of the criminal, we held that a sufficient nexus did not exist to warrant a forfeiture. Id. at 445; see Minn.Stat. § 609.531, subd. 6a (2002).

According to Riley, "common sense dictates that the law requires a substantially significant connection with criminal activity before an ordinary automobile may be seized and forfeited to the Government." Riley, 650 N.W.2d at 445 (citations omitted). In contrast to Riley, the vehicle in the present case was clearly and directly involved with appellant's drunken driving. The use of a vehicle in a first-degree DWI offense is a necessary prerequisite of the forfeiture statute. The question appellant raises does not revolve around appellant's guilt, or the vehicle's nexus to that guilt, but rather the degree that appellant will be harmed by her punishment.

The City first asks us to depart from the Solem test, arguing that in rem vehicle forfeitures should be judged purely based on an "instrumentality" inquiry.² We decline to depart from the Solem test in the present matter and therefore apply the three Solem factors to the facts of this case.

The first Solem factor examines the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001. Appellant argues that a determination of the harshness of the penalty should include an evaluation of the financial condition of the person being subject to forfeiture.³ To support this theory, appellant cites several forfeiture cases in other jurisdictions that suggest a possible evaluation of an offender's financial situation.

The district court agreed with appellant's argument. Under the first Solem factor, the district court ...