Miller v. El Paso County

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Alexander
• Citation: Miller v. El Paso County, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 136 Tex. 370 (Tex. 1941)
• Decision Date: 23 April 1941
• Docket Number: No. 7837.,7837.
• Parties: MILLER et al. v. EL PASO COUNTY.

150 S.W.2d 1000

MILLER et al. v. EL PASO COUNTY.

No. 7837.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 23, 1941.

Rehearing Overruled May 21, 1941.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Eighth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by J. R. Miller and others against the County of El Paso and others to enjoin collection of taxes. A judgment for defendants was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, 146 S.W.2d 1027, and plaintiffs bring error.

Judgments reversed, and cause remanded with instructions.

J. A. Gillett and Fred C. Knollenberg, both of El Paso, for Miller and others.

Gerald C. Mann, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Fairchild and Glenn R. Lewis, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

Ernest Guinn, Co. Atty., Frank B. Clayton, City Atty., Thornton Hardie, Eugene Smith, Louis Scott, and Potash & Cameron, all of El Paso, for defendants in error.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

This suit was brought by J. R. Miller and other tax payers against the Commissioners' Court of El Paso County and others to enjoin the collection of taxes under Acts 1935, 44th Legislature, First Called Session, p. 1541, ch. 370, Vernon's Ann. Stat. Art. 2352b, on the ground that said Act is unconstitutional. Said Act is as follows:

"Section 1. In all counties in this State having a population of not less than 125,000 inhabitants and not more than 175,000 inhabitants, and containing a city having a population of not less than 90,000 inhabitants, as shown by the last preceding Federal Census, a direct tax of not over Five (5) Cents on the valuation of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars may be authorized and levied by the Commissioners' Court of such county, for the purpose of advertising and promoting the growth and development of said county and its county seat; provided that before the Commissioners' Court of any such counties shall be authorized to levy any tax for such purpose, the qualified tax paying voters of the county shall by a majority vote authorize the Commissioners' Court to thereafter levy annually a tax not to exceed Five (5) Cents on the One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars assessed valuation.

"Sec. 2. The amount of money collected from such levy of taxes by the Commissioners' Court of any such county shall be paid to the Board of County Development in twelve (12) monthly installments as collected. All moneys received by the Board of County Development from such tax shall be expended only for the purposes authorized by this Act, and such Board shall annually render an itemized account to the County Auditor of all receipts and disbursements.

"Sec. 3. There is hereby created in such counties as may vote in favor of this tax a Board of County Development, which shall devote its time and efforts to the growth, advertisement and development of any such county. The Board of County Development shall consist of five (5) members; two (2) to be appointed by the Commissioners' Court of such counties, representative of the agricultural interest of such counties, who shall reside outside the county seat of any such county; and three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce of the county seat of such county, one of such three members to be a member, in good standing, of organized labor. Said members shall serve for a period of two (2) years from their appointment, without compensation, and until their successors are appointed and accept such appointment. Vacancies on such Board shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointments, and by the same agencies.

"All members of such Board of County Development shall be qualified tax paying voters of the county in which they are appointed to serve."

Section 56, Article III, of the State Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., reads, in part, as follows:

"Sec. 56. The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law, authorizing:

* * * * * *

"Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards or school districts;

* * * * * *

"Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties, cities, towns, election or school districts;

* * * * * *

"And in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted; * * *."

The purpose of this constitutional inhibition against the enactment of local or special laws is a wholesome one. It is intended to prevent the granting of special privileges and to secure uniformity of law throughout the State as far as possible. It is said that at an early period in many of the states the practice of enacting special and local laws became "an efficient means for the easy enactment of laws for the advancement of personal rather than public interests, and encouraged the reprehensible practice of trading and `logrolling.'" It was for the suppression of such practices that such a provision was adopted in this and many of the other states of the Union. 25 R.C.L., p. 820, § 68.

Notwithstanding the above constitutional provision, the courts recognize in the Legislature a rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes and to enact laws for the regulation thereof, even though such legislation may be applicable only to a particular class or, in fact, affect only the inhabitants of a particular locality; but such legislation must be intended to apply uniformly to all who may come within the classification designated in the Act, and the classification must be broad enough to include a substantial class and must be based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing such class from others with respect to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed legislation. In other words, there must be a substantial reason for the classification. It must not be a mere arbitrary device resorted to for the purpose of giving what is, in fact, a local law the appearance of a general law. City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 121 Tex. 14, 36 S.W.2d 470, 41 S.W.2d 228; Bexar County v. Tynan,...