Miller v. El Paso County
Decision Date | 23 April 1941 |
Docket Number | No. 7837.,7837. |
Citation | 150 S.W.2d 1000 |
Parties | MILLER et al. v. EL PASO COUNTY. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Gerald C. Mann, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Fairchild and Glenn R. Lewis, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.
Ernest Guinn, Co. Atty., Frank B. Clayton, City Atty., Thornton Hardie, Eugene Smith, Louis Scott, and Potash & Cameron, all of El Paso, for defendants in error.
This suit was brought by J. R. Miller and other tax payers against the Commissioners' Court of El Paso County and others to enjoin the collection of taxes under Acts 1935, 44th Legislature, First Called Session, p. 1541, ch. 370, Vernon's Ann. Stat. Art. 2352b, on the ground that said Act is unconstitutional. Said Act is as follows:
Section 56, Article III, of the State Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., reads, in part, as follows:
The purpose of this constitutional inhibition against the enactment of local or special laws is a wholesome one. It is intended to prevent the granting of special privileges and to secure uniformity of law throughout the State as far as possible. It is said that at an early period in many of the states the practice of enacting special and local laws became "an efficient means for the easy enactment of laws for the advancement of personal rather than public interests, and encouraged the reprehensible practice of trading and `logrolling.'" It was for the suppression of such practices that such a provision was adopted in this and many of the other states of the Union. 25 R.C.L., p. 820, § 68.
Notwithstanding the above constitutional provision, the courts recognize in the Legislature a rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes and to enact laws for the regulation thereof, even though such legislation may be applicable only to a particular class or, in fact, affect only the inhabitants of a particular locality; but such legislation must be intended to apply uniformly to all who may come within the classification designated in the Act, and the classification must be broad enough to include a substantial class and must be based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing such class from others with respect to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed legislation. In other words, there must be a substantial reason for the classification. It must not be a mere arbitrary device resorted to for the purpose of giving what is, in fact, a...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Lucas v. U.S.
...11.02 of article 4590i constitutes a special law in favor of a certain class of litigants. As we said in Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001-1002 (1941): [T]he courts recognize in the Legislature a rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes......
-
Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.
...far as possible.'" Maple Run at Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.1996) (quoting Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (1941)). In particular, it prevents lawmakers from engaging in the "`reprehensible'" practice of trading votes for the a......
-
Hughs v. Dikeman
...as possible.’ " Maple Run at Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monaghan , 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Miller v. El Paso Cty. , 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (1941) ). When analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the presumption of validity. Robinson v. Hill ,......
-
Hughs v. Dikeman
...as possible.’ " Maple Run at Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monaghan , 931 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Miller v. El Paso Cty. , 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000, 1001 (1941) ). When analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the presumption of validity. Robinson v. Hill ,......