Miller v. Paulson
| Decision Date | 25 October 1918 |
| Docket Number | No. 30692.,30692. |
| Citation | 185 Iowa 218,169 N.W. 203 |
| Parties | MILLER ET AL. v. PAULSON. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Harrison County; A. B. Thornell, Judge.
The appellees are the daughters of the appellant. They succeeded below in having their mother found to be of unsound mind. A motion attacking the verdict was denied. A guardian of the property of Mrs. Paulson has been appointed and has qualified. Mrs. Paulson appeals. Reversed and remanded.Turner & Cullison, of Avoca, for appellant.
Roadifer & Roadifer and H. L. Robertson, all of Logan, for appellees.
[1] I. For testimony which discloses the conduct and mental condition of the appellant in the past we will assume that, unless it has been overwhelmingly met, it is sufficient to sustain the verdict. This concession pro arguendo makes it needless to particularize, even if it were practicable. But to illustrate what ultimate effect said testimony of the past condition and conduct should have on this trial we point out one item which appellees will concede is as much of an aid to their case as anything that was adduced on their behalf. The item in question is evidence that appellant conveyed large tracts of land, perhaps all the land she had, to her two sons at much less than its value, and offered a comparatively trifling provision for the daughters, and, upon the rejection of this offer, gave these daughters little if anything. We understand it to be claimed, and will assume it to be the fact, that this transfer left appellant with much less of a provision for her maintenance than she might and should have had. What is the effect of all this, and of other testimony bearing on past conduct? Assume, for the sake of argument, that this transfer proves that at the time it was made it was proper to appoint a guardian for the property of the appellant; that being assumed, the presumption of continuity establishes prima facie that at the time of the trial, the time to which the statute confines the inquiry, she still needed such guardian. But at no time was the validity of these transfers for trial, and the mental condition when the deeds were made is material only as prima facie evidence that a guardian for her property was needed at the time of the trial.
[2][3] The ultimate inquiry remains whether the allegation that defendant is a person of unsound mind had been “satisfactorily proved upon the trial.” Code, § 3219. Since the mental condition at the time of the trial is controlling, were it conceded that at that time the defendant was of sound mind and capable of protecting her property rights, it would become utterly immaterial if it were further conceded that at some time in the past the defendant had made a transfer of her property in such manner as to show that at that time she was not capable of protecting her property rights. If fully recovered at the time of the trial, the making of such improvident deed in the past would not justify the appointment of a guardian for her, and her past mental incapacity would afford no remedy, except that she herself might, after having recovered, make successful attack upon such deeds by proving her past mental incapacity. Therefore it all resolves itself into an inquiry whether it was so strongly proved on the trial that defendant then had average mental capacity to protect her property rights, though she did not have it in the past, as that a motion for new trial, asserting failure to make satisfactory proof of incompetency, should have been sustained. On the one side we have testimony that tends to show lack of average mental capacity. There is testimony on the other hand disputing the first. This conflict we shall not attempt to settle. We shall first consider some matters which on final analysis exhibit no conflict.
[4] I. (a). Before going into this it is not amiss to point out that, as is not unusual in such contests, natural affection seems to be supplanted by a malicious desire to exaggerate and color. For illustration, throughout the testimony of all of the daughters and their husbands runs an utterly unjustified assertion that the old mother was filthy in habit and unnaturally indifferent to at least the physical well-being of her little children. The “expert” testimony runs true to form. It bases an edict of insanity upon assumed things that have in reason no relation whatever to establishing lack of mental balance. It is the kind of testimony which, in type, gives an opinion that death ensued from a bullet wound because the deceased at one time raised Holstein cattle. The testimony given is not much less absurd. Dr. Kennedy testified on cross-examination that, on the assumption that the father had shown a discrimination between the children, the fact that the mother carried this out shows she is of unsound mind, and that the witness had always thought people who discriminated between children were of unsound mind. With this digression out of the way, we turn to some of the matters concerning which, as said, there was no substantial, if any, conflict, and which upon analysis disprove rather than prove the case of the plaintiffs.
An argument of lack of business capacity is builded up on the purchase of a house in Persia. It appears that the initial negotiations were not made by the defendant, but one of her sons, and there is a claim that she forbore at all times to make such examination and inquiry as an ordinarily prudent person would make before purchasing. It is a sufficient answer that it fairly appears the house was in good condition, that before finally closing she did make reasonable investigation, and that whatsoever part her son Henry took in the matter was at her instance. It appears without dispute she asked the seller what shape it was in, and he told her it was in good shape. It all sums up merely to the claim that the son talked to the seller first, and wrote out the check in payment, at which time, however, the defendant was present; that the buyer talked with her when she was alone, and asked her if she did not want to go up and look at the property, and she answered she would be up there some time to see it. He admits he had a talk with her the day she came in to have the papers made out, and it is the undisputed testimony of Henry that the mother talked with the seller about the property on the day she bought it, and told him she wanted him to furnish her an abstract of title down to her name, move the outbuildings onto the lot and shingle them, and pay all the unpaid taxes, and that the seller agreed to do so.
Naturally enough the appellees attach importance to the fact that the mother has endowed the two sons much more liberally than the daughters. It will be conceded, of course, that, assuming her to be mentally capable, she had a right to make even an unreasonable discrimination. It is equally manifest that the theory of the appellee is unfavorably affected, if it be true that the differentiation was a natural one. Of itself, it counts for little, but it is still to be noted as a circumstance that the son Harry is older than two of the sisters. It appears without any dispute that both boys worked faithfully on the farm without wages until the death of their father, at which time the son Harry was 20 years old, and the son Henry 22. It is undisputed that they began working on this farm practically when they were little children, and, as one of them puts it, as soon as he was able to drive a team and hold a cultivator. This continued, as said, until the father died. His health was in such condition that for a long time prior to his death he was incapacitated from working. There were lots of cattle and hogs, and general farm work, and for all of five years before the death of the father the two brothers farmed all of the 250 acres that belonged to the father. They were faithful; they knew no such thing as a vacation, or going to a State Fair, or the like; they had no opportunity to visit any cities, except that it seems the two brothers were just once in Omaha and in Council Bluffs. Before the mother attempted any recognition of this service, the father recognized it. It is without dispute that before the father died he told the mother that he would like to have each of the boys have a home on the two places they had; that thereupon the mother said, “The boys worked hard for you, and now is a good time to give them a home;” that he then said to the boys, “This is going to be your home; I want you to stay right home here; you are getting of age, and I thought I would tell you this, so you would be working for your own interest.” Just before he died the father wrote the mother a letter. It is not stated, but is fairly to be inferred, that this letter was in line with these previous expressions. It appears that the father appointed Henry executor without bonds. He seems to have done nothing for the boys until he died, and at that time he merely noted on a slip of paper what amounted to giving Harry a team, and he left $400 in a bank in Henry's name; but this was not known until a note left by him advised the mother of it. In this letter no one but Harry was remembered. While the mother finally acted somewhat in line with this direction by her deceased husband, personal recognition of her own part was slight, and seems to have consisted of giving Harry a present of $5 when he married, and later a top buggy and a set of harness. It is true that of the father's estate the girls had distributed to them $952, and that the sons got as much; and it is true, also, that when the father died all the girls except Mrs. Putman were at home, and that the daughter Marie lived at home all the time until she married, except one fall. Since her marriage she has lived on a farm operated by her husband. The oldest daughter, Mrs. Putman, has lived in Woodbury county for many years, and was married 21 years before the trial. There is no evidence that either of the...
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