Miller v. Raytheon Co.

• Decision Date: 02 May 2013
• Docket Number: 11–10988.,Nos. 11–10586,s. 11–10586
• Parties: Richard MILLER, Plaintiff–Appellee Cross–Appellant v. RAYTHEON COMPANY, Defendant–Appellant Cross–Appellee. Richard Miller, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Raytheon Company, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

716 F.3d 138

Richard MILLER, Plaintiff–Appellee Cross–Appellant

v.RAYTHEON COMPANY, Defendant–Appellant Cross–Appellee.

Richard Miller, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Raytheon Company, Defendant–Appellee.

Nos. 11–10586, 11–10988.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 2, 2013.

Hal K. Gillespie, Yona Rozen, James Dennis Sanford, Gillespie, Rozen & Watsky, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee Cross–Appellant.

Michael Prospero Maslanka, William Engler Hammel, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, L.L.P., Ronald Wayne Chapman, Jr., Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Defendant–Appellant Cross–Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before JONES, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

A jury found that Raytheon Company (“Raytheon”) willfully violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), Tex. Lab.Code § 21.001 et seq., by terminating Richard Miller (“Miller”) because of his age. The district court denied Raytheon's motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), substantially reduced the jury's finding of $17 million in damages, and awarded attorneys' fees. Both parties appealed. We affirm the finding of liability, affirm in part the award of liquidated damages, and vacate the liquidated damages award for an enhanced pension because it was a future, not past loss, vacate the damages for mental anguish, reject Miller's issues on cross-appeal, and remand for reconsideration of the front pay award.

I. Background

Miller worked for Raytheon or a predecessor company for almost three decades in a variety of roles, primarily in supply chain management. In 2006, Miller was moved to a stand-alone role working on special projects, where he reported to Robert Lyells (“Lyells”). Miller initially performed well in his new position, earning a “Meets Expectations” rating in March 2007. After failing to meet some deadlines, however, Miller received a “Needs Improvement” rating on his 2007 mid-year review.

Raytheon initiated a reduction in force (“RIF”) in early 2008. Like all other managers, Lyells reviewed his employees for a possible headcount reduction. Raytheon policy dictated that Lyells evaluate his employees, subdivide them into “decisional units,” rank them based on a four-factor analysis, and develop a list of employees to recommend for reduction.

Lyells placed the then 53–year–old Miller and four other employees (ages 34, 49, 54, and 55) in decisional units that were considered for termination. A 46–year–old woman who worked in the same organization as Miller and had similar job responsibilities was placed in a decisional unit that was not considered for the RIF. Lyells testified that he recommended that Miller be included in the layoff after determining that Miller's job function was non-essential and his duties could be absorbed by three other employees. Although Miller was purportedly targeted for the RIF due to a budgetary shortfall, at that time Miller's job was neither charged to Lyells's budget nor costing his organization any money. The only employee in the RIF pool not recommended for termination was the 34–year–old. Lyells offered that younger employee retraining and identified a new task for her.

Because Miller had more than twenty years of service, Raytheon's internal Long Service Review Board (“LSRB”) reviewed Lyells's lay off proposal. The LSRB directed Human Resources Director Allen Reid and Lyells to search for job opportunities for Miller. Lyells contacted colleagues in other groups at Raytheon to determine whether there were any other positions that fit Miller's skills. He was told there were none, although Miller presented evidence at trial that he was qualifiedfor several positions. Based on the responses from Reid and Lyells, the LSRB approved the layoff. Lyells and Reid terminated Miller at a meeting on March 13, 2008. Miller and his wife testified that the layoff made Miller feel “sucker-punched” and caused him chest pain, back pain, sleep disturbances, and emotional problems.

Miller used Raytheon's internal job board and worked with the human resources (“HR”) department to find a new job at Raytheon. On March 27, 2008, Miller met with Amos Wilson from HR and complained that he would be unable to get another job at Raytheon due to his “Needs Improvement” rating. Wilson told Miller to apply for jobs at a lower salary grade and in a different group. When Miller asked Wilson why he would not be considered for a job in the supply chain group, Wilson simply responded, “Because you wouldn't be considered.” Miller applied for four jobs at Raytheon, but he was not re-hired.¹

Miller filed claims for age discrimination against Raytheon in federal district court under the ADEA and the TCHRA. His Complaint asserted that Raytheon (1) terminated him because of his age; and (2) failed to consider, assist, or place him in another job due to his age. At trial, however, the jury was only asked whether Raytheon discharged Miller because of his age. The jury found that Raytheon terminated Miller in willful violation of both statutes and awarded $352,179 in back pay and $227,000 in lost pension benefits, both of which were doubled as ADEA liquidated damages; $1 million in mental anguish damages; and $15 million in punitive damages pursuant to TCHRA.

Raytheon filed motions for JMOL and a new trial. In denying the motion for JMOL, the district court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings; ruled that lost pension benefits were a proper element of back pay rather than front pay; approved liquidated damages based on the jury's finding of willfulness; remitted the jury's award of $1 million in mental anguish damages to $100,000; declined to award punitive damages in order to prevent a double recovery; and awarded Miller $186,628, approximately one year's front pay. The district court did not rule on Raytheon's motion for a new trial. After the district court entered judgment, Miller moved for $711,323 in attorneys' fees. The court granted the motion in part, reducing the number of hours and the hourly rate for an award of $488,437.08. Both parties appealed.

II. Discussion

Raytheon argues that the district court erred in (1) denying JMOL because the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding of age discrimination under the ADEA and TCHRA; (2) refusing to grant its motion for a new trial; (3) concluding the evidence supported the jury's finding of willful discrimination; (4) allowing the jury to consider as back pay the loss of pension benefits set to vest by the trial date; and (5) concluding that the evidence supported the jury's finding of mental anguish. In his cross-appeal, Miller argues that the district court erred in (1) denying recovery for both liquidated damages under the ADEA and punitive damages under the TCHRA; (2) concluding that the non-economic damages cap under the TCHRA is constitutional according to Texas law; (3) awarding front pay from the date of the verdict rather than from the date of judgment; (4) denying prejudgment interest; and (5) reducing the attorneys' fees. We address each issue in turn.

A. Raytheon's Claims1. Judgment as a Matter of Law

We review a district court's denial of a motion for JMOL de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd., 650 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir.2011). “The jury's verdict can only be overturned if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find as the jury did.” Guile v. United States, 422 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir.2005) (internal quotation omitted).

The ADEA and the TCHRA prohibit employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual because of his or her age. McClaren v. Morrison Mgmt. Specialists, Inc., 420 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.2005). The familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies to both statutes. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir.2001). Under this framework, the employee carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir.2005). If he succeeds, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employment. Id. If the employer satisfies this burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove either that the employer's proffered reason was not true—but was instead a pretext for age discrimination—or that, even if the employer's reason is true, he was terminated because of his age. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2352, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009).² “[W]hen, as here, a case has been fully tried on its merits, we do not focus on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme.” Smith v. Berry Co., 165 F.3d 390, 394 (5th Cir.1999). Instead, we inquire whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of age discrimination. Id.

At trial, Miller presented undisputed evidence that Raytheon made erroneous statements in its EEOC position statement. Miller was told not to apply for jobs in supply chain management and was not selected for a new job at Raytheon, despite Raytheon's policy of searching “every corner of the earth” and “exhausting all opportunities to place the individual” before releasing an employee pursuant to a RIF. Although Raytheon emphasizes that these actions occurred after Miller's termination, the jury was entitled to view them as circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Norris v. Hartmarx Specialty Stores, Inc., 913 F.2d 253, 256 (5th Cir.1990); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2108, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“In appropriate circumstances,...