Miller v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 10 September 1897
• Citation: 169 Mass. 134,47 N.E. 585
• Parties: MILLER v. ROBERTS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

169 Mass. 134

47 N.E. 585

MILLER v. ROBERTS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

September 10, 1897

COUNSEL

C.T. Phelps, for plaintiff.

M.E Couch, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

The principle of law on which this action is founded is that if one has received money or other property as the consideration of an executory contract which cannot be enforced, by reason of the statute of frauds, and if he then refuses to perform the contract, he is liable to the other party under an implied promise to return the money or pay for the property. Dix v. Marcy, 116 Mass. 416; Root v. Burt, 118 Mass. 521; Cook v. Doggett, 2 Allen, 439; Basford v. Pearson, 9 Allen, 387; Abbott v Draper, 4 Denio, 51. The evidence showed conclusively that the defendant had received a deed of the plaintiff's farm, running to a third person for his benefit under an oral contract to convey to the plaintiff another farm of greater value, taking back a mortgage upon it for $3,000 to cover the difference. It was undisputed that he had neglected for a long time to make the conveyance of the other farm, and that he finally sold and conveyed it to other parties, thus putting it out of his power to perform his contract with the plaintiff. The principal questions in the case are: First, whether the defendant's conduct in selling and conveying away his farm was a breach of his oral contract with the plaintiff, which made him liable for the value of the plaintiff's farm, as property then in his hands, for which the expected consideration had failed, or whether the sale was made under an arrangement with the plaintiff which would give the plaintiff a remedy in another form; and, secondly, if the sale was made in violation of his contract, whether it was a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to recover that he should return all the benefits that he had received under the contract. The defendant's sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, fourteenth, and fifteenth requests for rulings relate to the first of these questions; his first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and thirteenth, to the second. The twelfth and sixteenth requests are sufficiently answered by the proposition at the beginning of this opinion.

In regard to the first of these questions the presiding judge instructed the jury, in substance, that, in order to recover the plaintiff must prove that, although he had done nothing to vary the original contract, the defendant put the property out of his hands, so that he could not convey it to the plaintiff, and did it without any understanding between the parties that it should be done for the plaintiff's benefit. Under the instructions the jury could not have returned their verdict for the plaintiff without finding that the sale was made without his consent, in violation of the oral contract. Although the instructions were not as full as they might have been in regard to possible aspects of the evidence, we think that they must have been understood by the jury as presenting the simple question, did the defendant sell the property on his own account, without the consent of the plaintiff, while the oral contract remained unchanged?...