Miller v. Runyon

• Decision Date: 28 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1:98CV00700.,1:98CV00700.
• Citation: 88 F.Supp.2d 461
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: James B. MILLER, Plaintiff, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Jr. in his official capacity as United States Postmaster General General, Defendant.

88 F.Supp.2d 461

James B. MILLER, Plaintiff, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Jr. in his official capacity as United States Postmaster General General, Defendant.

No. 1:98CV00700.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

February 28, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Regan A. Miller, Charlotte, North Carolina, for plaintiff.

Gill P. Beck, Office of U.S. Attorney, Greensboro, NC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BEATY, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Document # 7]. Also before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Strike Jury Demand as to Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act Claim [Document # 9]. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. In addition, Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand is GRANTED.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff, James B. Miller's ("Plaintiff' or "Miller") claims that the United States Postal Service ("Defendant" or "the Agency") discriminated against him in violation of §§ 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 and 794¹ and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.² Miller, a black male, received a career appointment with the United States Postal Service as a mail handler on March 16, 1986. (Pl.'s Brief in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Brief") at 4.) While working as a carrier for the Agency, Miller injured his knee and, on February 21, 1990, was removed from the carrier classification. He was offered a modified part time position in the clerk classification. (Id. at 5.) Miller's modified position was to include work as a window clerk. Believing that he had not received the training and work assignments promised to him in his modified position, Miller filed a discrimination complaint in August of 1990.

Miller alleges that after filing his complaint in 1990, his work hours began to decrease, even though he claims there was work available that he could have performed. (Id. at 6.) Miller also alleges that he was subjected to disparaging remarks about his disability, that he was given more difficult tasks than white employees, and was not offered the training necessary to allow him to work as a window clerk. (Id. at 6-7.) On October 15, 1991, Miller contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") Counselor and alleged that he was treated less favorably than a white female employee. Miller's final contact with the counselor was November 21, 1991. On December 5, 1991, Miller filed an administrative complaint (the "1991 EEO Complaint") in which he claimed that on October 15, 1991, he was discriminated against because of his race, sex, physical disability, and retaliated against for his August, 1990 EEO contact. (Def.'s Brief in Supp. of Mot. to Dism. or in the Alt. for Summ.Jud. ("Def.'s Brief") at 2.) In a statement attached to his 1991 EEO Complaint, Miller explained in greater detail the basis of his charge. In particular, he complained that he was treated less favorably in terms of the type of work and hours of work assigned in comparison with a white female co-worker. He specifically requested equitable distribution of work hours between his co-worker and himself. However, Miller did not mention in any manner an allegation of harassment due to his disability by his supervisors or co-workers in his 1991 EEO Complaint or the statement attached to that Complaint.

On December 3, 1992, Miller and the Agency settled the 1991 EEO Complaint. In the settlement agreement, Miller agreed to withdraw his complaint in return for the promise that he would be assigned hours on an equitable basis and would be given window training, upon approval by a doctor. (Id. at 3; Pl.'s Ex. B.) The settlement agreement also provided that if the Agency failed to adhere to the terms of the settlement, the Agency would, on Miller's written request, "reinstate the complaint for further processing from the point processing ceased under the terms of this agreement." (Pl.'s Ex. B.)

On February 10, 1994, believing that the Agency had breached the settlement agreement, Miller wrote a letter, addressed to an "EEO Counselor/Investigator," and requested that his case be reinstated. (Pl.'s Ex. C.) In this letter, Miller did not allege that the Agency had engaged in any additional discriminatory acts other than those that served as the basis for his 1991 EEO Complaint, nor did he request EEO counseling. On April 17, 1994, in a letter to the "EEOC," Miller claimed that the "primary reason" for the breach was that his supervisor, Steve Purser, did not provide reasonable accommodations for his disability. In addition, Miller claimed that in August of 1993, he was moved from his distribution position to a dispatch job without a written position description. Finally, Miller claimed that he had passed the written exam required of window clerks. (Pl.Ex.D.)

On March 31, 1995, in response to Miller's request, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations, issued a decision reinstating Miller's 1991 EEO Complaint. The decision included an Order, which stated that "[t]he agency ... is ORDERED to reinstate appellants complaint and to resume processing from the point processing ceased." (Pl. ex. E at 3.) Upon reinstatement, Miller's 1991 EEO Complaint was heard by an EEOC Administrative Judge on March 29, 1996. On or about June 3, 1996, the Administrative Judge issued a finding that Miller had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was discriminated against as alleged in his 1991 EEO Complaint. (Def.Ex. C-1 at 12.) The Postal Service issued a final agency decision on July 16, 1996, concurring with the Administrative Judge's finding of no discrimination. (Def.Ex. C-2 at 2.) On August 14, 1996, Miller appealed the Postal Service's final agency decision to the EEOC. At the time Miller filed the present action, on June 26 1998, more than 180 days had passed since Miller appealed the final agency decision to the EEOC. (Compl. ¶ 17.)

In its decision ordering that Miller's 1991 EEO Complaint be reinstated, the EEOC had specifically noted that Miller claimed that he had been subjected to discrimination when he was reassigned to a dispatch position in August, 1993. (Pl. Ex.D.) The decision then stated: "As it appears that [Miller] has not received counseling with regard to that allegation, he is instructed to contact an EEO Counselor within 15 days of receiving this decision if he wishes to pursue the matter." (Id.) On April 13, 1995, less than 15 days after the EEOC issued its order reinstating Miller's 1991 EEO Complaint, Miller contacted an EEO Counselor regarding his claim of alleged discrimination involving the reassignment of job duties that occurred in August, 1993. At the conclusion of counseling, Miller filed a formal complaint regarding this second allegation of discrimination on July 22, 1995 (the "1995 EEO Complaint"). In the 1995 EEO Complaint, Miller claimed that he was discriminated against because "[he] was reassigned to a dispatch clerk position which forced [him] too [sic] work outside walking and lifting limitations. Work hours were decreased. Malicious intent due too [sic] race, sex, disability, prior EEO activity." (Gov.Ex.C-7.) The 1995 EEO Complaint further stated that the date of discrimination was "approximately" August 1, 1993. On August 14, 1995, the Agency dismissed Miller's 1995 EEO Complaint for untimely EEO Counselor contact. (Gov.Ex.C-4.) On August 14, 1996, the EEOC affirmed the final agency decision to dismiss Miller's 1995 EEO Complaint on the same grounds. (Gov.Ex.C-5.) On May 21, 1998, the EEOC denied Miller's request for reconsideration as to the 1995 EEO Complaint. (Gov.Ex.C-6.)

On June 26, 1998, Miller filed the case that is now before this Court. In this Complaint, Miller seeks recovery under §§ 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Miller seeks to recover based on the allegations of discrimination contained in both his 1991 and 1995 EEO Complaints, as well as on a theory of harassment based on disability not raised in either of his EEO Complaints. Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment that is now before the Court. Defendant has also filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand as to his Rehabilitation Act Claim. The Court will consider these motions in turn.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56. Defendant's motion raised two primary issues: 1) whether Miller had exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to the claims asserted in his Complaint filed with this Court; and 2) whether Miller could establish a prima facie case to support his claims or discrimination and retaliation. On the same day that Plaintiff filed his response to Defendant's motion, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Motion for Summary Judgment [Document # 12]. In support of that motion, Miller's counsel filed an affidavit in which he stated that he needed additional time to obtain reports from physicians to more clearly establish that Miller had a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation Act. Miller's counsel also stated that he needed more time to discover documents regarding Miller's qualifications and availability for work. Miller's counsel also wanted to gather information regarding the motives behind the Agency's actions. Magistrate Judge Sharpe issued an order granting Miller's motion to extend time to respond to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ordering that discovery would be opened...